Campbell v. Wood
1994 WL 33393, 18 F.3d 662 (1994)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A method of execution does not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment if it does not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, even if the method has been abandoned by a vast majority of states. Additionally, a defendant in a capital case may knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive their fundamental right to be present at the empaneling of the jury.
Facts:
- In 1974, Charles Campbell assaulted and sodomized Renae Wicklund while threatening her one-year-old daughter, Shannah.
- Both Renae Wicklund and her neighbor, Barbara Hendrickson, testified against Campbell at his 1976 trial for these crimes, which resulted in his conviction and imprisonment.
- In March 1982, Campbell was transferred from prison to a work-release facility.
- On April 14, 1982, Renae Wicklund, her now eight-year-old daughter Shannah, and Barbara Hendrickson were found brutally slain in the Wicklund residence.
- All three victims had been beaten and had their throats cut with a knife.
- Police found Wicklund's earrings in Campbell's possession, found Shannah's earring in his car, and matched his fingerprint to a glass in the Wicklunds' kitchen.
- Investigators later recovered more of the victims' property from a river where Campbell had been on the evening of the murders.
Procedural Posture:
- Charles Campbell was convicted in Snohomish County Superior Court (a trial court) of three counts of aggravated first-degree murder and sentenced to death.
- The Washington Supreme Court (the state's highest court) affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal.
- Campbell filed a first federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, which was denied.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the first petition.
- Campbell filed a second federal habeas corpus petition in the same district court, which held an evidentiary hearing and denied the petition.
- Campbell appealed the denial of his second petition to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit granted a stay of execution pending appeal.
- The Ninth Circuit then granted a rehearing en banc and ordered a limited remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on whether execution by hanging violates the Eighth Amendment.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does execution by judicial hanging, as performed under Washington's statutory protocol, constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Beezer, J.
No. Execution by judicial hanging does not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment because it does not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. The Eighth Amendment forbids punishments that were considered cruel at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted and those contrary to 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' The court distinguishes between 'proportionality review,' which examines legislative consensus to determine if a punishment is excessive for a crime, and 'methodology review,' which focuses on the pain involved in the execution itself. While most states have abandoned hanging, this legislative trend is not dispositive for methodology review. The primary inquiry is whether the method involves 'the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.' Based on an evidentiary hearing regarding Washington's 'long-drop' protocol, the court finds the method is designed to cause rapid unconsciousness and death, thereby minimizing pain. The court concludes that the risk of accidental decapitation or slow strangulation is not substantial enough to render the practice unconstitutional, as the Eighth Amendment does not guarantee a painless death, only one free from purposeful cruelty.
Dissenting - Reinhardt, J.
Yes. Execution by judicial hanging violates the Eighth Amendment because it is a barbaric practice that is inconsistent with evolving standards of decency. The majority errs by creating a factitious distinction between 'methodology review' and 'proportionality review' and by improperly limiting its inquiry to whether the punishment inflicts unnecessary pain. The proper constitutional analysis requires examining whether the punishment comports with society's contemporary standards. The near-universal rejection of hanging by 46 states provides overwhelming objective evidence that society considers it a cruel and inhumane practice. Furthermore, hanging is a degrading and dehumanizing procedure that carries a significant and foreseeable risk of mutilation (decapitation) or a slow, torturous death by strangulation. Even under the majority's flawed 'unnecessary pain' test, hanging is unconstitutional because less painful and more reliable alternatives, such as lethal injection, are available, making the risks inherent in hanging unnecessary.
Dissenting - Poole, J.
Yes. Death by hanging inflicts intolerably cruel and unusual punishment. The method is as unacceptable in modern society as the rack and screw and is therefore in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a significant and controversial framework for analyzing Eighth Amendment challenges to methods of execution within the Ninth Circuit. By creating a distinction between 'methodology review' and 'proportionality review,' the court insulates methods of punishment from challenges based on their widespread legislative rejection. This precedent makes it substantially more difficult to invalidate a method of execution on Eighth Amendment grounds, shifting the focus almost exclusively to whether a state's protocol is designed to minimize pain, rather than whether the method itself comports with national standards of decency. The ruling solidifies the principle that a method's archaic nature or unpopularity is not, by itself, a basis for finding it unconstitutional.
Unlock the full brief for Campbell v. Wood