CARLIN, SUZETTE R. v. PATEL, M.D., RAJNIKANT M.
951 N.Y.2d 807, 99 A.D.3d 1220 (2012)
Rule of Law:
Under New York General Obligations Law § 15-108(c), a tortfeasor who settles with an injured party prior to the entry of judgment, even after a jury verdict, is barred from seeking contribution from any other tortfeasor.
Facts:
- Suzette R. Carlin and others (plaintiffs) commenced a medical malpractice action against Rajnikant M. Patel, M.D., Mohammad Sarwar, M.D., and Zahid M. Chohan, M.D.
- Zahid M. Chohan, M.D., asserted cross claims for contribution against Rajnikant M. Patel, M.D. and Mohammad Sarwar, M.D.
- The main action was dismissed against Rajnikant M. Patel, M.D. and Mohammad Sarwar, M.D.
- A jury in the main action returned a verdict finding Zahid M. Chohan, M.D., liable to plaintiffs and awarded them $2.4 million in damages.
- Following the jury's verdict in the main action but before the entry of the judgment, Zahid M. Chohan, M.D., settled with the plaintiffs.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs commenced a medical malpractice action (the main action) against defendants Rajnikant M. Patel, M.D., Mohammad Sarwar, M.D., and Zahid M. Chohan, M.D.
- Defendant Zahid M. Chohan, M.D., asserted cross claims for contribution against defendants Rajnikant M. Patel, M.D. and Mohammad Sarwar, M.D.
- The main action was dismissed against defendants Rajnikant M. Patel, M.D. and Mohammad Sarwar, M.D.
- Zahid M. Chohan, M.D.'s cross-claims for contribution were converted into a third-party action against Rajnikant M. Patel, M.D. and Mohammad Sarwar, M.D. (third-party defendants).
- The parties to the third-party action agreed to sever that action from the main action for a later trial.
- At the conclusion of the trial in the main action, a jury returned a verdict finding Zahid M. Chohan, M.D., liable to plaintiffs and awarded $2.4 million in damages.
- Following the jury verdict but before the entry of judgment, Zahid M. Chohan, M.D., (third-party plaintiff) settled with the plaintiffs.
- Rajnikant M. Patel, M.D. and Mohammad Sarwar, M.D., (defendants-third-party defendants) moved for summary judgment dismissing the third-party action, arguing that Zahid M. Chohan, M.D., was barred from seeking contribution under General Obligations Law § 15-108(c).
- The Supreme Court, Allegany County, denied the motion of defendants-third-party defendants for summary judgment.
- Rajnikant M. Patel, M.D. and Mohammad Sarwar, M.D. (third-party defendants-appellants) appealed the Supreme Court's order to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department.
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Issue:
Does New York General Obligations Law § 15-108(c) bar a tortfeasor from seeking contribution from co-tortfeasors if the tortfeasor settled with the injured party after a jury verdict establishing liability and damages but before the formal entry of judgment?
Opinions:
Majority - MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Yes, General Obligations Law § 15-108(c) bars a tortfeasor from seeking contribution from co-tortfeasors if the tortfeasor settled with the injured party after a jury verdict but before the formal entry of judgment. The court concluded that the Supreme Court erred in denying the motion to dismiss the third-party action. General Obligations Law § 15-108(c) explicitly states that a tortfeasor who has obtained their own release from liability is not entitled to contribution from any other person. While this rule does not apply to postjudgment settlements, General Obligations Law § 15-108(d)(3) clarifies that a release is only deemed a release for purposes of this section if it is provided 'prior to entry of judgment.' Since it was undisputed that Chohan settled with the plaintiffs prior to the entry of the judgment against him, the plain language of the statute dictated that he forfeited his right to seek contribution from Patel and Sarwar, regardless of the prior jury verdict. The court cited `Gonzales v Armac Indus.,` `Rock v Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co.,` and `Makeun v State of New York` to support its interpretation.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the strict temporal requirement for preserving contribution rights under New York General Obligations Law § 15-108, emphasizing that the 'entry of judgment' is a distinct and critical event. It reinforces that a jury verdict, even one establishing liability and damages, does not equate to a formal judgment for the purposes of a tortfeasor's right to contribution. This bright-line rule ensures predictability in settlements and prevents settling tortfeasors from leveraging a pre-judgment settlement while simultaneously seeking to relitigate fault for contribution, thus promoting finality in litigation. Future cases will continue to apply this strict interpretation, compelling parties to finalize settlements either before trial or strictly after judgment entry if they wish to retain contribution rights.
