Chapman v. Silber
760 N.E.2d 329, 97 N.Y.2d 9, 734 N.Y.S.2d 541 (2001)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
In the absence of controlling legislation, a landlord may be charged with constructive notice of a hazardous lead paint condition, precluding summary judgment, if the landlord (1) retained a right of entry and assumed a duty to make repairs, (2) knew the apartment was constructed at a time before lead-based interior paint was banned, (3) was aware that paint was peeling on the premises, (4) knew of the hazards of lead-based paint to young children, and (5) knew that a young child lived in the apartment.
Facts:
- In August 1994, James and Sallie Chapman rented the second-floor apartment at 443 Myrtle Avenue in Albany from Dennis, Jay, and Gertrude Silber, with Dennis and Gertrude later conveying their interests to Jay Silber and Judith Harrington (collectively, 'landlord').
- The Chapmans moved into the apartment with their three children, including one-year-old Jaquan; Mrs. Chapman observed old window sills and chipped/peeling paint on the second-floor porch before and shortly after moving in.
- The two-year lease between the parties stated the tenant must maintain and repair the apartment but also explicitly granted the landlord the right to enter to repair, inspect, install, or perform other necessary work.
- By spring 1995, the Chapmans noticed the paint on their porch had deteriorated, and paint in window tracks was chipped and peeling, with an accumulation of paint chips and dust on the sills, especially as windows were opened.
- Between April and July 1995, Mrs. Chapman complained to defendant Jay Silber twice about large chunks of peeling paint on the front porch; Jay Silber subsequently paid James Chapman $300 to paint the porch.
- Dennis Silber, Jay Silber, and Judith Harrington were present in the apartment at various times during the tenancy and observed the paint condition; the defendants knew the building was old (early 1900s) and at least some of them (Dennis, Gertrude, Judith) were aware of the general hazards of lead paint to children.
- About one month after moving in, Jaquan had a moderately elevated blood lead level, which persisted; by August 1995, his levels were so dangerously high that he was hospitalized after the City of Albany inspected and detected the presence of lead paint on the premises.
Procedural Posture:
- In Chapman v Silber, James and Sallie Chapman commenced an action in New York Supreme Court (trial court) against Dennis, Jay, and Gertrude Silber, and Judith Harrington, alleging common-law negligence and other claims.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing lack of notice regarding the lead-based paint condition.
- The Supreme Court denied all defendants’ motions for summary judgment, finding issues of fact as to notice.
- The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court's order and granted summary judgment, dismissing the complaint against the defendants.
- The plaintiffs (Chapmans) were granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.
- In Stover v Robilotto, Carlisa Stover commenced an action in New York Supreme Court (trial court) against her landlord, James O’Connor, alleging common-law negligence.
- The Supreme Court granted defendant O'Connor's motion for summary judgment, concluding he did not have notice of a hazardous lead paint condition.
- The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's order.
- The plaintiff (Stover) was granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a landlord have constructive notice of a lead paint hazard, sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment in a negligence claim, when the landlord (1) retained a right of entry and a duty to make repairs, (2) knew the apartment was built before lead paint was banned, (3) was aware of peeling paint, (4) knew of lead paint dangers to children, and (5) knew a young child resided there?
Opinions:
Majority - Ciparick, J.
Yes, a landlord can be charged with constructive notice of a lead paint hazard, sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment in a negligence claim, when the landlord retained a right of entry and a duty to make repairs, knew the apartment was built before lead paint was banned, was aware of peeling paint, knew of lead paint dangers to children, and knew a young child resided there. The Court explained that New York State has not enacted legislation specifically imposing a duty on landlords to test for or abate lead-based paint hazards without official notification. However, this absence is not fatal to an action, as a landlord may still be liable for negligence under traditional common-law principles. The Court rejected a rule that would allow landlords to shield themselves from liability by deliberately refraining from testing for lead, which is undetectable by the senses. Instead, it articulated a framework where a jury could infer constructive notice if a landlord knew of multiple conditions indicating a high degree of risk. The Chapman landlords met these criteria: they had a contractual right of entry, assumed a duty to make repairs (evidenced by one defendant's testimony), knew the building's age (implying lead paint), were aware of chipped and peeling paint through tenant complaints and personal observations, knew of lead paint dangers, and knew a young child lived in the apartment. This combination of knowledge created a triable issue of fact regarding whether they should have known of the lead paint hazard. Conversely, in Stover, the plaintiff failed to provide evidence that the landlord was on actual or constructive notice of peeling paint inside the apartment, leading to the affirmation of summary judgment dismissal for that case.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies and expands the scope of landlord liability for lead paint hazards in New York by defining specific criteria for constructive notice. It prevents landlords from avoiding responsibility merely by not explicitly knowing lead is present in paint, thereby closing a potential loophole. The ruling emphasizes a landlord's responsibility to act on multiple warning signs when a vulnerable population (young children) is at risk, aligning landlord duties with traditional premises liability. It sets a precedent that will likely make it easier for plaintiffs in similar cases to overcome summary judgment motions and proceed to trial, especially in the absence of specific state-level lead paint abatement legislation.
