Cannon v. University of Chicago et al.
441 U.S. 677 (1979)
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Rule of Law:
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 contains an implied private right of action, allowing individuals who allege sex discrimination by a federally funded educational institution to sue that institution directly in federal court, even though the statute only expressly provides for an administrative remedy.
Facts:
- Geraldine Cannon applied for admission to the medical schools at the University of Chicago and Northwestern University.
- Both universities received federal financial assistance for their medical education programs.
- Both universities denied Cannon's applications for admission.
- Cannon alleged that the universities denied her applications because she is a woman.
- At the time of her applications, Cannon was 39 years old, and the universities had policies that disfavored or absolutely disqualified applicants over a certain age.
- Cannon claimed these age-based policies disproportionately excluded women from consideration.
Procedural Posture:
- Geraldine Cannon sued the University of Chicago and Northwestern University in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
- The universities filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.
- The District Court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that Title IX did not provide an implied private remedy.
- Cannon (appellant) appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the statute's administrative remedy of terminating federal funding was the exclusive means of enforcement.
- After the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 was enacted, the Court of Appeals granted a rehearing but ultimately adhered to its original decision.
- Cannon petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does § 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibits sex discrimination in federally funded education programs but does not expressly authorize a private cause of action, implicitly create a private right for individuals to sue for alleged violations?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
Yes. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 implies a private right of action for individuals to sue educational institutions for alleged sex discrimination. The Court applied the four-factor test from Cort v. Ash and found all factors supported implying a remedy. First, the statute's plain language—'No person...shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded'—was enacted for the especial benefit of a class of which Cannon is a member. Second, the legislative history indicates Congress intended to create a private remedy, as Title IX was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which was understood at the time to contain an implied private remedy. Third, a private remedy is consistent with the legislative scheme's dual purposes of preventing the use of federal funds for discrimination and providing individual citizens with effective protection; the administrative remedy of terminating funding is a severe, last-resort measure ill-suited to remedying isolated violations. Fourth, protecting citizens from discrimination is a matter of primary federal concern, not one traditionally relegated to the states.
Concurring - Justice Rehnquist
Yes. While the question of a private right of action is one of statutory construction, the legal context at the time Congress enacted Title IX gave it good reason to believe that the federal judiciary would imply a private remedy where one was not specified. However, the far better course is for Congress to explicitly create causes of action. This opinion signals that in the future, the Court should be 'extremely reluctant' to imply a cause of action absent such specificity from the Legislative Branch.
Dissenting - Justice White
No. The legislative history and statutory scheme show that Congress did not intend to provide a new private cause of action under Title IX. Title IX was patterned on Title VI, which was a mandate for federal agencies to eliminate discrimination, not a grant of a new private remedy against private institutions. Congress intended agency action to be the principal enforcement mechanism, and it did not contemplate creating new private remedies beyond those already existing under statutes like 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for discrimination under color of state law. The lower court cases implying a remedy under Title VI are unpersuasive and there is no evidence Congress relied upon them.
Dissenting - Justice Powell
No. Federal courts should not assume the legislative role of creating private remedies where Congress has not explicitly done so, as this violates the separation of powers. The four-factor test from Cort v. Ash is an 'open invitation to federal courts to legislate' and should be rejected. Absent compelling evidence of affirmative congressional intent, a court should not infer a private cause of action. Implying a remedy in this case creates a risk of vexatious litigation that burdens academic institutions, a significant policy decision that should be made by Congress, which provided an administrative enforcement mechanism it deemed adequate.
Analysis:
This decision established a significant tool for the private enforcement of Title IX, empowering individuals to sue educational institutions directly for sex discrimination. It affirmed the vitality of the Cort v. Ash framework for implying private rights of action, relying heavily on legislative history and congressional intent at the time of enactment. However, the strong dissenting and concurring opinions signaled a growing judicial skepticism toward this practice, foreshadowing a future shift to a more restrictive approach that would demand much clearer evidence of congressional intent before implying such remedies.
