Carson v. Makin
596 U. S. ____ (2022) (2022)
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Rule of Law:
A state that offers a generally available public benefit, such as a tuition assistance program for private secondary education, violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment if it excludes schools from eligibility simply because they are religious or provide religious instruction.
Facts:
- Maine has many rural school districts that do not operate their own public secondary schools.
- To provide education for students in these districts, Maine enacted a tuition assistance program where parents can choose an approved public or private school, and the state pays a portion of the tuition.
- Since 1981, Maine law has required that any private school receiving these tuition payments must be 'nonsectarian,' meaning it cannot promote a particular faith or teach subjects through the lens of a specific belief system.
- Petitioners David and Amy Carson, and Troy and Angela Nelson, lived in districts without public secondary schools.
- They sought to use the tuition assistance to send their children to Bangor Christian Schools and Temple Academy, respectively.
- Both Bangor Christian Schools and Temple Academy are accredited private schools but are ineligible for the program because they are considered sectarian due to their integration of religious teaching into the curriculum.
- The families would have used the state assistance to send their children to these schools if not for the 'nonsectarian' requirement.
Procedural Posture:
- David Carson and other parents sued the Commissioner of the Maine Department of Education in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine.
- The petitioners alleged that Maine's 'nonsectarian' requirement for its tuition program violated the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Equal Protection Clauses.
- The District Court, a federal trial court, rejected the claims and granted summary judgment to the Commissioner.
- The petitioners appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, an intermediate federal appellate court.
- The First Circuit affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the Commissioner.
- The U.S. Supreme Court then granted the petitioners' writ of certiorari to hear the case.
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Issue:
Does Maine's 'nonsectarian' requirement for its tuition assistance program, which excludes schools that provide religious instruction, violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Roberts
Yes, Maine's 'nonsectarian' requirement violates the Free Exercise Clause. A state cannot disqualify some private schools from a generally available public benefit solely because they are religious. By conditioning the availability of tuition assistance on a school's relinquishment of its religious character and instruction, Maine's program penalizes the free exercise of religion. The Court rejected the argument that this was a restriction on the 'use' of funds rather than religious 'status,' holding that the distinction is immaterial because a school's religious mission is inextricable from its identity. Furthermore, distinguishing this case from Locke v. Davey, the Court noted there is no 'historic and substantial' state interest against government aid to religious schools comparable to the tradition against using public funds to train clergy.
Dissenting - Justice Breyer
No, Maine's program does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The two Religion Clauses have 'play in the joints,' giving states leeway to navigate the tension between them, and Maine's decision falls within this space. This case is about withholding funding for a religious 'use'—religious instruction—not merely religious 'status,' which distinguishes it from Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza. Maine created the program to provide a secular public education, and it has a compelling interest in not using taxpayer funds for religious indoctrination. Forcing Maine to fund these schools risks the very religious strife the Establishment Clause was designed to prevent by compelling taxpayers to support religious beliefs and practices with which they disagree.
Dissenting - Justice Sotomayor
No, the requirement does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The Court has continued to dismantle the wall of separation between church and state, transforming a constitutional slogan into a constitutional violation. This decision upends decades of precedent by collapsing the 'play in the joints' doctrine that allowed states flexibility. It is perverse to hold that Maine is barred from funding the only type of education it may constitutionally provide—a religiously neutral one. As a result of this decision, Maine is forced to choose between subsidizing religious indoctrination and discriminatory practices or curtailing support for all its citizens in these rural districts.
Analysis:
This decision significantly erodes the distinction between religious 'status' and religious 'use' in Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, making it difficult for states to exclude religious organizations from public benefit programs based on the religious nature of their activities. It narrows the 'play in thejoints' doctrine, compelling states that provide aid for secular private education to also fund religious education. This ruling will likely lead to further challenges against state programs that differentiate between secular and religious entities, forcing state governments to either fund religious indoctrination or terminate neutral aid programs entirely to avoid Establishment Clause concerns.
