Case v. Unified School District No. 233
157 F.3d 1243, 1998 Colo. J. C.A.R. 5254, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 25727 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
When calculating a reasonable attorney's fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a district court must set hourly rates based on evidence of the prevailing market rates in the community, not its own customary rates. While a court may make general reductions to the hours claimed, a drastic reduction requires a sufficient explanation that addresses the case's complexity and the opponent's litigation tactics.
Facts:
- A Kansas school district's school board made a decision to remove a book discussing homosexuality from the district's libraries.
- The school district also engaged in pre-distribution review and censorship of a student’s fliers that complained about the book’s removal.
- Attorneys recruited a group of students, their parents, and a teacher to challenge the school district's actions.
- The attorneys alleged the school district's actions violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and § 11 of the Kansas Bill of Rights.
- The underlying litigation was contentious and complex, involving extensive discovery including 3,263 pages of documents and twenty-seven depositions.
- Ultimately, the school district was ordered to return the book to its libraries, making the plaintiffs the 'prevailing party' in a civil rights action.
Procedural Posture:
- A group of students, parents, and a teacher (plaintiffs) sued a Kansas school district in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
- After a four-day bench trial, the district court ruled in favor of the remaining plaintiffs on their First Amendment and Kansas Bill of Rights claims, ordering the book returned to the libraries.
- The district court also dismissed some plaintiffs for lack of standing and ruled against the plaintiffs on their Fourteenth Amendment claim.
- As the prevailing party, the plaintiffs' attorneys (appellants) filed a motion requesting $481,330.83 in attorney's fees, expenses, and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
- The district court awarded the attorneys a total of $82,603.88.
- The attorneys appealed the district court's fee award to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
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Issue:
Did the district court abuse its discretion in calculating a reasonable attorney's fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 by (1) drastically reducing the number of compensable hours without sufficient explanation and (2) setting hourly rates based on its own customary practice instead of evidence of the prevailing market rates?
Opinions:
Majority - Henry, Circuit Judge.
Yes. The district court abused its discretion in calculating the fee award. A court must calculate a 'lodestar' figure by multiplying reasonable hours by a reasonable hourly rate. Here, the district court erred in setting the hourly rates by ignoring the market evidence presented by both parties and instead applying the rates it 'consistently grants.' The law requires rates to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for lawyers of comparable skill and experience. The court also abused its discretion by imposing a drastic 80% reduction in the attorneys' hours without providing a sufficient explanation. While general reductions for vague billing (e.g., 'conference'), background research, or time spent on losing claims are permissible, the sheer size of this reduction was improper in degree, especially given that the defendants' attorneys billed more than double the hours awarded to the plaintiffs. The court failed to explain why the defendants' hours were not relevant or to consider the 'responses necessitated by the maneuvering of the other side.' The court also erred by completely denying fees for preparing the fee application and by overlooking the hours of two attorneys. The court did not err, however, in disallowing fees for pre-recruitment time, an ACLU consultant with vague billing, unreasonable fax and copying costs, and undifferentiated Westlaw expenses. The case is remanded for a recalculation of the fee award consistent with these principles.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the boundaries of a district court's discretion in awarding attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. It establishes a firm precedent that hourly rates must be tied to objective market evidence, preventing judges from substituting their own 'customary' or personal rates. Furthermore, it creates a check on a court's power to make large, unexplained cuts to billable hours, requiring a reasoned justification that can be reviewed on appeal, particularly when the award is far below the hours spent by the losing party. The decision strengthens the enforcement of civil rights statutes by ensuring that prevailing attorneys are compensated in a manner that reflects market realities and the actual demands of contentious litigation.
