Carrender v. Fitterer
1983 Pa. LEXIS 765, 503 Pa. 178, 469 A.2d 120 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
A possessor of land has no legal duty to protect an invitee from a condition on the land if the danger is known or obvious to the invitee, and the possessor can reasonably expect the invitee to discover the danger and avoid it.
Facts:
- Ruth Carrender, who wore a prosthetic lower leg, had been a patient at Paul and Linda Fitterer's chiropractic clinic for seven years.
- On January 16, 1979, Carrender drove to the clinic for treatment and parked in the clinic's parking lot, which was situated on an incline.
- A sheet of smooth ice covered the area next to her chosen parking space, but several other convenient parking spaces free of ice were available.
- While still seated in her car, Carrender saw the ice and was aware that it presented a particular danger to her due to her prosthesis.
- Despite knowing the risk and seeing available ice-free spots, she got out of her car and crossed the ice to enter the clinic, using an adjacent car for support.
- After her treatment, she returned to her car, again crossing the ice patch.
- As she reached into her purse for her keys next to her car door, she was no longer holding on for support, slipped on the ice, and fractured her hip.
Procedural Posture:
- Ruth Carrender sued Paul and Linda Fitterer for negligence in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, a state trial court.
- A jury returned a verdict finding the Fitterers 65% negligent and Carrender 35% negligent, and the court entered a molded judgment for Carrender.
- The trial court denied the Fitterers' post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial.
- The Fitterers, as appellants, appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, an intermediate appellate court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- The Fitterers, as appellants, were granted an allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does a possessor of land owe a duty to an invitee to protect against harm from a known and obvious danger that the invitee voluntarily chooses to encounter, when safe and reasonable alternatives are available?
Opinions:
Majority - Roberts, Chief Justice
No, a possessor of land does not owe a duty to protect an invitee from a known and obvious danger under these circumstances. The court reasoned that under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A, a possessor of land is not liable to invitees for harm caused by a condition whose danger is known or obvious, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge. Here, Carrender's own testimony established that the ice patch was an obvious danger, she personally knew of the risk it posed, and there were safe, alternative ice-free parking spaces available. Therefore, the Fitterers could reasonably expect that an invitee would recognize the danger and choose to avoid it. Because the Fitterers owed no duty to Carrender regarding this specific hazard, she failed to establish a prima facie case of negligence. The court also clarified that the assumption of risk doctrine, in this context, is not a separate defense but is intertwined with the duty analysis; because the invitee assumes the risk of an obvious danger, the possessor owes no duty. Consequently, the comparative negligence statute is inapplicable, as it only apportions fault where a defendant has first breached a duty of care.
Concurring - Flaherty, Justice
No. The basis for barring the plaintiff's recovery is not the doctrine of assumption of risk, but rather the court's determination that, as a matter of law, the possessor of land owed the plaintiff no duty. When an individual unjustifiably subjects themselves to an obvious danger, the proper legal analysis is that no duty was owed in the first place. Retaining a separate 'assumption of risk' analysis is incompatible with the principles of a comparative negligence system.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the interplay between a landowner's duty to an invitee, the 'known or obvious danger' rule, and the doctrine of assumption of risk in a comparative negligence jurisdiction. The court establishes that the 'no duty' rule for obvious dangers is a threshold legal determination that precedes any analysis of the plaintiff's own negligence. By framing the invitee's choice to encounter an avoidable, obvious risk as negating the landowner's duty entirely, the decision prevents such cases from reaching a jury for an apportionment of fault under comparative negligence. This holding reinforces that a defendant cannot be found negligent if no duty of care was owed to the plaintiff at the outset, regardless of how the plaintiff's conduct might otherwise be characterized.
