CARYN HALL YOST-RUDGE v. A TO Z PROPERTIES, INC.
263 So.3d 95 (2019)
Rule of Law:
Under Florida law, a homestead property's protections, including the requirement for spousal joinder in alienation, are not lost due to abandonment when the owner is involuntarily prevented from residing on the property by a court injunction, especially when there is evidence of continued intent to return.
Facts:
- Caryn Hall Yost-Rudge (wife) and her husband lived together on a property that the wife claimed to be their homestead.
- In March 2010, after a series of code compliance issues, the City of Stuart and Martin County deemed the property unsafe.
- A court ordered the wife and her family to vacate the property and enjoined them from occupying or residing on it, which they complied with, never resuming residence.
- In March 2015, the wife's husband sold the property to A to Z Properties, Inc., and Capital C, Inc., who later quit-claimed its interest to A to Z Properties, Inc. The wife was not a party to the warranty deed and did not consent to the sale.
- The wife asserted a continuing homestead interest in the property, arguing the transfer was legally insufficient without her signature and that she maintained an intent to return to the property after remediating its condition.
Procedural Posture:
- A to Z Properties, Inc. (buyer) filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Martin County (trial court/court of first instance), seeking to quiet title and for relief declaring that Caryn Hall Yost-Rudge (wife) and her husband had no homestead interest in the property.
- Caryn Hall Yost-Rudge (wife) answered the complaint, asserting that the property remained her homestead and that the transfer without her signature was legally insufficient.
- A to Z Properties, Inc. (buyer) moved for partial summary judgment against Caryn Hall Yost-Rudge (wife).
- The trial court entered partial final summary judgment in favor of A to Z Properties, Inc. (buyer), ruling that the property was not the homestead of the wife or her husband at the time of the sale.
- Caryn Hall Yost-Rudge (wife) appealed the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to the District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Fourth District.
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Issue:
Does being involuntarily prevented from occupying a homestead property by a court order due to municipal violations constitute abandonment, thereby nullifying the requirement for spousal consent to sell the property?
Opinions:
Majority - Levine, J.
No, being prevented from returning to the property due to an injunction for municipal violations was not an abandonment that destroyed the homestead protections of the property. The Florida Constitution's homestead provisions are construed liberally to protect the familial home. Once homestead status is acquired, it continues until abandoned or alienated in the manner provided by law, and a finding of abandonment requires a 'strong showing' of intent not to return. Whether a property has been abandoned is a fact-intensive inquiry determined by the totality of circumstances, with all doubts resolved against the party claiming abandonment. Florida courts have consistently held that a property is not abandoned for homestead purposes when the owner involuntarily ceases to reside on the property. The wife's involuntary removal from the property by court order, combined with evidence of her ongoing efforts to remediate the property and her intent to return, raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding her intent to abandon. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment, as the question of the wife’s intent was still in dispute.
Concurring - Warner, J.
I concur.
Concurring - Ciklin, J.
I concur.
Analysis:
This case underscores the strong legal protection afforded to homestead properties under the Florida Constitution, emphasizing that abandonment is not easily proven, especially in cases of involuntary absence. It establishes that being forced from a property by court order, even for an extended period, does not automatically extinguish homestead rights or the requirement for spousal consent to sell. The decision highlights the critical importance of a factual inquiry into the owner's intent to abandon, making summary judgment inappropriate where such intent remains disputed. This precedent reinforces the high standard for proving abandonment and ensures that homestead protections are not casually stripped away due to circumstances beyond an owner's control.
