Carmack v. National RR Passenger Corp.

Majority - DEIN, United States Magistrate Judge

Yes, the Railway Labor Act preempts Carmack's state law claims that require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, and an employer can avoid liability for the various claims when requiring a fitness-for-duty examination and terminating an employee for refusal, provided such actions are based on legitimate business necessity and adhere to company policy and legal standards, absent evidence of discriminatory intent or extreme and outrageous conduct. The court found that many of Carmack's state law claims (defamation, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful discharge) were preempted by the Railway Labor Act (RLA). These claims constituted “minor disputes” because their resolution would require interpretation or application of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) governing Carmack’s employment, which dictates disciplinary and termination procedures. Specifically, the alleged defamatory statements made during the investigation and disciplinary hearing were intertwined with assessing whether Carmack's discharge was wrongful under the CBA. For the defamation claims not preempted (statements made after termination), Amtrak was entitled to summary judgment due to a conditional privilege, as the statements were made to serve legitimate business interests in workplace safety and employee fitness, and Carmack failed to demonstrate abuse of this privilege. The invasion of privacy claim was also preempted as it challenged Amtrak's right to demand a psychiatric evaluation, an action rooted in its CBA duties and workplace policies. Even if not preempted, no actionable invasion of privacy occurred because Carmack refused the examination, meaning no medical information was obtained or disclosed. Furthermore, Amtrak's demand for the examination was deemed reasonable given the perceived threat and its legitimate business interest in ensuring the safety of a locomotive engineer, with policies in place to maintain confidentiality. Carmack's FELA claim for emotional distress failed because he did not sustain a physical injury or was not in the “zone of danger” of physical harm, as required by Supreme Court precedent (Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall). The state-law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was preempted by the RLA as it arose from actions inextricably linked to the termination process. Additionally, Amtrak's conduct was not “extreme and outrageous” as required for such a claim under Massachusetts law, as they acted consistently with their workplace violence policy in response to a perceived threat. The wrongful discharge claim failed because Carmack was not an “at-will” employee, but rather was covered by a CBA that established specific procedures for discipline and dismissal, which provide the exclusive remedy for such disputes. This claim was also preempted by the RLA. Regarding disability discrimination (under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B), Carmack failed to establish a prima facie case. He did not prove he was disabled, had a record of disability, or was “regarded as” disabled. Amtrak's request for a fitness-for-duty examination was a reasonable means to ascertain the cause of troubling behavior in a safety-sensitive position, not an indication that they regarded him as substantially impaired. His claim under 42 U.S.C. § 10841, a restatement of the Bill of Rights for Mental Health Patients, failed because the statute is merely precatory and creates no enforceable federal rights. The retaliation claim under the ADA failed because Carmack provided no evidence of a causal connection between protected conduct (filing an MCAD complaint) and any adverse employment action. The disciplinary proceedings began before his MCAD complaint, and his termination was based on insubordination, not retaliation. Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claims failed because Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 37 is a criminal statute and inapplicable. Discrimination claims were preempted by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B as the exclusive remedy. For other claims, Carmack failed to show interference with rights “by threats, intimidation or coercion,” which typically requires actual or potential physical confrontation, rather than an employer’s response to a perceived threat under company policy. Finally, the RLA violation claim was a “minor dispute” subject to mandatory arbitration. Carmack also failed to produce evidence that Amtrak interfered with his union organizing efforts or acted with anti-union animus. The religious discrimination claims (Title VII, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, and First Amendment via § 1983) were barred due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as his MCAD complaint only alleged disability discrimination. Even if exhausted, there was no evidence that Amtrak’s actions were motivated by religious discrimination rather than a legitimate response to a perceived workplace threat.