Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd.
104 L. Ed. 2d 113, 490 U.S. 122, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 2026 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
The Warsaw Convention’s limitation on damages for passenger injury or death is not eliminated if an international air carrier fails to provide notice of that limitation in the specific type size required by the Montreal Agreement, as long as a passenger ticket was delivered.
Facts:
- On September 1, 1983, a Korean Air Lines, Ltd. (KAL) Boeing 747 en route from New York to Seoul, South Korea, was destroyed over the Sea of Japan by a military aircraft of the Soviet Union.
- All 269 persons on board the KAL flight perished in the incident.
- Survivors of the victims filed wrongful-death actions against KAL.
- KAL was a party to the Montreal Agreement, an accord among carriers that raised the per-passenger damages limitation for personal injury or death from approximately $8,300 (under the Warsaw Convention) to $75,000.
- The Montreal Agreement required participating carriers to provide passengers with written notice of the Convention’s damage limitations in print size no smaller than 10-point type.
- The notice of liability rules printed on KAL’s passenger tickets for the flight in question appeared in only 8-point type.
Procedural Posture:
- Survivors of the victims filed wrongful-death actions against KAL in several Federal District Courts.
- All these actions were transferred for pretrial proceedings to the District Court for the District of Columbia.
- Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment, seeking a declaration that KAL's use of 8-point type deprived it of the damages limitation.
- On July 25, 1985, the District Court for the District of Columbia denied the motion, finding that neither the Warsaw Convention nor the Montreal Agreement prescribed the elimination of the damages limitation as a sanction for defective notice.
- On September 24, 1985, the District Court certified for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) the question of whether KAL was entitled to the damages limitation despite its defective tickets.
- The District of Columbia Circuit (appellate court) allowed the appeal and affirmed the District Court's decision, adopting its opinion in full.
- The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals (specifically, the Second and Fifth Circuits were in disagreement with the District of Columbia Circuit’s resolution).
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Issue:
Does an international air carrier lose the benefit of the Warsaw Convention’s limitation on damages for passenger injury or death if it fails to provide notice of that limitation in the 10-point type size required by a private accord, the Montreal Agreement?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Scalia
No, an international air carrier does not lose the benefit of the Warsaw Convention’s limitation on damages for passenger injury or death merely because it fails to provide notice of that limitation in the 10-point type size required by the Montreal Agreement. The Court held that neither Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention nor the Montreal Agreement imposes a sanction for failure to provide “adequate” notice of the liability limitation, such as a specific type size. Petitioners conceded that the Montreal Agreement itself imposes no sanction for non-compliance with its type requirement. The only sanction for ticket-related issues in Article 3 appears in the second clause of Article 3(2), which removes liability limits only if a carrier "accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket having been delivered." The Court rejected the interpretation that "nondelivery of a ticket" includes delivery of a ticket with inadequate notice. It reasoned that the first sentence of Article 3(2) specifies that "[t]he... irregularity... of the passenger ticket shall not affect the existence or the validity of the contract of transportation," and this explicitly covers defects like insufficient notice. An "irregularity" does not prevent a document from being a "passenger ticket" and does not eliminate the damages limitation. Therefore, an 8-point type notice, though defective, is not equivalent to failing to deliver any ticket at all. The Court further supported its interpretation by comparing Article 3(2) with Articles 4(4) (baggage checks) and 9 (air waybills). Unlike Article 3, Articles 4 and 9 explicitly impose sanctions for failure to include certain particulars (including the liability notice) in addition to sanctions for non-delivery of the document. This differential treatment indicates that the drafters deliberately chose not to impose a similar sanction for defective notice on passenger tickets. The Court emphasized that where the text of a treaty is clear, courts have no power to insert an amendment or supply a casus omissus, even if extrinsic evidence or speculation about the drafters' intent suggests a different result.
Concurring - Justice Brennan
Yes, it is plausible that the Warsaw Convention does sanction failure to provide notice of its applicability with loss of its limit on liability, and notice that is not minimally legible is no notice at all. However, KAL's 8-point notice was adequate and did not trigger this sanction. Justice Brennan agreed with the judgment but disagreed with the majority's strict textualist approach, arguing that the Court should have considered the "wealth of evidence to be found in the Convention's drafting history on the intent of the governments that drafted the document." He argued that Article 3(1)'s description of a ticket ("a passenger ticket which shall contain the following particulars") could be read as shorthand for a ticket containing all requirements, implying that a ticket without a particular could be seen as "not delivered" for purposes of the sanction. He also argued the first sentence of Article 3(2) means the contract is subject to all rules, including the rule denying the liability limit for certain failures. He reviewed the drafting history, noting that early drafts clearly intended to apply the same sanctions regime to passenger tickets, baggage checks, and air waybills, and that loss of liability limits was intended as a means to compel carriers to include essential particulars. He suggested the final text's ambiguity in Article 3 regarding notice might have been an unintended consequence of combining amendments. However, even accepting an "adequate notice" requirement, Justice Brennan found KAL's 8-point notice to be "adequate" under a conventional interpretation, distinguishing it from "Lilliputian print" (4-point type) that would be "virtually invisible" as in Lisi v. Alitalia. He rejected the argument that the Montreal Agreement's 10-point type requirement established a bright-line standard for "adequate notice" under the Warsaw Convention, as the Montreal Agreement is a private accord and neither it nor related FAA regulations state that failure to comply results in loss of the Convention’s liability limits; rather, the sanction for non-compliance with the Agreement would be administrative penalties.
Analysis:
This case reinforces a strict textualist approach to treaty interpretation, emphasizing that courts should not infer sanctions or exceptions not explicitly stated in the treaty's text, even if extrinsic evidence (like drafting history) suggests a different intent or a perceived "absurd" outcome. It highlights the importance of precise drafting in international agreements. The decision limits the ability of domestic courts to unilaterally define "adequate notice" requirements for treaty benefits, placing the burden on treaty signatories to amend the treaty if they desire different sanctions. This ruling provides greater certainty for international air carriers regarding their liability under the Warsaw Convention, as long as a ticket is physically delivered, regardless of minor defects in the notice's presentation.
