No. The special law for sailors doesn't protect you if you get hurt before you even start working on the ship. The court said that to be a 'seaman' (a sailor), you need a real, solid connection to a ship. Campbell's connection was only in the future; he *planned* to be a seaman, but when he got hurt, he was still just a regular land-based worker. An older case said the law is for 'sailors who are actually sailors,' not for 'people who are about to become sailors.' Because Campbell never got on the boat, he wasn't a 'seaman in being,' so the special law doesn't apply to him.

No, Lance Campbell isn't considered a 'seaman' because he wasn't working on the ship yet and didn't have a strong enough job connection to the ship. We have a two-part test to decide if someone is a seaman: first, their job has to help the ship do its job, and second, they need to have a strong connection to the ship in terms of how long they work on it and what kind of work they do. Campbell doesn't pass the second part of this test. He never even started working on the ship and was still just a land worker when he got hurt. Even though he was planning to work on the cruise for seven months, he hadn't actually done it yet. The law doesn't cover people who might be seamen in the future, only those who are seamen right now. We've decided before that someone who gets hurt before they're assigned to a ship isn't a seaman. So, we're not going to change the law to include people who just plan to be seamen. The lower court was right to say Campbell wasn't a seaman and to decide in favor of Royal Caribbean.

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<opinion type="majority">
<author id="b896-22">
 PER CURIAM:
 <a class="footnote" href="#fn*" id="fn*_ref">
 *
 </a>
</author>

 Lance Campbell (“Campbell”) is a ballet dancer. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. (“Royal Caribbean”) hired Campbell to perform on its cruise ship, the Radiance of the Seas. Before embarking, Campbell participated in on-shore rehearsals for his performances on the cruise. He suffered injuries during one of these rehearsals. The sole question on appeal is whether Campbell qualifies as a “seaman” under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, given that he had not yet begun his journey on the ship. Based on Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent, we AFFIRM the district court’s ruling that Campbell does not qualify as a seaman.
 

 The Supreme Court in
 
 Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis,
 
 515 U.S. 347, 368, 115 S.Ct. 2172, 132 L.Ed.2d 314 (1995), fashioned a
 
 *873
 
 two-part test to determine if an employee is a “seaman” and therefore can bring a Jones Act claim. First, “an employee’s duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission.”
 
 Id.
 
 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court emphasized that this is a “very broad” threshold requirement: “All who work at sea in the service of a ship are
 
 eligible
 
 for seaman status.”
 
 Id.
 
 (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, “a seaman must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature.”
 
 Id.
 
 The Court clarified that a seaman’s connection to a vessel must be substantial in both respects.
 
 Id.
 
 at 370, 115 S.Ct. 2172.
 
<blockquote id="b897-5">
 The duration of a worker’s connection to a vessel and the nature of the worker’s activities, taken together, determine whether a maritime employee is a seaman because the ultimate inquiry is whether the worker in question is a member of the vessel’s crew or simply a land-based employee who happens to be working on the vessel at a given time.
 </blockquote>


 Id.
 


 In
 
 Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co.,
 
 342 U.S. 187, 72 S.Ct. 216, 96 L.Ed. 205 (1952), the Court concluded that a worker who suffered injuries while completing land-based work in preparation for placing boats in the water and serving as a boat operator was not a seaman. The Court noted that the employee “was a probable navigator in the near future, but
 
 the law does not cover probable or expectant seamen but seamen in being.” Id.
 
 at 191, 72 S.Ct. 216 (emphasis added).
 

 In
 
 Ramos v. Delmar Systems, Inc.,
 
 750 F.2d 389, 390 (5th Cir.1985) (per curiam), we held that an employee who suffered an injury before the employer actually assigned him to a particular vessel or group of vessels was not a seaman. More recently, we ruled that a “land-based employee who is permanently assigned to work in the service of a vessel but who spends only 10% of his time working aboard the vessel” is not a seaman.
 
 Nunez v. B &amp; B Dredging, Inc.,
 
 288 F.3d 271, 273 (5th Cir.2002).
 

 In light of these precedents, we decline Campbell’s invitation to expand Jones Act coverage to those who simply
 
 intend
 
 to serve as a seaman. Campbell has not shown that he had “a connection to a vessel in navigation (or an identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature.”
 
 Chandris,
 
 515 U.S. at 376, 115 S.Ct. 2172. Campbell never embarked on any vessel. Although he
 
 intended
 
 to spend seven months on the cruise as an entertainer, he did not in fact do so. See
 
 Nunez,
 
 288 F.3d at 276 (noting that a worker must spend at least some time aboard the vessel to qualify as a seaman). As the Supreme Court stated, “the law does not cover probable or expectant seamen but seamen in being.”
 
 Desper,
 
 342 U.S. at 191, 72 S.Ct. 216. Until Campbell actually embarked on the cruise to perform his ballet, he was a land-based worker. Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that Campbell was not a seaman and properly granted summary judgment to Royal Caribbean.
 

 AFFIRMED.
 

<div class="footnotes"><div class="footnote" id="fn*" label="*">
<a class="footnote" href="#fn*_ref">
 *
 </a>

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
 
</div></div></opinion>

No. An employee does not qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act unless they are a 'seaman in being,' not merely a 'probable or expectant' one. The court applied the two-part test from *Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis*, which requires that an employee's duties contribute to the vessel's function and that the employee has a connection to the vessel that is substantial in both duration and nature. Campbell failed the second part of this test. Although he intended to spend seven months on the cruise, his connection never materialized because he never actually embarked on the vessel. Citing *Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co.*, the court reasoned that the law does not cover individuals who simply intend to serve as seamen. Until Campbell began his service at sea, he was a land-based worker, and his claim could not be brought under the Jones Act.

No. I hold that Campbell does not qualify as a 'seaman' under the Jones Act because he lacks a substantial connection in terms of both duration and nature to a vessel in navigation. The Supreme Court in Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis established a two-part test to determine seaman status: first, an employee's duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission, and second, a seaman must have a connection to a vessel in navigation that is substantial in terms of both its duration and nature. Campbell fails to meet this second requirement. He never embarked on any vessel and was still a land-based worker at the time of his injury. Although he intended to spend seven months on the cruise as an entertainer, he had not yet done so. The law does not cover probable or expectant seamen, but seamen in being, as stated in Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co. Furthermore, our precedent in Ramos v. Delmar Systems, Inc. held that an employee who suffered an injury before being assigned to a particular vessel was not a seaman. Therefore, we decline to expand Jones Act coverage to those who simply intend to serve as seamen. The district court correctly concluded that Campbell was not a seaman and properly granted summary judgment to Royal Caribbean.

Campbell v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.

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