Carter v. Carter
526 So. 2d 141, 1988 WL 47490 (1988)
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Rule of Law:
Actions taken by adult children to assist an aging parent in executing a will, such as discussing the will's contents, procuring a draft from an attorney, and providing transportation for its signing, do not constitute active procurement for a claim of undue influence when such actions are consistent with a natural and dutiful familial relationship.
Facts:
- In 1971, Catherine S. Carter executed a will leaving her estate in equal shares to her three sons.
- In 1975, following her son Carl's divorce from Virginia, Catherine executed a codicil that reduced Carl's share, dividing it among Carl, Virginia, and their four children, including David Carter.
- After Catherine's husband died in 1983, her son James, who managed the family's business affairs, discussed her will with her.
- James informed his mother that his recently deceased father had wanted to change his own will back to its original form before he died.
- Catherine instructed James to have her will changed back to the original 1971 plan, which gave equal one-third shares to each of her sons.
- James had his attorney draft the new will per his mother's instructions, reviewed it with her in Miami, and left it with her for further consideration.
- Several days later, Catherine's other son, Carl, drove her to a local attorney's office where she executed the 1983 will in the presence of disinterested witnesses.
- Catherine S. Carter died in 1985.
Procedural Posture:
- David Ray Carter and Virginia Carter filed a petition in the probate trial court to revoke the 1983 will of Catherine S. Carter.
- The petitioners alleged that the will was the product of undue influence by the decedent's sons, Carl Carter, Jr. and James Carter.
- Following a hearing, the trial court judge found that the will was executed under undue influence and entered an order revoking it.
- Carl Ray Carter, Jr., a beneficiary of the revoked will, appealed the trial court's judgment to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District. Carl is the appellant; David and Virginia are the appellees.
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Issue:
Do the actions of two adult sons, who have a confidential relationship with their aging mother, constitute active procurement and undue influence when they assist her in changing her will back to a prior testamentary scheme that increases one son's inheritance?
Opinions:
Majority - Nesbitt, J.
No. The sons' actions did not constitute active procurement or undue influence because they were perfunctory activities performed by dutiful children assisting an aging parent. To establish undue influence, a contestant must prove the respondent: (1) occupied a confidential relationship, (2) was a substantial beneficiary, and (3) was active in procuring the will. While a confidential relationship existed, the court found the 'active procurement' element was not met. The court reasoned that James's discussion about the will was natural given his role in managing family affairs and the passage of time since the divorce that prompted the earlier change. The court characterized the sons' involvement as 'perfunctory physical activities' and the 'acts of dutiful sons,' distinguishing them from the sort of overreaching or coercion required for a finding of undue influence. It held that within a close family context, such assistance is not presumptively undue.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the 'active procurement' prong of the undue influence test, particularly within the context of adult children assisting elderly parents with estate planning. It establishes that actions which might be suspicious in other relationships are viewed through a different lens when performed by family members in a caregiving or supportive role. The ruling creates a significant hurdle for challengers alleging undue influence against dutiful children, reinforcing that natural family affection and assistance in end-of-life matters do not, by themselves, constitute improper influence. The case serves as a key precedent for distinguishing between legitimate familial assistance and manipulative conduct in will contests.
