Camp v. Camp
1979 Va. LEXIS 303, 220 Va. 595, 260 S.E.2d 243 (1979)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
When a deed contains two irreconcilably repugnant clauses, the first clause prevails. A conveyance to two or more persons "as tenants in common with the right of survivorship as at common law" creates a tenancy in common, as the latter clause is void for repugnancy.
Facts:
- In 1955, Robert Camp, Jr., an unmarried man, and his mother, Tincy Camp, agreed to purchase a house and lot together.
- Tincy Camp hired an attorney who drafted a deed to convey the property to Robert Camp, Jr. and Tincy Camp.
- The deed's granting clause conveyed the property to them "as tenants in common with the right of survivorship as at common law."
- As part of the purchase, Robert Camp, Jr. and Tincy Camp assumed the obligations of two existing deeds of trust on the property.
- In 1956, Robert Camp, Jr. married Hilda Camp.
- In 1966, Robert Camp, Jr. died, survived by his wife Hilda, six children, and his mother Tincy.
- Following Robert's death, a dispute arose between his widow, Hilda Camp, and his mother, Tincy Camp, over ownership of the property.
Procedural Posture:
- Hilda Camp, the widow of Robert Camp, Jr., filed a petition for declaratory judgment in a trial court of equity against Tincy Camp.
- Hilda Camp sought a declaration that she and her children held a one-half interest in the property as tenants in common.
- Tincy Camp responded, asserting that the deed created a joint tenancy and she owned the property in fee simple through right of survivorship.
- The trial court (chancellor) heard ore tenus testimony from the attorney who drafted the deed.
- The trial court found that the parties intended to create a joint tenancy and ruled in favor of Tincy Camp, holding that she owned the property in fee simple.
- Hilda Camp (appellant) appealed the trial court's decision to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a deed conveying real property to two individuals "as tenants in common with the right of survivorship as at common law" create a joint tenancy with a right of survivorship, or does it create a tenancy in common?
Opinions:
Majority - Compton, J.
No, this language creates a tenancy in common. The primary goal in deed construction is to ascertain the parties' intention from the language used in the instrument. Parol evidence, such as the drafting attorney's testimony about the grantees' intent, is inadmissible to contradict or vary the terms of a valid written deed. The language "as tenants in common" is totally and irreconcilably repugnant to the words "with the right of survivorship as at common law," as a tenancy in common by definition lacks survivorship rights. Under the established rule of construction for deeds, where two clauses are irreconcilably repugnant, the first clause prevails. Therefore, the conveyance created a tenancy in common, and the subsequent language conferring survivorship rights is rejected as surplusage.
Dissenting - Poff, J.
Yes, this language should be construed to create a joint tenancy with a right of survivorship. The majority's mechanistic application of the repugnant clauses rule defeats the clear intent of the parties. Virginia statutes permit the creation of survivorship estates where the intent to do so "manifestly appears from the tenor of the instrument." The inclusion of the explicit phrase "with the right of survivorship as at common law" is the clearest possible manifestation of such intent. The language is not irreconcilably repugnant but rather an inartful attempt to create a joint tenancy. The court should give effect to the parties' obvious intent rather than treating the most crucial language as mere surplusage.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms a rigid, formalistic rule of deed construction, prioritizing textual consistency over extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent. By strictly applying the rule that the first of two repugnant clauses prevails, the court demonstrates a reluctance to reform ambiguous instruments, even when the drafter's intent seems apparent. The case serves as a significant cautionary tale for legal drafters, emphasizing that the use of contradictory legal terms of art can lead to outcomes directly opposed to the clients' wishes. It solidifies the principle that parol evidence cannot be used to correct such a fundamental drafting error in a deed.
