Caplan v. Town of Acton
479 Mass. 69, 92 N.E.3d 691 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
Public grants of funds to an active church for historic preservation do not categorically violate the Massachusetts anti-aid amendment. Instead, their constitutionality must be evaluated under a three-factor test analyzing the grant's purpose, its effect, and whether it avoids the political and economic abuses the amendment was designed to prevent.
Facts:
- The Acton Congregational Church, an active church with over 800 members, owns three adjacent historic buildings in the Acton Centre Historic District.
- The main church building, built in 1846, is used for worship services and religious education, while two adjacent historic houses owned by the church are rented to local families.
- In 2015, the church applied to the Town of Acton for two grants under the state's Community Preservation Act.
- One grant for $49,500 was to fund a 'Master Plan for Historic Preservation' for all three buildings.
- A second grant for $51,237 was to fund the restoration of the main church building's stained glass windows, which depict religious imagery including Jesus and a cross.
- In its applications, the church stated that due to declining membership and contributions, it lacked the funds to both preserve its buildings and fully serve its congregation's needs.
- The town approved the grants, conditioning them on the church conveying a perpetual historic preservation restriction to the town.
Procedural Posture:
- A group of taxpayers, led by David Caplan, sued the Town of Acton in Massachusetts Superior Court.
- The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the grants violated the state's anti-aid amendment and requested a preliminary injunction to prevent the disbursement of funds.
- The Superior Court judge denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.
- The Superior Court judge also granted the town's motion for a protective order, which stayed discovery proceedings.
- The plaintiffs appealed the trial court's orders to the state's intermediate appellate court.
- The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the state's highest court, granted the plaintiffs' application for direct appellate review before the intermediate court could hear the case.
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Issue:
Does the grant of public funds under the Community Preservation Act to an active church for the purpose of historic preservation violate the anti-aid amendment of the Massachusetts Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Gants, C.J.
Yes, such grants may violate the anti-aid amendment depending on the outcome of a three-factor analysis. The anti-aid amendment does not impose a categorical ban on aid to churches, but rather requires a case-by-case evaluation using the three-factor test from Commonwealth v. School Comm. of Springfield. The factors are: (1) the motivating purpose of the grant, (2) whether the grant substantially aids the church, and (3) whether the grant avoids the risks of political and economic abuse that prompted the amendment. Here, the stained glass grant is likely unconstitutional because it substantially aids the church by freeing up funds for its religious mission and, due to the explicit religious imagery, it presents significant risks of infringing on taxpayer conscience, creating government entanglement with religion, and fostering political divisiveness. The Master Plan grant requires further factual development to determine its purpose and the extent to which it aids the church's religious versus secular property.
Concurring - Kafker, J.
Yes, the stained glass grant likely violates the anti-aid amendment, and this conclusion is consistent with the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment. The Supreme Court's decision in Trinity Lutheran prohibits excluding churches from generally available public benefits solely based on their religious identity. However, Locke v. Davey allows a narrow exception for denying funds for an 'essentially religious endeavor.' Funding the restoration of stained glass windows with explicit sectarian messages falls within this narrow Locke exception, so denying the grant does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The Master Plan grant is less clearly an 'essentially religious endeavor' and requires remand for further factual analysis under both state and federal constitutional law.
Dissenting - Cypher, J.
No, the grants do not violate the anti-aid amendment because their primary purpose is the secular goal of historic preservation, not aiding religion. The majority errs by applying 'careful scrutiny' to a religious institution, which contradicts precedent stating the anti-aid amendment treats religious and secular entities equally. This heightened scrutiny for an active church also creates a conflict with the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Trinity Lutheran, which forbids conditioning a public benefit on an applicant renouncing its religious character. The grants serve the important public purpose of preserving the Commonwealth's historic landscape, a benefit that should be available to historic churches just as it is to secular historic buildings.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies that Massachusetts's anti-aid amendment is not a categorical bar to funding religious institutions, instead requiring a flexible, fact-intensive inquiry. It establishes the Springfield test as the governing framework for historic preservation grants to active churches, focusing courts on the grant's specific purpose, effect, and potential for creating strife. The ruling signals that grants for inherently religious elements of a building, such as stained glass with religious iconography, face a high constitutional hurdle, whereas aid for more secular aspects may be permissible. This creates a nuanced precedent that will guide municipalities in balancing historic preservation goals with the constitutional separation of church and state.
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