Carr v. Deeds
2006 WL 1899782, 453 F.3d 593 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force claims if their conduct was objectively reasonable given the threat posed by a suspect or if there is no admissible evidence linking the officer to a pretrial detainee's de minimis injuries. Furthermore, a district court acts within its discretion to exclude an expert witness under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) when the plaintiff fails to provide the required Rule 26(a)(2)(B) expert disclosures without substantial justification or harmlessness.
Facts:
- On June 20, 2001, Trooper V.S. Deeds and other law enforcement officers arrested Joshua Morgan at Dale Arbaugh's home pursuant to an outstanding warrant for suspected arson.
- Later on June 20, 2001, Morgan was transported to the State Police Barracks and then to the Southern Regional Jail, where medical evaluations noted a cut on his lip and an abrasion on his right flank or abdomen.
- Later on June 20, 2001, Morgan's mother, stepfather, and brother visited him at the police station, observed injuries, and testified that Morgan either pointed to or verbally indicated that Deeds had inflicted them.
- On July 9, 2001, Morgan told his mother that he would "take a bullet in the head before he would go to jail," which she included in an application for his involuntary custody for a mental health examination.
- On July 10, 2001, Morgan told Alicia and Timothy Holliday that he would "kill himself or anyone who tried to take him down, including the police," and left their home possessing a pistol and ammunition.
- Later on July 10, 2001, Deputy Farmer pursued Morgan's vehicle; Morgan abruptly stopped, fled on foot over an embankment, turned, and fired at least two shots at Farmer.
- Troopers V.S. Deeds and T.D. Bradley, responding to Farmer's call for assistance, located Morgan, who was approaching them in a crouched position with a pistol, and fired two or three rounds at them.
- Deeds and Bradley returned fire, repeatedly ordered Morgan to drop his weapon, and after a continued exchange of gunfire, jointly approached Morgan and discovered he was dead.
Procedural Posture:
- On July 16, 2003, Sharon Carr, individually and as administratrix of Joshua Morgan's estate, filed an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, alleging two claims of excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state law claims against the State of West Virginia, the Superintendent of the West Virginia State Police (Howard E. Hill, Jr., in his official capacity), and Troopers V.S. Deeds and T.D. Bradley.
- On May 5, 2004, the district court dismissed Trooper T.D. Bradley from the case for plaintiff's failure to properly serve him with the summons and complaint.
- On June 21, 2004, defendants moved to exclude the testimony and opinions of plaintiff’s expert, Dr. John T. Cooper, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) for plaintiff's failure to serve the expert disclosure required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B).
- On July 1, 2004, defendants also filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting insufficient evidence that Morgan was injured in an altercation with Deeds (June 20 incident), that the injuries were de minimis, and that Deeds and Bradley employed objectively unreasonable deadly force (July 10 incident), and alternatively, that the July 10 claim did not survive Morgan’s death.
- The district court granted defendants’ motion to exclude plaintiff’s expert and, by separate order, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding Deeds entitled to qualified immunity from the June 20 assault claim because Morgan’s injuries were de minimis, and that the July 10 deadly force claim did not survive Morgan’s death. The court also granted summary judgment to Superintendent Hill and the State of West Virginia on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds for the § 1983 claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims, dismissing them without prejudice.
- Plaintiff Sharon Carr appealed the district court's orders excluding her expert and granting summary judgment to defendants on the § 1983 claims to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
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Issue:
Is a law enforcement officer entitled to qualified immunity from a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of deadly force when an armed suspect fires at officers while fleeing, and from a claim of non-deadly force against a pretrial detainee where there is no admissible evidence linking the officer to the alleged de minimis injuries, and did the district court properly exclude an expert witness whose disclosures failed to meet Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) requirements?
Opinions:
Majority - Traxler
Yes, law enforcement officers are entitled to qualified immunity from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims of excessive force in these circumstances, and the district court properly excluded the plaintiff's expert witness. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Deeds on the deadly force claim, finding Deeds entitled to qualified immunity. Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald and Saucier v. Katz, qualified immunity shields officers performing discretionary duties unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. Claims of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment are assessed using an "objective reasonableness" standard, balancing the intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests against governmental interests, and considering factors like crime severity, immediate threat, and resistance/flight, as per Graham v. Connor. Deadly force is permissible, as per Tennessee v. Garner, where an officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm. Here, Morgan, subject to arrest warrants and an involuntary commitment order, had threatened to die before going to jail, threatened to harm officers, was armed, and fired upon officers while fleeing. A reasonable officer could believe Morgan posed a significant threat of serious physical harm, entitling Deeds to qualified immunity. The court also affirmed the exclusion of plaintiff's expert, Dr. John Cooper. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) requires specific disclosures for retained experts, and Rule 37(c)(1) mandates exclusion for non-compliance unless substantially justified or harmless. Plaintiff failed to provide the required expert disclosure, lacking crucial information such as Dr. Cooper's qualifications, publications, compensation, or prior testimony, despite notification. This failure was not substantially justified or harmless, as it prejudiced defendants' ability to investigate Dr. Cooper's expertise and prepare for deposition in a case heavily reliant on expert testimony, consistent with Saudi v. Northrop Grumman Corp. Finally, the court affirmed summary judgment for Deeds on the June 20 excessive force claim. Excessive force claims for pretrial detainees are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and require proof that force was applied "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm" and resulted in "more than de minimis" injury (Riley v. Dorton; Taylor v. McDuffie). Deeds was entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff presented no admissible evidence linking him to Morgan's injuries. Testimony that Morgan indicated Deeds inflicted injuries was inadmissible hearsay, and the conditions for an "adoptive admission" were not met. Under Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, a party moving for summary judgment can discharge its burden by pointing out an absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case; Deeds bore no burden to produce evidence negating the claim. Therefore, without admissible evidence that Deeds employed any force, let alone excessive force, Deeds was entitled to qualified immunity.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the high bar for overcoming qualified immunity in excessive force cases under § 1983, particularly when officers are confronted with an armed and actively threatening suspect. It firmly establishes that strict adherence to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) regarding expert witness disclosures is not merely a formality but a critical prerequisite; non-compliance, without strong justification or proof of harmlessness, will lead to exclusion under Rule 37(c)(1), potentially dismantling a plaintiff's case. The ruling also clarifies that for excessive force claims involving pretrial detainees, plaintiffs must provide admissible evidence directly linking the officer to the alleged force and demonstrating that the force was malicious and resulted in more than de minimis injury, emphasizing that the burden of proof rests squarely on the plaintiff and that defendants need only point out the absence of such evidence to secure summary judgment.
