Capozzella v. Capozzella
213 Va. 820 (1973)
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Rule of Law:
Delivery of a deed is operative if the grantor possesses the intent to deliver, which can be effectuated by words or acts. Physical transfer of the deed to the grantee is not essential if the grantor's intent to pass title is demonstrated by the totality of the circumstances.
Facts:
- Pursuant to a separation agreement with his first wife, Henry F. Capozzella conveyed his 51-acre property to two trustees, who were empowered to reconvey the property according to his instructions.
- Prior to marrying Harriet A. Capozzella, Henry told his attorney, Lytton Gibson, that he wanted to put the property in Harriet's name.
- Four days after their marriage on June 15, 1970, Henry took Harriet to Gibson's office and instructed Gibson to remove the trustees' names from the title and put his wife's name on it.
- Gibson advised conveying the property to Henry and Harriet as tenants by the entirety to protect it from claims by Henry's first wife, and Henry authorized Gibson to proceed.
- Following Henry's instructions, Gibson had the trustees execute a deed dated October 15, 1970, which conveyed the property to Henry and Harriet.
- During an August 1970 meeting, Gibson suggested delaying the recordation of the deed to save on costs, and Henry agreed.
- The morning after the August meeting, Henry told Harriet's parents that he had signed the papers and given Harriet one-half of his property as a gift.
- The trustees delivered the fully executed deed to Gibson, who notified Henry of its receipt on November 6, 1970; five days later, Henry and Harriet separated.
Procedural Posture:
- Harriet A. Capozzella filed a bill of complaint in a Virginia trial court against her husband, Henry F. Capozzella, and his attorney, Lytton H. Gibson.
- The complaint sought a mandatory injunction to compel Gibson to deliver a deed for recordation.
- The trial court (chancellor) entered a final decree on December 20, 1971, granting the injunction in favor of Harriet A. Capozzella.
- Henry F. Capozzella (appellant) appealed the trial court's decree to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
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Issue:
Does a valid delivery of a deed occur when trustees, acting on the grantor's oral instructions to his attorney, execute a deed conveying property to the grantor and his wife as tenants by the entirety and deliver it to the grantor's attorney, even if the grantor never provides written instructions or directs the attorney to record the deed?
Opinions:
Majority - Poff, J.
Yes. A valid delivery occurred because the grantor's intent to deliver was effectuated by his words and acts. For a deed to pass title, delivery is essential, but it is the grantor's intent, not physical tradition to the grantee, that makes the delivery operative. The court found that Henry Capozzella's actions—repeatedly expressing his desire to put the property in his wife's name, authorizing his attorney to prepare the deed, having his wife supply necessary information, telling her parents he had gifted her the property, and agreeing merely to delay recordation for cost purposes—all demonstrated a clear intent to make the deed presently operative. When the trustees delivered the executed deed to Gibson, who was acting as a conduit for Capozzella's intent, delivery was complete, and title passed to the Capozzellas as tenants by the entirety. The absence of specific instructions on what to do with the deed after its delivery to the attorney does not negate the grantor's manifested intention to transfer title.
Dissenting - Harrison, J.
No. A valid delivery did not occur because Harriet Capozzella failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that her husband had the requisite donative intent or that a completed delivery took place. Gibson was Henry's agent, and delivery of a deed to the grantor's own agent does not constitute delivery to the grantee because the grantor does not relinquish dominion and control over the instrument. The evidence showed Henry never provided the written instructions the trustees requested and never unequivocally expressed his final intention to Gibson. Furthermore, Gibson himself acknowledged he was 'dragging his feet' because of friction in the marriage. Because the deed remained in the possession of Henry's attorney and thus under Henry's control, the essential element of delivery was lacking, and the purported gift was never legally completed.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the principle that in property law, the grantor's intent is the paramount consideration in determining whether a deed has been delivered. It illustrates that a court will look to the totality of the circumstances, including oral statements and patterns of conduct, to find a valid constructive delivery. The ruling suggests that once a grantor manifests a clear intent for a deed to be operative and the deed is transferred to a third party (even the grantor's own attorney) for the grantee's benefit, title may pass irrevocably. This lowers the formal requirements for delivery, especially in intra-familial transfers, but creates uncertainty for grantors who may have a change of heart before a deed is recorded.
