Carolyn Sue Kelsey v. Nita Lint
912 N.W.2d 862, 322 Mich.App. 364 (2017)
Rule of Law:
Whether a person has an 'implied license' to enter private residential property and approach a home, thereby qualifying as 'lawfully on private property' for statutory dog-bite claims, is generally a question of fact for the jury, guided by established social customs and objective indicators from the property owner. Additionally, trial courts must make specific findings regarding an attorney's 'reasonable inquiry' into facts when considering mandatory sanctions for documents signed under MCR 2.114(D).
Facts:
- On August 30, 2013, Carolyn Kelsey attended a garage sale at Nita Lint's house.
- On August 31, 2013, around 5:00 p.m., after the garage sale had ended, Carolyn Kelsey returned to Nita Lint's property to inquire about an item that had been for sale the previous day.
- When Carolyn Kelsey exited her vehicle, Nita Lint’s dog ran at Kelsey from the back of the house and bit Kelsey’s leg.
- Nita Lint's property did not have a fence preventing entry, nor were there 'no trespassing' signs visible when approaching the house from the street.
- A small 'no soliciting' sign was posted on a door leading to a portion of Nita Lint's garage where she previously operated a beauty parlor, but Carolyn Kelsey was bitten within seconds of exiting her vehicle, before she had an opportunity to approach that door.
- Nita Lint had previously acquiesced to people, including Carolyn Kelsey on one occasion, returning to her property after garage sales to take a second look at items, though she preferred them to call first.
- Nita Lint gave a recorded statement in February 2014 to an insurance representative, admitting that her dog had previously bitten a mailman, was 'protective' of her, and had 'shown aggression' toward people.
Procedural Posture:
- Carolyn Sue Kelsey and David B. Kelsey (plaintiffs) filed a lawsuit against Nita Lint (defendant) in Montcalm Circuit Court (trial court/court of first instance), alleging a statutory dog-bite claim, a common law negligence claim, and a claim for loss of consortium.
- Nita Lint moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10), arguing that Carolyn Kelsey was a trespasser when bitten.
- Plaintiffs opposed Lint's motion for summary disposition and also sought sanctions against Lint or her attorney under MCR 2.114(E), presenting a recorded statement from Lint about her dog's prior bite history.
- The trial court granted summary disposition to Lint, concluding as a matter of law that Kelsey was a trespasser and dismissing plaintiffs’ statutory and common law dog-bite claims.
- The trial court also denied plaintiffs’ request for sanctions under MCR 2.114(E).
- Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied.
- Plaintiffs-Appellants appealed the trial court's order to the Michigan Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a person who returns to residential property after a public event (like a garage sale) has concluded, to inquire about an item previously offered for sale, automatically become a trespasser as a matter of law, thereby precluding statutory and common law dog-bite claims, and must a trial court make specific findings regarding an attorney's reasonable inquiry into facts when denying sanctions under MCR 2.114(E) for inconsistent statements?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No, a person in such circumstances does not automatically become a trespasser as a matter of law; whether they had an implied license to enter is a question of fact for the jury. Yes, a trial court must make specific findings regarding an attorney's reasonable inquiry into facts when denying sanctions. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary disposition, holding that reasonable minds could conclude Carolyn Kelsey had an implied license to enter Nita Lint's property. The court cited established customs in Michigan, derived from cases like Florida v Jardines and People v Frederick, which recognize an implied license for ordinary persons to enter residential property, approach a home, and knock. This implied license is defined by customary and socially accepted norms, allowing entry unless expressly revoked by clear signs or barriers. Lint’s property lacked fences or 'no trespassing' signs at the entrance, and the 'no soliciting' sign on a garage door was not synonymous with prohibiting entry and was not immediately visible. The court reasoned that the end of the garage sale only removed Kelsey's 'invitee' status, but did not eliminate the underlying implied license to approach the door. Furthermore, evidence suggested Lint had a practice of allowing people to return after sales, reinforcing the potential for an implied license. Because evidence supported an inference that Kelsey was a licensee, her status was a question for the jury, making summary disposition inappropriate for both the statutory dog-bite claim (which requires the person to be 'lawfully on private property') and the common law negligence claim (which would apply a higher duty of care than owed to a trespasser). The court also vacated the denial of sanctions under MCR 2.114(E), remanding for the trial court to make specific findings on whether Lint's attorney conducted a 'reasonable inquiry' into the factual basis of documents signed. Lint's attorney had made assertions in filings denying the dog's prior bite history, despite Lint's recorded statement to the contrary. The court emphasized an attorney's affirmative duty to conduct a reasonable factual inquiry, and that sanctions are mandatory if a violation of MCR 2.114(D) is found, irrespective of the attorney's general character.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of the 'implied license' doctrine in Michigan, underscoring that customary social norms for entering residential property are key to determining an entrant's legal status. It reinforces that summary disposition is improper when factual inferences, such as implied consent, could lead reasonable minds to different conclusions. Moreover, the decision is a crucial reminder to attorneys that the duty to conduct a reasonable factual inquiry under MCR 2.114(D) is an objective and mandatory obligation, and failure to do so, especially when clients provide contradictory information, will result in sanctions.
