Carter v. Kentucky
101 S. Ct. 1112, 450 U.S. 288, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 77 (1981)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The Fifth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires a state trial judge to provide a “no-adverse-inference” jury instruction when a criminal defendant requests that the jury be instructed that their failure to testify cannot be used as an inference of guilt and should not prejudice them.
Facts:
- Officer Deborah Ellison observed two men stooped in an alley between Young’s Hardware Store and Edna’s Furniture Store, who then fled when she shined her spotlight.
- Officer Ellison found a hole in Young's Hardware Store and radioed Officer Leroy Davis about the fleeing men.
- Officer Davis pursued and apprehended Lonnie Joe Carter, who dropped a gym bag and a police radio tuned to a police band during the chase, and was wearing gloves.
- Officer Ellison later identified Carter as similar in height, weight, and clothing to one of the men but could not make a positive facial identification due to darkness.
- During his trial for third-degree burglary, Lonnie Joe Carter, after consulting with his defense counsel, decided not to testify because his prior felony convictions could be used to impeach his credibility.
- Lonnie Joe Carter's defense counsel then requested the trial court to give the jury a specific instruction: “The [defendant] is not compelled to testify and the fact that he does not cannot be used as an inference of guilt and should not prejudice him in any way.”
Procedural Posture:
- Lonnie Joe Carter was indicted in Kentucky for third-degree burglary and for being a persistent felony offender.
- A Kentucky state trial court jury found Carter guilty of both charges.
- Carter appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, arguing that the trial judge's refusal to give the requested 'no-adverse-inference' instruction violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
- The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the trial court's decision, finding no error and citing a state statute (Ky. Rev. Stat. § 421.225) which prohibits 'commenting upon' a defendant’s failure to testify.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider Carter's contention.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment, require a state trial judge to give a jury instruction that a defendant's failure to testify cannot be used as an inference of guilt, when such an instruction is requested by the defendant?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stewart
Yes, the Fifth Amendment requires that a criminal trial judge must give a “no-adverse-inference” jury instruction when requested by a defendant to do so. The Court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, means that a defendant must pay no court-imposed price for exercising the constitutional privilege not to testify, as established in Griffin v. California. The Court found that leaving a jury to speculate about a defendant's silence without a limiting instruction exacts an impermissible toll on the full and free exercise of this privilege, as jurors may naturally draw adverse inferences. While Bruno v. United States involved a federal statute, its reasoning was influenced by the absolute constitutional guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination. Lakeside v. Oregon underscored the 'salutary purpose' of such an instruction, recognizing its importance in removing unspoken adverse inferences from jury deliberations. Jurors are not legal experts and cannot be expected to understand the technical meaning of 'evidence' or the constitutional significance of silence without explicit guidance. Other general instructions, such as the presumption of innocence or determining guilt from 'evidence alone,' are not a sufficient substitute for a direct instruction on the meaning of the privilege against self-incrimination. The state's purported interest in protecting the defendant by avoiding 'comment' on their silence was specifically rejected in Lakeside, as such a cautionary instruction protects the very constitutional provision it is intended to safeguard.
Concurring - Justice Powell
Yes, the defendant was entitled to the requested jury instruction. Justice Powell joined the Court’s opinion, stating that the result is required by precedent, specifically Griffin v. California, even though he personally believes Griffin departed from the language and purpose of the Self-Incrimination Clause. He explained that Griffin held that neither the judge nor the prosecutor could suggest jurors draw inferences from a defendant’s failure to testify, due to the principle that a penalty for exercising a constitutional privilege cannot be tolerated. He noted his agreement with Justice Stewart's dissent in Griffin, which argued that the concept of compulsion was stretched beyond reasonable bounds and that jurors naturally realize when a defendant does not testify. However, since Griffin is established law, he concurred that the petitioner was entitled to the instruction.
Concurring - Justice Stevens
Yes, the defendant was entitled to the requested jury instruction. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan, concurred with the Court’s opinion but emphasized that the holding is limited to cases where the defendant has specifically requested that the jury be instructed not to draw an inference of guilt from the defendant’s failure to testify. He reiterated his conviction, previously expressed in his dissent in Lakeside v. Oregon, that the decision of whether such an instruction should be given in any specific case, like the decision of whether the defendant should testify, should rest with the defendant and their lawyer, not with the State.
Dissenting - Justice Rehnquist
No, the United States Constitution does not require a state trial judge to provide the requested instruction. Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court’s conclusion rests on a series of steps, only the first of which is directly traceable to the Constitution. He asserted that Bruno v. United States, a case relied upon by the majority, was decided under a federal statute and therefore has no relevance to state trial procedures in Kentucky. He contended that the constitutional privilege in the Fifth Amendment, even after its application to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, does not compel such an instruction. He further argued that Griffin v. California only prohibited adverse comment by the prosecution or judge on a defendant’s silence, and did not extend to requiring an affirmative 'no-inference' instruction. He criticized the majority for expanding the concept of 'burdens' and 'penalties' to the point where a criminal defendant can virtually dictate jury instructions, asserting that the formulation of state procedural rules should properly remain a matter of local concern.
Analysis:
This case significantly strengthens the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination, extending the principle from Griffin v. California by requiring an affirmative judicial instruction, rather than merely prohibiting adverse comment. It clarifies that a defendant's right not to testify carries a corresponding right to have the jury explicitly told that silence cannot be used against them. This ruling underscores the judiciary's responsibility to educate lay jurors on complex constitutional principles, particularly given the common misconception that silence implies guilt. The decision impacts trial strategy, ensuring that defense attorneys can request this safeguard to minimize juror speculation and uphold the defendant's right to a fair trial without facing an unconstitutional 'cost' for exercising their privilege.
