Campbell v. Seaman
63 N.Y. 568 (1876)
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Rule of Law:
An owner's use of their property, even for a lawful business, constitutes an actionable nuisance if it produces a tangible and appreciable injury to neighboring property, for which an injunction is a proper remedy.
Facts:
- The plaintiffs, the Campbells, owned a forty-acre property on the Hudson River, upon which they built an expensive home and cultivated with ornamental and useful trees, shrubs, and vines.
- The defendant, Seaman, owned an adjoining property which he used as a brick-yard.
- In his brick-burning process, Seaman used anthracite coal, which generated sulphuric acid gas.
- When the wind was from the south, this gas would blow over the Campbells' land.
- During 1869 and 1870, the gas killed the foliage on the Campbells' pine and spruce trees, destroying between 100 and 150 of them, and also injured their grape vines and plum trees.
- The gas was not emitted continuously, but primarily during the final two days of burning a kiln.
Procedural Posture:
- The Campbells sued Seaman for damages and an injunction.
- The case was tried before a referee, who found for the Campbells, awarding $500 in damages and granting an injunction to restrain the nuisance.
- A judgment was entered based on the referee's report.
- Seaman, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the General Term of the Supreme Court, an intermediate appellate court.
- The General Term affirmed the judgment, with the Campbells as appellees.
- Seaman then appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does a lawful business's emission of noxious gas, which causes substantial physical damage to an adjoining property owner's trees and vegetation, constitute a nuisance that a court of equity may enjoin?
Opinions:
Majority - Earl, J.
Yes. The emission of noxious gas that causes tangible injury to an adjoining property is a nuisance that may be enjoined. While every person has the right to use their property for their own interests, this right is limited by the principle that one cannot use their property to injure another's. A use becomes an unreasonable nuisance when it produces a tangible and appreciable injury to neighboring property. The court rejected the defense that the brick-yard was a reasonable use of property in a convenient location, focusing instead on the actual physical harm caused to the Campbells' property. An injunction is the appropriate remedy because monetary damages are inadequate to compensate for the destruction of ornamental trees and the loss of enjoyment of one's home. Furthermore, an injunction prevents a multiplicity of future lawsuits, as the injury is recurring. The fact that Seaman's brick-yard existed before the Campbells built their home is not a defense, as one cannot establish a nuisance and thereby control how a neighbor may use their land in the future.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the principle that tangible physical harm to property from a neighboring land use is a per se nuisance, regardless of the social utility or location of the offending activity. It strongly affirms the power of equity courts to issue injunctions to stop recurring nuisances, especially where damages are inadequate to compensate for harm to the enjoyment of real property. The decision explicitly rejects a balancing of the hardships or a 'convenient location' defense when the plaintiff suffers substantial, non-trivial physical damage, setting a precedent that prioritizes the right to quiet enjoyment of property over industrial convenience.
