Camicia v. Howard S. Wright Construction Co.
317 P.3d 987, 179 Wash. 2d 684 (2014)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Washington's recreational use immunity statute (RCW 4.24.210) provides immunity to landowners only when they open land for the purpose of outdoor recreation, not merely when incidental recreational use occurs on land opened primarily for other public purposes like transportation, and the landowner must possess the authority to control public access for recreational purposes.
Facts:
- The Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) built the 1-90 bicycle trail in the mid-to-late 1980s as part of a multi-modal transportation facility using federal and state highway funds.
- WSDOT installed wooden posts (bollards) at intersections to prevent motor vehicles from entering the asphalt trail.
- In 2002, WSDOT determined the 1-90 trail was primarily for transportation, serving as the only non-motorized access to Mercer Island and across Lake Washington, and concluded it was not a public park or recreation area for federal Section 4(f) purposes.
- In 1987, WSDOT and the City of Mercer Island (City) entered into an agreement for the City to maintain and landscape transit facilities, including a portion of the 1-90 trail.
- The City of Mercer Island's 1991 Comprehensive Park, Recreation, Open Space, Arts and Trails Plan described the “1-90 Trail and Linear Park” as being "used as park lands."
- On April 1, 2000, WSDOT conveyed a portion of the trail, including the accident site, to the City via a quitclaim deed stipulating the property was transferred “for road/street purposes only, and no other use shall be made of said property without obtaining prior written approval of the grantor.”
- In 2006, Susan Camicia was bicycling along the 1-90 trail on Mercer Island, veered to avoid a construction fence footing, hit a wooden post, and was thrown from her bike, suffering severe injuries that rendered her paralyzed.
Procedural Posture:
- Susan Camicia sued the City of Mercer Island and Howard S. Wright Construction Company in King County Superior Court (trial court) for negligence.
- The City of Mercer Island moved for summary judgment in the King County Superior Court, asserting immunity under Washington’s recreational use immunity statute, RCW 4.24.210.
- Judge Douglas McBroom of the King County Superior Court denied the City's initial motion for summary judgment without prejudice, finding that issues of fact remained regarding ownership/control and whether the trail was sufficiently recreational for immunity.
- The case was transferred to Judge Laura Inveen, and the City renewed its motion for summary judgment, submitting additional evidence of ownership and control.
- Judge Laura Inveen of the King County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, ruling that the City had established ownership and that the trail's function as a transportation route did not affect the immunity inquiry.
- Camicia appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Washington Court of Appeals.
- The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, agreeing that disputed factual issues (regarding the public purpose of the trail) precluded summary judgment, and remanded the case for trial, with Camicia as the appellee and the City of Mercer Island as the appellant.
- The City of Mercer Island petitioned the Washington State Supreme Court for review, which was granted.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does Washington's recreational use immunity statute (RCW 4.24.210) provide immunity to a city for injuries sustained by a bicyclist on a trail if there are disputed material facts about whether the land was opened for the purpose of outdoor recreation, given its potential dual function as a transportation corridor?
Opinions:
Majority - Stephens, J.
Yes, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the 1-90 trail was opened for the purpose of outdoor recreation by the City of Mercer Island, thus precluding summary judgment based on recreational use immunity. The court reasoned that the recreational use immunity statute (RCW 4.24.210) applies only when a landowner allows public use for the purposes of outdoor recreation, not merely because incidental recreational use occurs on land primarily opened for another public purpose, such as transportation. The statute's intent, as articulated in RCW 4.24.200, is to "encourage owners...to make them available to the public for recreational purposes," implying an inducement for land that would not otherwise be open for recreation. The quitclaim deed restricted the land's use to "road/street purposes only" and WSDOT's prior determination of the trail's primary transportation purpose created a factual dispute about the City's primary purpose in opening the land and its authority to close it to transportation. The court clarified that the landowner's intent, not the user's intent, is determinative, and proof that land is opened for bicycling is not conclusive proof that it is opened for recreational purposes, as bicycling can serve both recreational and transportation functions. Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the summary judgment.
Dissenting - Madsen, C.J.
No, the recreational use immunity statute (RCW 4.24.210) should apply to the City of Mercer Island because there is abundant evidence that the City held the trail open for public recreational bicycling, even if it also served a transportation purpose. Chief Justice Madsen reasoned that nothing in the statute or its purpose precludes immunity for lands with "mixed uses"; the statute only requires that land be made available for public recreational use. To hold otherwise would discourage landowners from expanding public recreational opportunities on lands already open for other public uses, which contradicts the statute's goal of encouraging such opportunities, as stated in RCW 4.24.200. The dissent argued that the City clearly opened the land for recreational bicycling, an activity explicitly listed in the statute as recreational, and the "continuing authority to determine whether the land should be open to the public" requirement from Tennyson v. Plum Creek Timber Co. is inapposite here because the City is the landowner, and its authority to close for transportation is irrelevant to its authority to open for recreation. The relevant inquiry should be whether the landowner has authority to make the land available for public recreation, which the City did.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of Washington's recreational use immunity statute (RCW 4.24.210) to "mixed-use" public lands, especially those with both transportation and recreational functions. It establishes that immunity hinges on the landowner's purpose for opening the land for recreation, rather than merely the presence of recreational activity. This approach avoids an overly broad application of immunity that could absolve governmental entities of their common-law duties to maintain safe roadways and emphasizes that the landowner must have the actual authority to open or close the land for recreational use to qualify for the statute's inducement. Future cases involving public trails, parks, or facilities with dual purposes will require a careful factual inquiry into the original intent and ongoing management decisions of the landowner regarding recreational access and the limits of their control over the land's primary purpose.
