Carmell v. Texas
529 U.S. 513, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 3004, 146 L. Ed. 2d 577 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
A state law that retroactively alters the legal rules of evidence by requiring less testimony to convict an offender than was required at the time the offense was committed violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. Such a law falls into the fourth category of prohibited laws identified in Calder v. Bull.
Facts:
- From February 1991 to March 1995, Scott Leslie Carmell engaged in multiple acts of sexual abuse against his stepdaughter.
- For four specific counts of the abuse, the acts occurred between June 1992 and July 1993, when the victim was 14 or 15 years old.
- At the time these offenses were committed, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.07 required that a sexual assault conviction for a victim aged 14 or older be supported by the victim's testimony plus corroborating evidence.
- The victim did not make an 'outcry' (report the offense) within the six-month time limit required by the law then in effect.
- There was no other evidence corroborating the victim's testimony for these four specific counts.
- On September 1, 1993, after these specific acts occurred, Texas amended Article 38.07 to permit a conviction based on the uncorroborated testimony of a victim younger than 18.
- The abuse ceased in March 1995 after the victim informed her mother.
Procedural Posture:
- In 1996, a Texas grand jury indicted Scott Leslie Carmell on 15 counts of sexual offenses against his stepdaughter.
- Following a trial in a Texas state court, Carmell was convicted on all 15 counts.
- The convictions on four of these counts were based on the retroactive application of a 1993 amendment to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.07.
- Carmell (appellant) appealed his convictions on those four counts to the Texas Court of Appeals for the Second District.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the retroactive application of the amended statute was a permissible procedural change and did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
- The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the state's highest court for criminal matters, denied Carmell's petition for discretionary review.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Carmell's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the retroactive application of a state law that reduces the amount of evidence required to secure a conviction for a crime violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
Yes. The retroactive application of the amended Texas statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. A law that reduces the quantum of evidence necessary to sustain a conviction falls squarely within the fourth category of prohibited ex post facto laws articulated in Calder v. Bull, which forbids any law that 'alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender.' The old law required the victim’s testimony plus corroboration for a conviction to be legally sufficient; the new law permits a conviction on the victim's testimony alone. This is a substantive change to a sufficiency of the evidence rule, not a mere procedural change to witness competency as in Hopt v. Utah. Retroactively applying such a change is fundamentally unfair, as it allows the government to change the rules after the fact to facilitate an easier conviction.
Dissenting - Justice Ginsburg
No. The retroactive application of the amended Texas statute does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The amendment is a procedural change concerning witness competency and credibility, not a substantive change in the quantum of proof required for a conviction. The law does not alter the elements of the offense or lower the prosecution's ultimate burden of proof, which remains 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' The change simply accords certain victims full testimonial stature, enlarging the class of persons whose testimony can be fully credited, which is permissible under precedent like Hopt v. Utah. The majority's holding improperly expands the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause and blurs the line between permissible procedural changes and prohibited substantive ones.
Analysis:
This decision revitalizes the fourth category of prohibited ex post facto laws from the 1798 case Calder v. Bull, which some had viewed as narrowed by modern jurisprudence. It establishes a crucial distinction between permissible retroactive changes to witness competency or evidentiary admissibility rules (as in Hopt) and impermissible changes to 'sufficiency of the evidence' standards. The ruling limits a legislature's power to retroactively make convictions easier to obtain by lowering the legal threshold of proof required, thereby reinforcing protections against arbitrary government action. Future courts must now carefully analyze whether a new evidentiary rule merely changes how facts are presented or if it fundamentally alters the amount of proof legally required to convict.
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