Chandler v. Gene Messer Ford, Inc.
81 S.W.3d 493, 2002 WL 1477431 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
A product manufacturer may be liable for a marketing defect if its warning is inadequate or ambiguous, and a plaintiff's failure to read such a warning does not automatically break the causal chain. The plaintiff may still benefit from the legal presumption that an adequate warning would have been read and heeded if a fact issue exists as to whether the provided warning was sufficient to apprise the consumer of the specific risk.
Facts:
- Philip and Ronda Chandler expressed safety concerns about small cars for their children to a Gene Messer Ford salesman.
- The salesman assured the Chandlers that the Ford Aspire, equipped with dual airbags, was a safe choice for their children and safer than a competing car without a passenger-side airbag.
- Relying on these assurances, the Chandlers purchased the Ford Aspire.
- The Aspire's sun visor had a warning label stating, 'An inflating air bag can seriously injure small children.'
- The car's owner's manual defined 'small children' as those four years old or younger and weighing 40 pounds or less.
- In May 1995, the Chandlers' seven-year-old son, Philip Jr., who weighed approximately 60-65 pounds, was riding in the front passenger seat during a collision.
- The passenger-side airbag deployed, and Philip Jr. suffered a severe closed-head injury, which the Chandlers alleged was caused or enhanced by the airbag.
- Mr. Chandler admitted in his deposition that he had not read the warnings provided in the vehicle.
Procedural Posture:
- Philip and Ronda Chandler sued Carrie Kinkier Smith, Ford Motor Company, and Gene Messer Ford in a Texas trial court for negligence, product liability, and other claims.
- Ford and Gene Messer Ford filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the Chandlers' claims for misrepresentation, Deceptive Trade Practices Act violations, and marketing defect.
- The trial court granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment without specifying the grounds.
- Following the ruling, the Chandlers non-suited their remaining causes of action, which made the judgment final.
- The trial court then dismissed the defendants' cross-claim against Smith.
- The Chandlers, as appellants, appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Texas Court of Appeals, Eleventh District, at Eastland.
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Issue:
Does a product warning that cautions against risks to 'small children,' coupled with the consumer's admission that he did not read the warning, entitle a manufacturer to summary judgment on a marketing defect claim when the consumer's seven-year-old child is injured by the product?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Terry McCall
No. A genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether a warning regarding 'small children' was adequate to inform a consumer of the risk to a seven-year-old child, and a consumer's failure to read an allegedly inadequate warning does not, as a matter of law, negate causation. The court affirmed summary judgment on the misrepresentation, DTPA, and breach of warranty claims, but reversed on the marketing defect claim. The court reasoned that the salesman's statements were private opinions ('puffing'), not public misrepresentations under Section 402B. The DTPA claims failed because the Chandlers did not produce evidence that the safety claims were false or that Ford intentionally concealed a known risk. However, for the marketing defect claim under Section 402A, the court found the term 'small children' in the warning was ambiguous. Because the owner's manual defined 'small children' in a way that excluded the seven-year-old victim, a fact question existed as to the warning's adequacy. Citing Stewart, the court held that a plaintiff who fails to read a warning is not precluded from the presumption that an adequate warning would have been heeded if the warning that was provided was itself inadequate. Therefore, summary judgment on the marketing defect claim was improper.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the causation element in Texas failure-to-warn cases by limiting the application of the rule from General Motors Corp. v. Saenz. It establishes that a defendant cannot use a plaintiff's failure to read a warning as a definitive defense on summary judgment if the warning itself is arguably ambiguous or inadequate for the specific risk that materialized. The case reinforces the policy of encouraging manufacturers to provide clear and specific warnings by ensuring that vague warnings do not provide an easy escape from liability. It preserves the plaintiff's ability to rely on the presumption of causation, shifting the focus to a jury's determination of the warning's adequacy rather than the plaintiff's conduct in not reading it.
