Cameron v. Cameron
641 S.W. 2d 210, 1982 Tex. LEXIS 358, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 34 (1982)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
In a Texas divorce proceeding, property acquired by spouses while domiciled in a common-law state will be treated as community property if it would have been community property had the couple been domiciled in Texas at the time of acquisition. This quasi-community property is subject to a just and right division, unlike true separate property, which cannot be divested from one spouse and awarded to the other.
Facts:
- Paul Cameron joined the United States Air Force in 1954.
- Paul Cameron married Sue Akers in Texas in 1957.
- Immediately after marrying, the couple moved to California, a community property state, where they lived for three months.
- For the remainder of Paul's military career, the couple lived in several common law property states, including Arkansas, Indiana, and Ohio.
- During the marriage and while living in common law states, the couple acquired U.S. Savings Bonds with Paul's earnings.
- In 1977, Paul retired from the Air Force, and the couple moved to Texas.
- In 1978, while both spouses were living in Texas, a suit for divorce was filed.
Procedural Posture:
- Sue Cameron filed a suit for divorce against Paul Cameron in a Texas trial court.
- The trial court awarded Sue Cameron 35% of Paul Cameron's future military retirement pay and 50% of the U.S. Savings Bonds.
- Paul Cameron, as appellant, appealed to the court of civil appeals (an intermediate appellate court).
- The court of civil appeals reversed the trial court's judgment in part, holding that the retirement pay and savings bonds were Paul Cameron's separate property and thus not subject to division.
- Sue Cameron, as appellant, sought review from the Supreme Court of Texas.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does property acquired by a married couple during their marriage while domiciled in a common-law state constitute 'separate property' under the Texas Constitution, thereby prohibiting a Texas court from dividing it upon divorce?
Opinions:
Majority - Pope, J.
No. Property acquired during marriage in a common-law state is not considered 'separate property' in the Texas constitutional sense and is therefore subject to division upon divorce. The court distinguishes between the concept of 'separate' property in common-law states (where one spouse may hold title, but the other retains equitable rights upon divorce) and the Texas constitutional definition of separate property (that which is owned before marriage or acquired during marriage by gift, devise, or descent). To achieve an equitable result and align Texas law with that of other community property states, the court judicially adopts the principles of the newly enacted but not yet effective Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.63(b). This creates a 'quasi-community property' characterization, allowing Texas courts to divide marital assets acquired elsewhere as if they were community property. The court simultaneously reaffirms its holding in Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, stating that true Texas separate property, both real and personal, remains inviolate and cannot be divested in a divorce.
Concurring - McGee, J.
Agrees with the judgment but disputes the majority's reasoning. This opinion argues that the majority's extensive discussion and reaffirmation of Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer is unnecessary dictum because the court found the savings bonds were not separate property to begin with. The concurrence strongly criticizes the Eggemeyer decision, asserting it was wrongly decided and that Texas courts, based on historical precedent, should have the statutory and constitutional power to divest a spouse of true separate personalty in certain circumstances to achieve an equitable division. The author contends that the phrase 'estate of the parties' historically included all property, not just community property, and that a division of separate property is a valid exercise of state power over the marital relationship, not a prohibited taking or an award of alimony.
Concurring - Greenhill, C.J.
Agrees with the substance of Justice McGee's concurrence and the Court's holding. This opinion emphasizes the judicial principle that constitutional grounds should not be decided unless absolutely necessary. It characterizes the majority's discussion of due process and the Eggemeyer rule as dictum. The author expresses hope that the Legislature will address the Court's power to deal with separate property to provide an alternative to enacting alimony statutes, which would be the likely result if the Eggemeyer dictum were to prevail.
Analysis:
This landmark decision effectively established the doctrine of 'quasi-community property' in Texas, preventing inequitable property divisions for couples who migrate from common-law states. By 'judicially adopting' a newly enacted statute before its effective date, the court signaled a major policy shift to protect the non-titled spouse's interest in the marital estate. However, the court's forceful reaffirmation of Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer cemented the rule that true Texas separate property cannot be divested, a position strongly contested in the concurrences. This created a clear distinction between divisible quasi-community property and indivisible separate property that continues to shape Texas divorce law.
