Campbell v. Clinton
203 F.3d 19 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
Members of Congress lack standing to sue the President over the legality of military action when they retain legislative remedies, such as passing a law to stop the action, denying appropriations, or impeachment, because their votes are not considered completely nullified.
Facts:
- On March 24, 1999, President Bill Clinton announced the commencement of NATO air and cruise missile attacks against targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
- Two days later, President Clinton submitted a report to Congress regarding the military action, stating it was 'consistent with the War Powers Resolution.'
- On April 28, 1999, the U.S. House of Representatives voted on several measures concerning the conflict.
- The House defeated a declaration of war by a vote of 427 to 2.
- The House also defeated a resolution to authorize the air strikes by a tie vote of 213 to 213.
- Concurrently, the House defeated a measure that would have required the President to immediately end U.S. participation in the NATO operation.
- Congress subsequently passed an appropriations bill to fund the military involvement.
- The military campaign continued for 79 days, ending on June 10, 1999.
Procedural Posture:
- A group of 31 congressmen, led by Representative Tom Campbell, filed a lawsuit against President Bill Clinton in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
- The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the President's use of military force in Yugoslavia violated the War Powers Clause of the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution.
- The President, as the defendant, filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit.
- The district court (a court of first instance) granted the President's motion, dismissing the case on the grounds that the congressmen lacked legal standing.
- The congressmen (appellants) appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
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Issue:
Do members of Congress have standing to sue the President for allegedly violating the War Powers Resolution and the War Powers Clause of the Constitution by conducting a military campaign without a declaration of war or specific authorization, when Congress has voted on the matter but has not used its full legislative powers to stop the action?
Opinions:
Majority - Silberman
No. Members of Congress do not have standing to challenge the President's military actions when they retain adequate political and legislative remedies. The Supreme Court's decision in Raines v. Byrd established that legislative standing requires a 'complete nullification' of a legislator's vote, a standard not met here. Unlike the state senators in Coleman v. Miller, whose votes were treated as defeated when they should have passed, the appellant congressmen were not deprived of a legislative victory. The President did not claim to be acting pursuant to the defeated resolutions. More importantly, the congressmen retained ample power to stop the military campaign through other legislative means, such as passing a statute to forbid the use of forces, cutting off appropriations (which they instead voted to approve), or initiating impeachment. Because these political remedies were available, the injury is not a concrete and particularized one fit for judicial resolution but is rather a political dispute between the legislative and executive branches.
Concurring - Silberman
Even if the congressmen had standing, the case should be dismissed because it presents a nonjusticiable political question. The court lacks 'judicially discoverable and manageable standards' to determine what constitutes 'hostilities' under the War Powers Resolution or 'war' in the constitutional sense. These are inherently political judgments, and defining them would require the judiciary to make policy determinations that are constitutionally committed to the political branches. Furthermore, questions of which party initiated a conflict are often fact-intensive, sensitive, and unsuitable for judicial inquiry.
Concurring - Randolph
I concur in the judgment but disagree with the majority's reasoning on standing. The congressmen's votes against declaring war were not nullified; in fact, they were effective. A formal declaration of war triggers numerous statutory powers for the President. By voting against a declaration, the congressmen successfully deprived the President of this expanded authority, and the President never attempted to exercise those powers. Therefore, their votes had a significant legal effect and were not rendered a nullity. The plaintiffs' actual complaint is that the President ignored the War Powers Resolution, which is a generalized grievance about the President violating a law, not the specific injury of vote nullification required for standing.
Concurring - Tatel
I agree that existing precedent on legislative standing requires dismissal, but I strongly disagree that the case is nonjusticiable. The judiciary is fully capable of determining whether a military conflict constitutes 'war' in the constitutional sense, as it has done since the early days of the Republic in cases like Bas v. Tingy and The Prize Cases. Resolving whether the President has exceeded his constitutional authority is a core function of Article III courts and is a purely legal question, not a political one. The court's duty is 'to say what the law is,' and it should not abdicate this responsibility merely because a case involves foreign relations or has political overtones.
Analysis:
This decision significantly restricts the doctrine of legislative standing, reinforcing the high bar set by Raines v. Byrd. By holding that the availability of political remedies defeats standing, the court effectively channels disputes between Congress and the President over war powers away from the judiciary and back into the political arena. This makes it exceedingly difficult for individual members of Congress to use litigation as a tool to check presidential war-making. The ruling solidifies the principle that courts will avoid refereeing political battles between the other two branches, especially when Congress has not spoken with a unified voice or used its ultimate powers, like appropriations or impeachment.
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