California v. Green
399 U.S. 149 (1970)
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Rule of Law:
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is not violated by the admission of a declarant's prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence so long as the declarant is testifying as a witness at trial and is subject to full and effective cross-examination. Additionally, prior testimony from a preliminary hearing where the defendant had an adequate opportunity for cross-examination is admissible even if the witness is forgetful at trial.
Facts:
- In January 1967, Melvin Porter, a minor, was arrested for selling marihuana to an undercover officer.
- Four days after his arrest, Porter told Officer Wade that respondent John Green was his supplier and had personally delivered the marihuana.
- A week later, at Green's preliminary hearing, Porter testified under oath and subject to cross-examination that Green had supplied the marihuana, although he slightly changed the details of the delivery.
- At Green's trial two months later, Porter testified that he was on LSD at the time of the events and could not remember how he obtained the marihuana.
- During the trial, Porter claimed he was unable to remember the events surrounding the drug transaction, rendering him evasive and uncooperative.
- Porter did admit to making the prior statements to Officer Wade and at the preliminary hearing, and stated he believed he was telling the truth at those times.
Procedural Posture:
- John Green was charged in California state court with furnishing marihuana to a minor.
- At a bench trial, the court admitted into evidence for their substantive truth two prior inconsistent statements made by the minor, Melvin Porter.
- Green was convicted by the trial court.
- Green appealed, and the California District Court of Appeal (an intermediate appellate court) reversed the conviction, finding the use of the prior statements violated Green's confrontation rights.
- The State of California appealed, and the California Supreme Court (the state's highest court) affirmed the reversal, holding that California Evidence Code § 1235 was unconstitutional to the extent it allowed substantive use of prior inconsistent statements.
- The State of California petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does the admission of a witness's prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence, where the witness testifies and is subject to cross-examination at trial, violate a criminal defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice White
No, the admission of a witness's prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence does not violate the Confrontation Clause when the witness is available for cross-examination at trial. The core purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to provide the defendant an opportunity for face-to-face confrontation and cross-examination of their accuser before the trier of fact. When the declarant is present at trial, the defendant can cross-examine them about their prior statements and their current, inconsistent testimony. This allows the jury to observe the witness's demeanor and assess their credibility, satisfying the clause's requirements even if the cross-examination is not contemporaneous with the original statement. Furthermore, Porter's preliminary hearing testimony, given under oath and subject to cross-examination by the same counsel, would have been admissible even if Porter were unavailable, and thus it is certainly admissible when he is present at trial.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Brennan
Yes, the use of these prior statements violates the Confrontation Clause. The right to confrontation requires an opportunity to effectively cross-examine a witness about the substance of their testimony in front of the jury. When a witness, like Porter, claims they cannot remember the events, they cannot be meaningfully cross-examined on the facts, and the jury cannot observe their demeanor while they recount those facts. This turns the witness into a mere conduit for stale, untested evidence. A preliminary hearing is not an adequate substitute for trial confrontation because its purpose is limited to establishing probable cause, and cross-examination at that stage is far less searching than what is required at trial.
Concurring - Mr. Chief Justice Burger
No. This decision is important because it allows states to innovate in the area of criminal justice and evidence rules. The Constitution does not require absolute uniformity in criminal law among the states, and California's statutory experiment with this evidence rule is a permissible one that other jurisdictions can observe.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Harlan
No. The Confrontation Clause's primary purpose is to require the prosecution to produce any available witness whose declarations it seeks to use. Once the witness is produced and available for confrontation, the Sixth Amendment is satisfied. The Clause should not be interpreted to constitutionalize the complex rules of hearsay, and using an available witness's prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence does not violate the Constitution.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarified the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the rules of hearsay. It established that the Clause's primary concern is ensuring a defendant's opportunity to physically confront and cross-examine witnesses at trial, rather than constitutionalizing the common-law hearsay rule. By rejecting the view that cross-examination must be contemporaneous with the statement, the Court opened the door for states to permit the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements, which was traditionally limited to impeachment purposes. This ruling provides prosecutors with a powerful tool against witnesses who recant their prior testimony at trial due to intimidation or other factors.
