David R. Camm v. State of Indiana
908 N.E.2d 215 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
Under Indiana Evidence Rule 803(3), a declarant's statement of then-existing state of mind is admissible to prove the declarant's own future conduct, but it is not admissible to prove the future conduct of a third party.
Facts:
- David Camm's wife, Kim, and their two children were found shot to death in the family's garage.
- On the day of the murders, Kim Camm told her friend, Cindy Mattingly, that she was expecting her husband home between 7:00 and 7:30 p.m.
- Camm claimed he was playing basketball at a nearby church from approximately 7:00 p.m. to 9:22 p.m. on the night of the murders.
- An autopsy of Camm's daughter revealed blunt force trauma to her external genital region, which expert testimony suggested was consistent with sexual molestation occurring within 24 hours of her death.
- Investigators discovered the DNA of another man, Charles Boney, on a sweatshirt found under the son's body.
- Police also matched Boney's palm print to one found at the crime scene.
- After his arrest, Boney eventually asserted that he had provided a gun for Camm and was present when the three victims were shot.
Procedural Posture:
- David R. Camm was first convicted by a jury in 2002 for the murders of his wife and two children.
- The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed Camm's initial conviction, finding prejudice from improperly admitted character evidence related to his extramarital affairs.
- Following remand, the State recharged Camm with three counts of Murder and added one count of Conspiracy to Commit Murder.
- The case was transferred to the Warrick Superior Court for a second trial.
- At the close of the State's case-in-chief in the second trial, the trial court entered a judgment on the evidence in favor of Camm on the conspiracy charge.
- A jury in the second trial convicted Camm on the three remaining Murder counts.
- The trial court sentenced Camm to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
- Camm filed a direct appeal of his convictions and sentence to the Supreme Court of Indiana.
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Issue:
Does Indiana Evidence Rule 803(3), the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule, permit the admission of a declarant's statement expressing their belief or expectation of a third party's future actions to prove that the third party acted in conformity with that belief?
Opinions:
Majority - Dickson, J.
No, Indiana Evidence Rule 803(3) does not permit the admission of a declarant's statement of belief about a third party's future conduct to prove that conduct. The court identified two independent grounds for reversing Camm's conviction. First, the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce highly speculative and inflammatory evidence that Camm had molested his daughter as a motive for the murders. The State failed to satisfy the test for admissibility under Rule 404(b) because there was no competent evidence connecting Camm to the alleged molestation, and the evidence's extreme prejudicial effect far outweighed any probative value. Second, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the wife's hearsay statement that she expected Camm home between 7:00-7:30 p.m. While the state-of-mind exception allows statements of a declarant's intent to prove their own future actions (the Hillmon rule), it does not extend to a declarant's belief about another person's future actions. Such a statement relies on the declarant's perception and memory of a past fact, making it unreliable hearsay, and its admission was reversible error because it was critical to undermining Camm's alibi.
Dissenting - Shepard, C.J.
Yes, the evidence should have been permitted, and the conviction should be affirmed. The majority draws an unnecessarily fine distinction regarding the wife's hearsay statement under Rule 803(3); the difference between expecting her husband home and planning to meet him is not significant enough to warrant reversal. Furthermore, the evidence suggesting the daughter had been molested was probative of Camm's motive and should have been heard by the jury. The dissent argues that when considering this evidence alongside Camm's confessions to three different inmates and his suspicious behavior after the murders, there was more than enough evidence to support the jury's verdict.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the boundaries of two key Indiana evidence rules. It establishes a bright-line rule for the state-of-mind hearsay exception (Rule 803(3)), explicitly rejecting the extension of the Hillmon doctrine to prove the conduct of a third party, thereby aligning Indiana with a number of other jurisdictions. The decision also reinforces the stringent requirements for admitting 'other bad acts' evidence under Rule 404(b), emphasizing that prosecutors cannot use inflammatory theories of motive without sufficient proof directly linking the defendant to the alleged bad act. This holding serves as a strong caution against building a case on speculation and stacking inferences, particularly where the evidence has a high potential for unfair prejudice.
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