Candler v. Smith
179 S.E. 395, 1935 Ga. App. LEXIS 264, 50 Ga. App. 667 (1935)
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Rule of Law:
The owner or keeper of a wild animal, known as an animal ferae naturae, is held to a strict liability standard, meaning negligence is presumed if the animal escapes and causes injury. Knowledge of the animal's dangerous propensities is presumed by law and does not need to be separately proven by the plaintiff.
Facts:
- Asa G. Candler Jr. maintained a private zoo on his residential property, which housed various wild animals, including a baboon.
- The baboon escaped from its enclosure at the zoo.
- The escaped baboon entered Mrs. M. L. Smith's automobile, which was parked in the driveway of her home.
- When Smith discovered the baboon, it advanced toward her in a menacing manner.
- As Smith fled back into her house to escape the baboon, she tripped on a doormat, fell, and sustained physical injuries.
- The baboon then returned to the car, took Smith's pocketbook, and destroyed its contents, including currency.
- Smith suffered a severe nervous shock and fright as a direct result of the confrontation and her subsequent fall.
Procedural Posture:
- Mrs. M. L. Smith filed a suit for damages against Asa G. Candler Jr. in a Georgia trial court.
- The defendant, Candler, demurred to the petition (filed a motion to dismiss), arguing the plaintiff failed to allege his negligence or knowledge of the baboon's vicious propensities.
- The trial judge overruled the demurrer.
- The case proceeded to a jury trial, which resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff, Smith, for $10,000.
- The defendant moved for a new trial, but the trial judge overruled the motion.
- The defendant, Candler (appellant), appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals of Georgia, with Smith as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does the owner of a wild animal (ferae naturae) have a duty of strict liability, making them liable for injuries caused by the animal's escape regardless of proof of the owner's specific negligence or knowledge of the animal's viciousness?
Opinions:
Majority - Sutton, J.
Yes, the owner of a wild animal is held to a strict liability standard for injuries it causes. The law presumes negligence when an animal ferae naturae escapes and causes harm, because the keeper's duty is to keep such an animal perfectly secure. Unlike cases involving domesticated animals, a plaintiff does not need to prove that the owner knew of the animal's specific vicious propensities, as such knowledge is presumed for any animal considered ferae naturae, such as a baboon. The court reasoned that safety from such animals lies only in keeping them perfectly secure, and the owner keeps them at their peril. The occurrence of an injury from an escaped wild animal is sufficient evidence that the required degree of care was not exercised. Furthermore, damages for fright and nervous shock are recoverable when they are accompanied by a physical injury, such as the fall and bruises Smith sustained while fleeing.
Dissenting - Stephens, J.
No, the judgment should not be affirmed. While concurring with the majority's general rulings on liability for wild animals, the dissent argues that the trial court committed a reversible error by refusing to give the jury specific instructions requested by the defendant. The requested instructions concerned proximate cause and the possibility of remote damages, which were pertinent because evidence suggested Smith's long-term nervous condition might have been caused by factors other than the baboon incident. The defendant was entitled to have the jury specifically consider whether Smith's condition was a direct result of the tort or if other circumstances were the preponderant cause. The failure to give these specific, relevant instructions deprived the defendant of a fair consideration of that issue and warrants a new trial.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the common law doctrine of strict liability for keepers of wild animals (ferae naturae) in Georgia. It clearly distinguishes the standard of care for wild animals from that for domesticated animals (mansuetae naturae), where a plaintiff must prove the owner had knowledge of the specific animal's vicious propensity. The decision establishes that for inherently dangerous animals, the owner's knowledge is presumed, and the act of the animal escaping is itself proof of a breach of the duty to keep it secure. This precedent significantly lowers the evidentiary burden for plaintiffs injured by escaped wild animals and reinforces the principle that those who harbor such animals do so at their own risk.
