California v. Brown
479 U.S. 538 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
An instruction informing a capital sentencing jury that it "must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling" does not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Facts:
- Albert Brown was convicted of the forcible rape and first-degree murder of 15-year-old Susan J.
- During the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecution presented evidence that Brown had previously raped another young girl.
- Brown presented mitigating evidence, including testimony from family members about his peaceful nature.
- A psychiatrist testified on Brown's behalf, stating that Brown killed the victim out of shame and fear over sexual dysfunction.
- Brown himself testified, expressing shame for his prior criminal conduct and asking the jury for mercy.
- The trial judge instructed the jury that it 'must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.'
Procedural Posture:
- Albert Brown was convicted of first-degree murder and forcible rape in a California state trial court.
- Following the penalty phase, the jury sentenced Brown to death.
- Brown took an automatic appeal to the Supreme Court of California.
- The Supreme Court of California reversed the death sentence, holding that the 'no sympathy' jury instruction violated the U.S. Constitution.
- The State of California petitioned for, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted, a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a jury instruction, given during the penalty phase of a capital murder trial, stating that the jury must not be swayed by 'mere sympathy', violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by unconstitutionally limiting the jury's consideration of mitigating evidence?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Rehnquist
No. A jury instruction cautioning against being swayed by 'mere sympathy' during the penalty phase of a capital trial does not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. A reasonable juror would not interpret such an instruction as a directive to ignore relevant mitigating evidence, but rather as an admonition to avoid emotional responses that are not rooted in the evidence presented. The instruction's use of the word 'mere' qualifies 'sympathy', distinguishing it from the sympathetic response that mitigating evidence is intended to evoke. When read in the context of the other prohibited factors—such as passion, prejudice, and public opinion—the instruction properly channels the jury's deliberations towards a decision based on the evidence, thereby fostering reliability and preventing arbitrary sentencing in violation of the principles established in Gregg v. Georgia and Woodson v. North Carolina.
Concurring - Justice O'Connor
No. The instruction does not by itself violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as it properly directs the jury to make a reasoned moral response to the defendant's culpability rather than a purely emotional one. There is a constitutional tension between the need for guided discretion to prevent arbitrary sentences and the requirement that the jury consider all mitigating evidence. This instruction serves the former principle. However, there is a risk that the jury might be misled into believing it must ignore mitigating evidence about the defendant's background. Therefore, on remand, the California Supreme Court should determine if the instructions as a whole, combined with the prosecutor's closing argument, adequately informed the jury of its constitutional obligation to consider all of the mitigating evidence.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
Yes. The instruction violates the Federal Constitution because a reasonable juror would likely interpret it as precluding the very compassionate response that mitigating evidence is designed to elicit. The word 'mere' is insufficient to clarify that only sympathy untethered to the evidence is prohibited. The inclusion of 'sympathy' in a list of clearly improper factors like 'prejudice' and 'passion' would lead a juror to conclude that any emotional response is forbidden. Evidence from this case and others shows that prosecutors consistently use this instruction to argue that juries must disregard mitigating evidence about a defendant's character and background, demonstrating that the instruction is inherently misleading and unconstitutional.
Dissenting - Justice Blackmun
Yes. The instruction unconstitutionally interferes with the critical role of mercy in capital sentencing. The ability of a sentencer to show mercy is a valued and humane aspect of our justice system, and it is fundamentally an emotional response. An instruction telling a juror not to be 'swayed' by sympathy could directly 'arrest or restrain this humane response' at the moment a juror is moved to be merciful. Given the finality of the death penalty, the risk that this instruction could prevent an act of mercy, with fatal consequences for the defendant, is constitutionally unacceptable.
Analysis:
This case refines the boundary between permissible, evidence-based consideration of mitigating factors and impermissible, arbitrary emotional responses in capital sentencing. It establishes that states can constitutionally instruct juries to base their penalty decisions on the evidence presented, rather than on pure emotion divorced from that evidence. The holding gives states a tool to channel jury discretion, but the strong concurrences and dissents highlight the persistent danger that such instructions can confuse jurors or be used by prosecutors to improperly nullify the defendant's right to have all mitigating evidence considered. The decision reinforces the 'reasonable juror' standard for evaluating instructions and emphasizes that they must be reviewed in their full context.
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