Carol Artibee v. Home Place Corporation
71 N.E.3d 1205, 28 N.Y.3d 739 (2017)
Rule of Law:
In New York, a private defendant in a Supreme Court personal injury action cannot reduce its liability for noneconomic damages by apportioning fault to the State under CPLR 1601(1), because Supreme Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims against the State due to sovereign immunity, meaning the claimant cannot 'obtain jurisdiction' over the State in that court.
Facts:
- Carol Artibee was traveling on a state highway.
- A large branch broke off a tree bordering the road, falling through her Jeep.
- The falling branch struck Carol Artibee on the head, causing her injuries.
- Home Place Corporation allegedly owns the property on which the tree was located.
- The tree was allegedly dead or diseased.
- Department of Transportation employees were allegedly negligent in failing to monitor open and obvious hazards along the highway, properly maintain trees, or warn drivers of the hazard.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff Carol Artibee and her spouse commenced a personal injury action in Supreme Court against Home Place Corporation.
- Plaintiffs separately filed a claim against the State of New York in the Court of Claims.
- Defendant Home Place Corporation moved in Supreme Court for permission to introduce evidence of the State’s negligence and for a jury charge directing the apportionment of liability between Home Place and the State.
- Supreme Court ruled that while evidence of the State’s negligence would be admissible, the jury would not be instructed to apportion liability, concluding that sovereign immunity prevented obtaining jurisdiction over the State for apportionment purposes in Supreme Court.
- Supreme Court adjourned the trial to allow Home Place Corporation to appeal, treating its ruling as essentially granting summary judgment dismissing the apportionment claim.
- The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court's order by reversing the denial of Home Place Corporation's motion for a jury charge on apportionment, holding that Home Place was entitled to have the jury consider apportionment against the State.
- The Third Department granted plaintiffs leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, certifying the question of whether its order of modification was in error.
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Issue:
Does a factfinder in Supreme Court have the authority to apportion fault to the State under CPLR 1601(1) when a plaintiff alleges that both the State and a private party are liable for noneconomic losses in a personal injury action?
Opinions:
Majority - Stein, J.
No, the factfinder in Supreme Court may not apportion fault to the State under CPLR 1601(1) when a plaintiff claims both the State and a private party are liable for noneconomic losses in a personal injury action. CPLR 1601(1) modifies common-law joint and several liability by limiting a defendant's liability for noneconomic losses to its proportionate share if found 50% or less at fault. However, this apportionment is precluded if the claimant, with due diligence, was unable to obtain 'jurisdiction' over the nonparty in 'said action.' The New York Constitution (article VI, § 9) and relevant case law establish that the doctrine of sovereign immunity imposes a subject matter jurisdictional limitation on Supreme Court, meaning it lacks the competence to entertain claims for money damages against the State; such claims must be brought exclusively in the Court of Claims. Thus, a claimant cannot 'obtain jurisdiction' over the State in Supreme Court. The term 'jurisdiction' in CPLR 1601(1) is not restricted to 'personal jurisdiction' but encompasses subject matter jurisdiction. Strict construction of statutes in derogation of common law requires adherence to the plain meaning of the text. The legislative history of CPLR 1601 reflects a 'painstaking balance of interests' to address a liability insurance crisis by protecting 'low-fault, 'deep pocket' defendants.' However, the State is not an insolvent tortfeasor, and a private defendant may still pursue a separate contribution claim against the State in the Court of Claims, thereby achieving equity without violating the statutory language or legislative intent. The statute's specific language allowing the State to seek apportionment against private tortfeasors in the Court of Claims, while omitting similar language for apportionment against the State in Supreme Court, demonstrates legislative intent against such apportionment.
Dissenting - Abdus-Salaam, J.
Yes, the factfinder in Supreme Court should be able to apportion fault to the State under CPLR 1601(1). The majority's interpretation is an overly strained reading of the statute that contravenes the legislative goal of limiting liability for all low-fault tortfeasors and grants the State an unintended preferred status. The use of 'or' in CPLR 1601(1) indicates that the legislature intended to create parallel rights of apportionment for both state and non-state tortfeasors. The statutory phrases 'due diligence' and 'over such person' logically refer only to personal jurisdiction, as a plaintiff's diligence pertains to serving parties, not a court's inherent subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court generally possesses subject matter jurisdiction over personal injury actions, so the legislature would have no reason to be concerned with subject matter jurisdiction in this specific context. The majority's holding creates an anomalous and inequitable situation where a private defendant in Supreme Court cannot shift liability to the nonparty State, but the State, as a defendant in the Court of Claims, can apportion fault to a private party, and plaintiffs suing the State are consequently disadvantaged compared to those suing private parties.
Analysis:
This case provides crucial guidance on the interplay between CPLR 1601(1), sovereign immunity, and jurisdictional limitations in New York. It reinforces the distinct subject matter jurisdiction of the Court of Claims for actions against the State, preventing private defendants in Supreme Court from directly apportioning fault to the State. The ruling means that 'deep pocket' private defendants, even if less than 50% at fault, must bear the full noneconomic damages for their share in Supreme Court and, if they wish to recover from the State, must initiate a separate contribution action in the Court of Claims. This impacts litigation strategy for plaintiffs and defendants when the State is a potential tortfeasor, emphasizing the importance of understanding the precise jurisdictional boundaries for claims involving governmental entities.
