Campos-Chaves v. Garland
602 U.S. 447 (2024)
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Rule of Law:
A noncitizen cannot rescind an in absentia removal order for lack of notice under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) if they received a hearing notice compliant with § 1229(a)(2) for the specific hearing they missed, even if the initial notice to appear under § 1229(a)(1) was defective for omitting the time and place of the proceeding.
Facts:
- Moris Esmelis Campos-Chaves, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States without inspection in 2005.
- The government served Campos-Chaves with a Notice to Appear (NTA) that listed the hearing date and time as 'a date to be set' and 'a time to be set.'
- A few months later, the government sent Campos-Chaves a notice of hearing with a specific date and time for his removal proceeding.
- Campos-Chaves failed to appear at the scheduled hearing.
- In separate but similar circumstances, Varinder Singh and Raul Daniel Mendez-Colín also each received an initial NTA that omitted the specific hearing time and date, listing it as 'TBD' or 'to be set.'
- Both Singh and Mendez-Colín later received subsequent notices of hearing that provided a specific time and date for their respective removal proceedings.
- Both Singh and Mendez-Colín failed to appear at their scheduled hearings.
Procedural Posture:
- In three separate cases, Immigration Judges entered in absentia orders of removal against Campos-Chaves, Singh, and Mendez-Colín after they failed to appear for their hearings.
- Each individual later filed a motion to reopen their proceedings, arguing their initial NTAs were defective. The Immigration Judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied their motions.
- Campos-Chaves (petitioner) sought review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which denied his petition.
- Singh and Mendez-Colín (petitioners) sought review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which granted their petitions, creating a circuit split.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the circuits.
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Issue:
Does a noncitizen's receipt of a subsequent hearing notice under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2) that provides the correct time and place for a removal hearing preclude them from rescinding an in absentia removal order under § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), even if their initial notice to appear under § 1229(a)(1) was defective for omitting that same information?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Alito
Yes, receipt of a subsequent, compliant hearing notice precludes rescission of an in absentia removal order based on an initially defective notice to appear. To rescind such an order, an alien must demonstrate they did not receive proper notice for the specific hearing at which they were ordered removed. The statutory text 'notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)' is disjunctive, meaning a compliant notice under either paragraph is sufficient. It would be incongruous for the law to require more notice to defend against rescission than is required to issue the removal order in the first place, as § 1229a(b)(5)(A) allows removal based on notice under 'paragraph (1) or (2).' A subsequent notice providing a specific time where one was previously 'to be set' constitutes a 'change' to a 'new' time, thereby qualifying as a valid paragraph (2) notice. The Court's prior statements in Pereira and Niz-Chavez suggesting a paragraph (2) notice requires a valid paragraph (1) notice were dicta and not controlling here.
Dissenting - Justice Jackson
No, a subsequent notice cannot cure a defective initial notice to appear, and therefore should not preclude rescission. The plain text and statutory structure establish that a Notice to Appear under paragraph (1) is a mandatory, foundational document, while a paragraph (2) notice is supplemental and is only meant to 'change or postpon[e]' a time and place that has already been properly set. One cannot 'change' or provide a 'new' time if no 'old' time ever existed in the statutorily required initial document. Because the initial NTAs were defective and no valid paragraph (2) notice could logically follow, the noncitizens did not receive notice 'in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)' and should be able to seek rescission. The majority's holding ignores the Court's own reasoning in Pereira and Niz-Chavez, blesses the government's 'abject noncompliance' with the law, and removes the government's incentive to issue proper notices from the start.
Analysis:
This decision resolves a circuit split by holding that a factually sufficient notice for a specific hearing is what matters for sustaining an in absentia removal order, regardless of defects in the initial charging document. It significantly curtails a noncitizen's ability to reopen old removal orders based on the government's widespread past practice of issuing NTAs without specific time-and-date information. The ruling effectively lowers the procedural bar for the government by allowing it to cure defective initial notices with subsequent hearing notices, thereby weakening the formal requirements for the foundational NTA document as laid out in the statute and discussed in prior cases like Niz-Chavez.
