Cernauskas v. Fletcher
211 Ark. 678, 1947 Ark. LEXIS 596, 201 S.W.2d 999 (1947)
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Rule of Law:
A city possesses the power to vacate public alleys, especially those not dedicated by plat, for corporate purposes, and a party asserting a prescriptive easement must specifically allege continuous use for the statutory minimum period.
Facts:
- The Catholic Bishop of the Diocese of Little Rock (appellee) owned Block 299 in the original city of Little Rock, which was bounded by Garland, Cross, Markham, and Pulaski streets, and had never been platted into lots.
- An alley-way ran east and west through the middle of Block 299, but there were no improvements built directly adjacent to this alley.
- Appellant resided on the west side of Pulaski Street, between Markham and Garland, and used the alley for 'many years' as a convenient, though not necessary, passage-way for his automobile.
- A manufacturing concern desired to locate in Little Rock and required a large enough building to house its various branches.
- The Catholic Bishop was willing to construct a sufficiently large building on Block 299 to accommodate the manufacturing concern, provided the alley was closed.
- On August 6, 1946, the Little Rock city council passed Ordinance No. 7087, formally closing the alley.
- Later, Ordinance No. 7147 was passed, reclassifying the property in Block 299 to a 'class 'K' heavy industrial district.'
Procedural Posture:
- Appellant initiated an action in a trial court (court of first instance) seeking an injunction to prevent the Catholic Bishop of the Diocese of Little Rock from closing the alley.
- Appellant's complaint alleged, among other things, that the Catholic Bishop's petition to close the alley did not comply with Act 17 of 1945 and that appellant had a prescriptive right to use the alley.
- The Catholic Bishop (appellee in this court) filed a demurrer to the appellant's complaint.
- The trial court sustained the demurrer.
- Appellant elected to stand on his complaint, refusing to amend it.
- The trial court dismissed the complaint for want of equity.
- Appellant appealed the trial court's decision to the Arkansas Supreme Court (this court).
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Issue:
Does a city council have the authority to close a public alley that was never formally platted, without adhering to the specific requirements of Act 17 of 1945, and can an individual establish a prescriptive easement over such an alley by merely alleging its use for 'many years'?
Opinions:
Majority - McHaney, Justice
Yes, the city had the power to close the alley, and no, the appellant did not establish a prescriptive easement. The court determined that Act 17 of 1945 did not apply because it specifically governs alleys that have been dedicated to public use through platting and filing a record, a condition not met here as Block 299 was never platted. Instead, the city's authority to close the alley derived from § 9944, subsection Third, of Pope’s Digest, which grants cities the power to vacate portions of public grounds no longer required for corporate purposes. The court also held that the repealing clause of Act 17 should be construed to repeal only laws "in conflict herewith," thereby preserving the city's general powers under Pope's Digest. Regarding the prescriptive easement claim, the court found the appellant's allegation of using the alley 'for many years' insufficient, as 'many' is an indefinite term and does not confirm continuous use for the minimum seven-year statutory period required to establish such a right, citing McLain v. Keel.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the scope of municipal authority in managing public ways, particularly distinguishing between platted and unplatted properties when applying specific state statutes. It reinforces that general legislative grants of power (like those in Pope's Digest) remain valid unless explicitly and unambiguously repealed or superseded by conflicting special legislation. Furthermore, the decision sets a precedent for the strict pleading requirements for prescriptive easements, emphasizing that claimants must allege specific facts demonstrating compliance with statutory duration periods, not just vague temporal descriptions, to withstand a demurrer.
