Carbone v. Tierney

Supreme Court of New Hampshire
151 N.H. 521, 864 A.2d 308, 2004 N.H. LEXIS 189 (2004)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

In legal malpractice actions, expert testimony is generally required to prove proximate causation unless the causal link is within the common knowledge of a layperson; noncollectibility of an underlying judgment is an affirmative defense that the defendant attorney must prove; and damages awarded for legal malpractice are not reduced by the plaintiff's hypothetical contingency fee with the negligent attorney.

Facts:

In 1994, Alfred Carbone purchased a home in Londonderry, converting its two-car garage into a laboratory for research and testing his inventions, and using additional buildings for a woodworking shop and chemical storage.
After approximately two years of discussions, Carbone agreed with his son Daniel that Carbone would sell his home, give Daniel the proceeds, and Daniel would sell his Danvers home, combine the proceeds, and purchase a larger home to accommodate Daniel's family, Carbone, and his laboratory; they further agreed Daniel would return Carbone's money if the arrangement 'didn't work out.'
On September 9, 1996, Carbone transferred the deed to his home to Daniel's wife, Lisa, who later sold the home to a third party, collecting $69,812.41.
Carbone moved into Daniel and Lisa's basement, storing some laboratory equipment in their garage and the rest in storage, but found the situation 'nerve-racking' and asked Daniel for his money back, to which Daniel responded he had used it to pay other bills.
On November 27, 1996, Daniel and Lisa purchased a new home in Danvers with an apartment for Carbone, but its small shed was not large enough for his laboratory, so Carbone purchased a box trailer for his lab and placed it on a friend’s property.
Carbone's relationship with Daniel and Lisa deteriorated, leading him to move out of their home; subsequently, his friend required him to move the trailer, resulting in Carbone storing some equipment and selling or disposing of the rest, eventually losing all his laboratory equipment.
Lisa filed for bankruptcy, and Carbone asked Tierney to represent his interests by opposing the homestead exemption Lisa sought and the discharge of the debt owed to him.

Procedural Posture:

In 1998, Alfred Carbone hired Nancy S. Tierney to represent him in an action against Daniel and Lisa.
On August 8, 1998, Tierney filed a complaint on Carbone’s behalf in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire, alleging diversity jurisdiction and an amount in controversy exceeding $10,000.
On September 24, 1998, Daniel and Lisa moved to dismiss the complaint.
On October 22, 1998, the district court dismissed Carbone’s complaint for failure to establish subject matter jurisdiction, as it did not allege damages exceeding $75,000.
On October 27, 1998, Tierney moved to amend the complaint and for late entry, and filed objections to the dismissal motion, which were returned as 'Motion denied. Case has been dismissed.'
On December 2, 1998, Tierney filed a second complaint in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire, this time alleging an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.
On April 7, 1999, the district court dismissed the second complaint, stating Carbone had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the jurisdictional issue in the former action and could not avoid the ruling by filing a new action, dismissing it without prejudice to reinstate in state court.
In April 1999, Tierney filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
On February 9, 2000, the Massachusetts district court dismissed that complaint because Tierney had failed to establish federal jurisdiction in the New Hampshire district court.
On June 9, 1999, while the Massachusetts district court complaint was still pending, Tierney filed a complaint in the Massachusetts Superior Court in Essex County.
In March 2000, the superior court sent Tierney a 'Notice of Status Review of the Docket' form, which she completed and returned, but the court later discovered it had misplaced the form.
In April 2000, the Massachusetts Superior Court dismissed the complaint; Tierney did not inquire of the court why the case had been dismissed.
Lisa filed for bankruptcy, and Carbone asked Tierney to represent his interests, but Tierney did not appear at the first meeting of creditors or oppose the homestead exemption.
Lisa was discharged in bankruptcy on August 18, 1999.
In September 2000, Carbone filed the instant action claiming legal malpractice against Tierney.
Carbone moved for summary judgment on the legal malpractice claim and damages; the trial court granted summary judgment on liability but denied it for damages.
A jury trial was held in January 2003, which returned a verdict in Carbone’s favor, awarding $69,812.41 for the loss of his residence and laboratory, and $105,000 for the loss of his laboratory equipment.
The trial court subsequently ordered interest to be added to the judgment.
Tierney appealed the jury verdict to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Premium Content

Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief

You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture

Issue:

Did the trial court err by granting summary judgment on liability for legal malpractice without requiring expert testimony on proximate causation, where the attorney's conduct was deemed egregious but the causal link to the plaintiff's injuries was not explicitly obvious to a layperson?

Opinions:

Majority - Duggan, J.

Yes, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on liability for legal malpractice without requiring expert testimony on proximate causation in this case. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that expert testimony on proximate cause is generally required in legal malpractice actions when the determination of causation is beyond the common knowledge and everyday experience of an average layperson. While acknowledging Tierney’s conduct was egregious and demonstrated a fundamental lack of knowledge, the court concluded that discerning which specific egregious conduct legally caused Carbone's injuries, such as whether he would have prevailed in the underlying action or suffered harm from the bankruptcy inaction, was sufficiently complex to necessitate expert testimony. Regarding the other issues raised, the court further held that noncollectibility of an underlying judgment is an affirmative defense that must be proven by the defendant attorney, not the plaintiff, finding the minority view on this issue persuasive because it prevents placing an unfair burden on the plaintiff. Lastly, the court determined that a legal malpractice damage award should not be reduced by the amount of the contingency fee the plaintiff would have paid the negligent attorney. Such a reduction would inequitably penalize the plaintiff by requiring them to effectively pay two attorneys (the original negligent attorney through a reduced award, and the new attorney for the malpractice suit) to achieve the result they should have obtained initially. The court declined to adopt a quantum meruit approach for similar practical and equitable reasons.

Dissenting - Nadeau, J.

No, the trial court did not err in finding liability for legal malpractice without expert testimony on proximate causation, as the defendant attorney's negligence and its consequences were so obvious as to be within common knowledge. Justice Nadeau argued that Tierney’s conduct constituted 'exceptional circumstances' where expert testimony was unnecessary to establish causation. He highlighted Tierney’s repeated failures: to allege sufficient amount in controversy, to appeal dismissals in federal and state courts, to inquire about the Massachusetts Superior Court dismissal, to appear at the first meeting of creditors in Lisa's bankruptcy, and to oppose the homestead exemption, which resulted in Lisa's debt discharge. Justice Nadeau likened Tierney's conduct to 'a surgeon leaving a sponge inside a patient,' asserting that the negligence and resultant harm were abundantly clear and did not require expert explanation for the jury to understand. He would have upheld the jury verdict for Carbone without further judicial process.

Analysis:

This decision significantly clarifies several critical aspects of legal malpractice law in New Hampshire. The ruling that expert testimony is generally required for proximate causation, even for seemingly obvious attorney errors, sets a higher evidentiary bar for plaintiffs. However, the court balanced this by adopting plaintiff-favorable positions on collectibility (making it an affirmative defense for the defendant attorney) and the non-reduction of damages by hypothetical contingency fees. This aims to ensure that victims of legal malpractice are made whole without being penalized for the necessity of hiring a second attorney to litigate the malpractice claim, while also acknowledging the complexity of legal practice requires specialized knowledge for causality assessment in most cases.

🤖 Gunnerbot:

Query Carbone v. Tierney (2004) directly. You can ask questions about any aspect of the case. If it's in the case, Gunnerbot will know.

Subscribe to Lexplug to chat with the Gunnerbot about this case.

Premium Feature