Carney v. State
249 P.3d 308 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
A confession is not rendered involuntary by police promises of immunity if the totality of the circumstances, including the suspect's own statements and conduct, demonstrates that the suspect did not actually believe or rely on those promises when confessing.
Facts:
- Natalia Timurphy was reported missing, and her body was later discovered near Dillingham, Alaska.
- Cress Carney approached Sergeant Kirby at a convenience store, asked about the Timurphy investigation, and stated he would be available to talk.
- Two days later, Carney voluntarily went to the Dillingham police station for an interview with Sergeants Kirby and Pasquariello.
- During the three-hour interview, the sergeants repeatedly promised Carney he would not be arrested and that his statements would be kept confidential.
- Carney eventually admitted that he had strangled Timurphy.
- Immediately after confessing, Carney told both officers that if he were to be arrested, he wanted Sergeant Kirby to be the one to perform the arrest.
- Carney had a history of traumatic brain injury, borderline intellectual functioning, and extensive prior experience with the criminal justice system, including thirty-three prior convictions.
- The night after the interview, Carney could not sleep because he was worried the police were coming to arrest him.
Procedural Posture:
- Cress Carney was charged with first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and tampering with evidence in the Alaska Superior Court, the state's trial court.
- Carney filed a motion to suppress his confession, arguing it was involuntary.
- The Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing and issued a written decision denying Carney's motion.
- Following a trial, Carney was convicted on all three charges.
- Carney, as the Appellant, appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals of Alaska, challenging the denial of his suppression motion, against the State of Alaska, the Appellee.
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Issue:
Is a confession involuntary and subject to suppression when police repeatedly promise not to arrest the suspect, but the suspect's own statements and actions indicate he did not believe the promises and fully expected to be arrested and prosecuted?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Bolger
No. A confession is not involuntary if the suspect did not subjectively believe or rely on the officers' promises of leniency. While promises of immunity can be coercive, the critical inquiry is the subjective effect of the police conduct on the suspect's will. Here, the totality of the circumstances shows that Carney, despite his cognitive impairments, did not actually believe he would be immune from prosecution. His extensive criminal history, his awareness that the interview was being recorded, and most significantly, his statements immediately after the confession—requesting that a specific officer be the one to arrest him and later worrying all night about being arrested—demonstrate that he expected to be arrested and prosecuted. Because Carney did not rely on the promises, they did not overbear his will, and his confession was therefore voluntary and admissible.
Analysis:
This case refines the legal standard for evaluating confessions induced by police promises. It clarifies that such promises do not create a per se rule of involuntariness. Instead, the focus is on the suspect's subjective state of mind and whether they actually relied on the promise. This decision establishes that a defendant's own contemporaneous statements and subsequent conduct can be used as powerful evidence to rebut a claim of coercion, even when police make objectively coercive promises. It places a higher burden on defendants to show not just that a promise was made, but that this promise was the actual cause of their confession.
