No. Simply making a song available online isn't the same as 'distributing' it under the law. The judge explained that the legal definition of 'distribution' means an actual transfer has to happen, like selling a CD or emailing a file. The instruction he originally gave the jury—that just making the files available was enough to be guilty—was a mistake. Because the jury might have found Thomas guilty based on this wrong rule, their decision wasn't fair. Therefore, the judge threw out the original verdict and ordered a brand new trial.

No, just putting songs in a shared folder so others could download them isn't enough to be illegal sharing under copyright law. For it to be illegal, there needs to be proof the files were actually shared and downloaded by someone else. The judge said the jury was told the wrong thing, so Thomas should get a new trial. The judge also said the amount Thomas was ordered to pay was way too high compared to the actual harm, and suggested Congress should change the law on this for cases involving individuals not trying to make money.

Although Chief Judge Davis, who presided over the case, ordered a new trial because of an error in the jury instructions, not because of the size of the award, he noted in dictum that "the award of hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages" for file-sharing was "unprecedented and oppressive."

Because the record strongly suggests that TBL's motive was to profit from its conduct, a substantial statutory damages award is likely to discourage TBL's conduct.

D] irect proof of actual dissemination is not required by the Copyright Act. Plaintiffs are free to employ circumstantial evidence to attempt to prove actual dissemination

The Court's examination of the use of the term `distribution'in other provisions of the Copyright Act, as well as the evolution of liability for offers to sell in the analogous Patent Act, lead to the conclusion that the plain meaning of the term `distribution'does not include making available and, instead, requires actual dissemination

Because the Court has held that the Copyright Act does not provide a making-available right, it will not enjoin Thomas-Rasset from making the copyrighted sound recordings available to the public.

But "[t] he general rule, supported by the great weight of authority, is that infringement of the distribution right requires an actual dissemination of either copies or phonorecords."

—a peer-to-peer file-sharing case, in which a jury awarded $80,000 per infringed song against an individual file-sharer, for a total award of over $1.92 million, despite the trial judge' s estimate of actual damages of around $50

Thomas allegedly infringed on the copyrights of 24 songs-the equivalent of approximately three CDs, costing less than $54

The Court would be remiss if it did not take this opportunity to implore Congress to amend the Copyright Act to address liability and damages in peer-to-peer network cases

Not only did the court recognize that National Car Rental, and not Hotaling, is binding precedent in the Eighth Circuit, it further posited that "National Car Rental, not Hotaling, is consistent with the logical statutory interpretation of § 106 (3), the body of Copyright Act case law, and the legislative history of the Copyright Act

No. To violate the exclusive right of distribution under § 106(3) of the Copyright Act, there must be an actual dissemination of a copy or phonorecord; merely making a work available on a peer-to-peer network is not sufficient. The court's previous instruction to the jury, stating that making works available was enough to find a violation, was a manifest error of law. The plain meaning of 'distribute' in § 106(3), described by terms like 'sale,' 'lease,' and 'transfer,' implies an actual change in possession. This interpretation is supported by Eighth Circuit precedent in *National Car Rental System, Inc. v. Computer Associates Int'l, Inc.*, which explicitly states that infringement of the distribution right requires 'an actual dissemination.' The court rejected the argument that 'distribution' is synonymous with the broader term 'publication,' which does include 'offering to distribute.' It also found that the 'to authorize' language in § 106 creates a basis for secondary liability, not an independent right of direct infringement. Because the jury may have based its verdict on the erroneous 'making available' instruction, a new trial is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

No, the act of making copyrighted sound recordings available for electronic distribution on a peer-to-peer network does not constitute distribution under 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) without proof of actual dissemination. The Court holds that distribution requires an actual dissemination of either copies or phonorecords. The Court reasoned that the plain meaning of the term 'distribution' does not include making available and instead requires actual dissemination. This interpretation is supported by the statutory language, the legislative history, and the Supreme Court's opinion in Harper & Row. The jury instruction stating that making works available violates the distribution right was erroneous and prejudicial, warranting a new trial. The Court also expresses the need for legislative reform of statutory damages in peer-to-peer copyright infringement cases involving non-commercial individuals, where current damages are wholly disproportionate to the actual harm.

Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset

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