Castro v. Melchor.
414 P.3d 53 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
Under Hawaii's survival statute (HRS § 663-7), the estate of a viable fetus that is stillborn as a result of a tortious act may recover hedonic damages for the loss of enjoyment of life. This recovery is supported by the legislature's intent for broad remedial application of tort statutes and the public policy of preventing tortfeasors from benefiting from inflicting greater harm.
Facts:
- Leah Castro, an inmate at O'ahu Community Correctional Center (OCCC), was approximately seven months pregnant.
- On June 30, 2007, correctional officers forced Castro to the ground.
- In early July 2007, a nurse practitioner at OCCC ordered an OBGYN consultation and an ultrasound for Castro, but these were never performed during her month-long stay there.
- Following the incident, Castro began experiencing vaginal bleeding and made four to five reports to correctional officers between July 2 and August 2, 2007, but she received no medical care for these complaints.
- On August 10, 2007, after being transferred to another facility, a midwife could not detect a fetal heartbeat and Castro was immediately transported to Kapi'olani Medical Center.
- At the hospital, an ultrasound confirmed the fetus, named Briandalynne, was dead, and she was delivered stillborn.
- An autopsy determined that Briandalynne was a healthy, near-term fetus with no congenital abnormalities and that her death was caused by a placental abruption related to the vaginal bleeding, occurring between July 29 and August 4, 2007.
Procedural Posture:
- Leah Castro, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Briandalynne, filed a complaint against the State of Hawai'i, the Hawai'i Department of Public Safety (HDPS), and several employees in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (trial court).
- The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing a stillborn fetus's estate cannot bring a claim, which the trial court initially granted but subsequently reversed on its own motion.
- Following a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of Castro, awarding damages to her individually for emotional distress and loss of consortium, and to Briandalynne's estate for loss of enjoyment of life.
- The defendants, as appellants, appealed the judgment to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA).
- The ICA affirmed the trial court's judgment in a published opinion.
- The defendants, as petitioners, filed an application for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Hawai'i, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does Hawaii's survival statute, HRS § 663-7, permit the estate of a stillborn, but previously viable, fetus to recover damages for loss of enjoyment of life?
Opinions:
Majority - Recktenwald, C.J.
Yes. Hawaii's survival statute permits the estate of a viable, unborn fetus to recover hedonic damages. The court's decision is based on four grounds: First, the legislative history of the survival and wrongful death statutes indicates a clear intent for broad, remedial application, which supports including a viable fetus. Second, Hawaii precedent does not require a decedent to have been conscious of their loss to recover for loss of enjoyment of life. Third, disallowing hedonic damages would not adequately compensate the estate, as recovery for conscious pain and suffering is unlikely. Fourth, allowing recovery for prenatal injuries if a child is born alive but not if the child dies creates a perverse incentive for tortfeasors, where causing greater harm (death) eliminates liability. To prevent maternal liability, the court states as a matter of law that a pregnant woman does not owe a legal duty of care to the fetus she carries.
Concurring - Nakayama, J.
Concurs in the judgment only. The court should affirm because the petitioners failed to challenge the Intermediate Court of Appeals' threshold holding that a viable fetus is a 'person' under the wrongful death statute in their application for certiorari. Had this critical issue been properly raised, I would have reversed the lower court and held that a fetus is not a 'person' for purposes of a wrongful death claim, consistent with the definition in Hawaii's penal code. If no cause of action for wrongful death exists, then no cause of action can 'survive' in favor of the estate under the survival statute, and no hedonic damages would be recoverable.
Dissenting - McKenna, J.
No. The award of hedonic damages to the estate of a stillborn fetus was legal error because a viable fetus does not qualify as a 'person' under Hawaii's wrongful death statute (HRS § 663-3), which is a prerequisite for a survival action. The plain language and legislative history of the statute, which was originally titled 'An Act to prevent homicides,' show no intent to include a fetus. The word 'person' is used in multiple contexts within the statute (decedent, tortfeasor, dependent), and it would be absurd to apply the term 'fetus' to all of them, violating principles of consistent statutory interpretation. Furthermore, Hawaii's expansive common law tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress already provides a sufficient remedy for the mother, eliminating the 'wrong without a remedy' concern.
Analysis:
This case establishes a significant new precedent in Hawaii by judicially extending the right to recover under the state's survival statute to the estate of a stillborn but viable fetus. The decision aligns Hawaii with the majority of U.S. jurisdictions but does so through a broad interpretation of legislative intent rather than explicit statutory language. The fractured nature of the court, with a strong dissent and a concurrence based only on procedural grounds, highlights the controversial nature of defining 'personhood' in tort law and suggests the issue may be revisited by the legislature. This ruling could expand liability for third parties in future prenatal injury cases while simultaneously creating a judicial exception to prevent maternal liability.
