Carroll v. Whitney
29 S.W.3d 14, 2000 WL 1468856, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 563 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
Under Tennessee's comparative fault system, a trier of fact in a negligence action may apportion fault to a nonparty who is immune from suit, except in workers' compensation cases involving an immune employer.
Facts:
- Fourteen-month-old Jessica Renee Carroll developed a high fever and began vomiting, prompting her mother, Forestine Carroll, to contact her pediatrician, Dr. Carolyn Whitney.
- The next day, March 23, 1992, Dr. Whitney examined Jessica, found her nonresponsive with a low white blood cell count, and diagnosed her with tonsillitis, a heart murmur, and dehydration.
- Dr. Whitney admitted Jessica to LeBonheur Children’s Medical Center and ordered the administration of antibiotics and intravenous fluids.
- At LeBonheur, resident physicians Dr. Reggie Lyell and Dr. Azra Sehic examined Jessica at approximately 1:00 p.m.; Dr. Sehic suspected pneumonia with possible sepsis.
- By 3:30 p.m., more than two and a half hours after admission, Jessica still had not received the antibiotics or intravenous fluids ordered by Dr. Whitney.
- Blood tests confirmed the presence of bacteria in Jessica's blood, and shortly thereafter, she suffered a seizure, lapsed into unconsciousness, and died around 6:30 p.m. from pneumonia and sepsis.
Procedural Posture:
- James and Forestine Carroll (the plaintiffs) filed a medical malpractice action in state trial court against LeBonheur, Dr. Whitney, Dr. Barnes, and the resident physicians, Dr. Sehic and Dr. Lyell.
- The resident physicians filed a motion to dismiss, arguing they were immune from suit as state employees, which the trial court granted.
- The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the action and then re-filed it in Shelby County Circuit Court against only the non-immune defendants (LeBonheur, Dr. Whitney, and Dr. Barnes).
- The plaintiffs also filed a separate claim against the State of Tennessee in the Claims Commission based on the actions of the resident physicians.
- At the conclusion of the trial in Circuit Court, the jury was instructed to apportion fault among the defendants, the immune resident physicians, and Forestine Carroll.
- The jury returned a verdict apportioning 100% of the fault to the immune resident physicians (70% to Dr. Lyell and 30% to Dr. Sehic) and 0% fault to the defendants, resulting in a judgment for the defendants.
- The plaintiffs (appellants) appealed to the Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court) reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the jury should not have been permitted to apportion fault to the immune residents.
- The defendants (appellees at the Court of Appeals, now appellants) were granted permission to appeal to the Supreme Court of Tennessee.
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Issue:
Does Tennessee's comparative fault system permit a jury to apportion fault to nonparties who are immune from suit?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Barker
Yes. When a defendant raises the nonparty defense in a negligence action, a trier of fact may generally allocate fault to immune nonparties. The core principle of comparative fault, established in McIntyre v. Balentine, is fairness achieved by linking liability to fault. Prohibiting the apportionment of fault to immune nonparties undermines this principle, as it forces named defendants to bear liability for fault that properly belongs to others, effectively reviving the obsolete doctrine of joint and several liability. Prior decisions in Ridings and Snyder, which held that fault could not be attributed to immune employers, are now limited to the unique context of workers' compensation law, where an employer's subrogation rights would otherwise unfairly defeat an employee's recovery from a third party.
Dissenting - Chief Justice Anderson
No. A jury should not be permitted to allocate fault to an immune nonparty. This decision violates the principle of stare decisis by effectively overruling the court's recent, unanimous holdings in Ridings and Snyder. Those cases correctly interpreted McIntyre to mean that fault may only be attributed to persons against whom the plaintiff has a valid cause of action. The majority's new rule departs from this settled precedent without sufficient justification, shifting the entire risk of loss created by a nonparty's immunity onto the plaintiff, which is inconsistent with the balancing of fairness concerns that has guided the court's comparative fault jurisprudence.
Analysis:
This decision significantly alters Tennessee's comparative fault doctrine by shifting the risk of a nonparty's immunity from named defendants to the plaintiff. It establishes that a defendant's liability will be limited to its own percentage of fault, even if other responsible parties cannot be sued. This holding aligns Tennessee with the majority of comparative fault jurisdictions but creates a specific and complex carve-out for workers' compensation cases, preserving a different rule for that context. The decision prioritizes a pure link between fault and liability for defendants over ensuring a plaintiff's ability to achieve full recovery from solvent tortfeasors.
