Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery
968 P.2d 65, 19 Cal.4th 714, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 506 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
California Civil Code section 847 grants landowners immunity from liability for injuries occurring on their property during or after the injured person's commission of an enumerated felony, unless the owner's conduct was willful, wanton, or criminal, or involved willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition. 'Willful or wanton conduct' refers to intentional wrongful conduct, done with knowledge that serious injury will probably result, or with a wanton and reckless disregard of possible results, but does not include intentional injurious acts that are justifiable under the circumstances (e.g., self-defense).
Facts:
- On October 12, 1990, Salvador Calvillo-Silva entered Home Grocery, owned by John Pacheco and Ramon Block and operated by employees Don Pacheco and Robert Sharp III, to purchase a soda.
- Three men, including Salvador, entered the store and attempted a robbery, during which one intruder pointed a pistol at Don Pacheco, and Robert Sharp III claimed Salvador held a knife to his throat (a claim Salvador denied and no knife was ever found).
- As the attempted robbery unfolded, Don Pacheco was unable to open the cash register, and the man with the pistol slapped Pacheco.
- After two of the alleged intruders had left, and the man with the pistol moved toward the front door, Don Pacheco retrieved a gun from under the counter and shot Salvador Calvillo-Silva in the back as he was running out of the store.
- Salvador Calvillo-Silva was rendered a paraplegic from the gunshot wound.
- Salvador Calvillo-Silva was subsequently charged with several felonies related to the incident and pleaded nolo contendere to felony attempted grand theft as part of a plea bargain.
Procedural Posture:
- On October 11, 1991, Salvador and Bertha Calvillo-Silva filed a complaint in superior court (trial court) against Home Grocery, its owners (John Pacheco and Ramon Block), its employees (Don Pacheco and Robert Sharp III), and the lessor (Daniel Dieguez), alleging various torts including assault and battery and negligence.
- Defendants asserted affirmative defenses, including contributory negligence, self-defense, and defense of property.
- In September 1993, defendant Dieguez moved for summary judgment, and the superior court, on its own initiative, requested briefing on Civil Code section 847 and subsequently granted Dieguez's motion.
- The remaining defendants (Home Grocery, Pachecos, and Sharp) then moved for summary judgment based on Civil Code section 847, which the superior court granted, finding no triable issue of fact as to the statute's applicability and the absence of 'willful, wanton, or criminal conduct'.
- The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeal, which overturned the summary judgment by a split vote, concluding that section 847 immunized only negligent conduct and did not protect the intentional use of deadly or injurious force.
- Defendants filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does California Civil Code section 847 provide immunity to a landowner for the intentional use of deadly force against a person who is later convicted of a statutorily enumerated felony, or is such immunity limited to negligent conduct or premises liability unrelated to intentional acts?
Opinions:
Majority - Baxter, J.
Yes, California Civil Code section 847 does provide immunity to a landowner for the intentional use of deadly force against a person later convicted of a statutorily enumerated felony, provided such force was justifiable under the circumstances, and is not limited solely to negligent conduct or premises liability. The court applied settled rules of statutory construction to interpret Section 847, considering its plain language and legislative intent. Subdivision (f) of Section 847 explicitly states that it 'does not limit the liability of an owner or an owner’s agent which otherwise exists for willful, wanton, or criminal conduct, or for willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity.' The court found that the statute's language and legislative history (aimed at partially reversing Rowland v. Christian and preventing criminals from suing victims) do not confine immunity solely to premises liability or negligent conduct. Instead, the exception for 'willful, wanton, or criminal conduct' implies that conduct not falling within this exception is immunized. 'Willful or wanton conduct' is defined as intentional wrongful conduct, done either with knowledge that serious injury will probably result, or with a wanton and reckless disregard of possible results. However, acts that are intentionally injurious but justifiable (e.g., self-defense or defense of property under Civil Code § 50) are considered not 'wrongful' and thus fall within the scope of immunity. The court rejected the argument that 'willful' in § 847 should adopt the Penal Code's definition of simple intent, emphasizing the requirement of 'wrongfulness' in the civil liability context. Given that the record presented conflicting inferences regarding whether the defendants' use of force (shooting Salvador in the back while he was reportedly fleeing and an alleged knife was disputed) was justifiable, summary judgment was deemed inappropriate, and the case was remanded for a factual determination of justification.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Werdegar, J.
Justice Werdegar concurred with the majority's reasoning and result, with the sole exception of footnote 18 in the majority opinion, which asserted that the plaintiff could not relitigate the facts behind his nolo contendere plea to avoid the statute's application. Justice Werdegar dissented from this specific point, arguing that under well-settled California law, as established in cases like Teitlebaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co. Ltd., a conviction by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere does not preclude the convicted person from relitigating issues of factual guilt or intent in a subsequent civil trial. Such a plea is admissible as an admission but is not conclusive, because, unlike a conviction after a trial, no issues have been 'drawn into controversy' by a 'full presentation' of the case. The Justice found no explicit language or legislative history in Civil Code section 847 that abrogates this long-standing principle of California law regarding collateral estoppel for plea-based convictions.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the scope of California's Civil Code section 847, affirming that it provides broad immunity to property owners against civil liability for injuries sustained by felons on their property, extending beyond mere negligence or premises liability to include intentional acts. However, the immunity is not absolute; it does not protect 'willful, wanton, or criminal conduct,' which the court defines as intentional wrongful conduct. The key distinction lies in whether the intentional use of force was justifiable (e.g., self-defense), leaving such determinations to the trier of fact. This ruling strikes a balance between protecting property owners from lawsuits by injured criminals and preventing unjustified excessive force, reinforcing the principle that even criminals are not without all protections from excessive force.
