Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp.
270 F.3d 863, 2001 WL 1269178 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
The term "disposal" under CERCLA § 9607(a)(2) does not encompass the gradual, passive migration of hazardous substances through soil that were previously deposited. For a prior owner to be liable, the disposal must involve an active event such as a discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of contaminants onto the property during their ownership.
Facts:
- From 1945 to 1983, Unocal Corporation leased a 70-acre property and used it for petroleum production, leaving behind tar-like and slag materials containing hazardous substances.
- From 1977 to 1983, a general partnership, Carson Harbor Village Mobile Home Park, along with Richard G. Braley and Walker Smith, Jr. (the "Partnership Defendants"), owned the property and operated a mobile home park on it.
- In 1983, Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. ("Carson Harbor") purchased the property from the Partnership Defendants and continued operating the mobile home park.
- In 1993, while attempting to refinance the property, Carson Harbor discovered the tar-like and slag materials in a wetlands area of the site.
- Subsequent investigation confirmed the materials were a by-product of petroleum production and that the surrounding soil contained elevated levels of petroleum hydrocarbons and lead exceeding state reporting limits.
- During the Partnership Defendants' ownership, there was no evidence that they actively introduced any hazardous substances onto the property; any movement of the pre-existing contaminants was through gradual, passive migration in the soil.
- Carson Harbor undertook a cleanup of the materials in 1995, removing 1,042 tons of material.
- The cleanup cost Carson Harbor approximately $285,000.
Procedural Posture:
- Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. sued the Partnership Defendants, the Government Defendants, and Unocal in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California for cost recovery under CERCLA and other claims.
- The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
- The district court, a court of first instance, granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the CERCLA claim. It held in the alternative that the Partnership Defendants were not potentially responsible parties because "disposal" under CERCLA requires an affirmative introduction of hazardous substances.
- Carson Harbor, as appellant, appealed the district court's judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion, which was subsequently withdrawn when the court agreed to hear the case en banc.
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Issue:
Does the passive migration of pre-existing hazardous contaminants through soil constitute a "disposal" under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2), thereby making a prior landowner during such migration a potentially responsible party?
Opinions:
Majority - McKeown, Circuit Judge
No. The passive migration of pre-existing hazardous contaminants through soil does not constitute a "disposal" under CERCLA § 9607(a)(2). The court conducted a plain meaning analysis of the words defining "disposal" in the statute: "discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing." It concluded that while some terms like "leaking" or "spilling" might not require affirmative human conduct, none of these terms describe the gradual, passive spreading of contamination through soil. The court reasoned that interpreting "disposal" to include all passive migration would make disposal a perpetual process, rendering every subsequent landowner a potentially responsible party and making the innocent landowner defense superfluous. Therefore, because no statutory "disposal" occurred during the Partnership Defendants' ownership, they cannot be held liable as past owners under CERCLA.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - B. Fletcher, Circuit Judge
Yes. The passive migration of hazardous contaminants through soil does constitute a "disposal" under CERCLA. The dissent argued that the majority's plain meaning analysis was flawed because it ignored the ordinary meaning of the word "deposit," which can refer to substances being laid down by natural processes, such as when contaminated water deposits hazardous waste into surrounding soil. Excluding passive migration from the definition of "disposal" frustrates CERCLA's dual purposes of encouraging prompt cleanup and ensuring responsible parties pay their fair share. Under the majority's holding, a landowner could discover passive contamination, sell the property, and escape all liability, which creates a disincentive for cleanup and remediation.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrowed the scope of past owner liability under CERCLA in the Ninth Circuit, establishing that passive migration of previously deposited contaminants is not a "disposal." This holding aligns the Ninth Circuit with the Second and Third Circuits, creating a deeper circuit split with the Fourth Circuit's broader interpretation of "disposal." The ruling provides greater certainty for former landowners who did not actively contribute to contamination, but it potentially increases the burden on current owners by limiting their ability to recover cleanup costs from the entire chain of title. The case emphasizes a textualist, plain-meaning approach to statutory interpretation in environmental law.
