Carver v. United States
164 U.S. 694, 1897 U.S. LEXIS 1704, 17 S. Ct. 228 (1897)
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Rule of Law:
A dying declaration admitted into evidence may be impeached by introducing proof of the declarant's other statements that are inconsistent with the declaration, without the necessity of first laying a foundation by questioning the declarant.
Facts:
- The defendant, Carver, and the deceased, Anna Maledon, had been in a friendly and apparently attached relationship for several years.
- On the evening of the incident, Carver made threats while apparently in an "alcoholic frenzy."
- Carver shot Anna Maledon.
- As she was dying, Maledon made a statement, known as a dying declaration, identifying Carver as the shooter.
- Maledon had also made other statements at different times that were inconsistent with her dying declaration, tending to show the shooting was not intentional.
Procedural Posture:
- Carver was prosecuted by the United States for the murder of Anna Maledon in a federal trial court.
- At trial, the prosecution's evidence included Maledon's dying declaration.
- The trial court refused to permit the defendant to introduce evidence of Maledon's prior statements that contradicted her dying declaration.
- The trial court also refused to allow the defendant's witnesses to testify about their version of a conversation that occurred immediately after the shooting, about which prosecution witnesses had already testified.
- Carver was convicted of murder.
- Carver, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the U.S. Supreme Court, and the United States was the appellee.
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Issue:
Is evidence of a deceased person's statements that contradict their dying declaration admissible to impeach the credibility of that declaration, even though no foundation was laid by questioning the declarant about the prior statements?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Brown
Yes, evidence of a deceased person's statements that contradict their dying declaration is admissible to impeach its credibility. Dying declarations are a hearsay exception admitted out of necessity, but they do not carry an assurance of absolute truth. Because the defendant is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, it would be a great hardship to prevent the defendant from introducing other evidence, such as prior inconsistent statements, to challenge the declaration's veracity. This situation is distinct from impeaching the prior trial testimony of a deceased witness, as in Mattox v. United States, because in that case, the witness had previously been subject to cross-examination, an opportunity that never exists with a dying declaration.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Brewer and Mr. Justice Peckham
These justices concurred in the judgment to reverse the conviction and order a new trial, but only on the grounds of the trial court's error in excluding the defendant's version of a conversation that occurred immediately after the shooting (the res gestae issue), not on the grounds related to impeaching the dying declaration.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a crucial procedural safeguard for defendants in homicide cases where a dying declaration is used as evidence. It carves out an exception to the traditional rule requiring a foundation for impeachment with prior inconsistent statements, recognizing the unique, ex parte nature of dying declarations. By allowing such declarations to be contradicted, the Court reinforces that they are not sacrosanct evidence and must be subject to scrutiny, thereby protecting the defendant's right to a fair trial in the absence of the ability to cross-examine their accuser.
