Caldwell v. A.R.B., Inc.
176 Cal. App. 3d 1028, 222 Cal. Rptr. 494, 1986 Cal. App. LEXIS 2502 (1986)
Rule of Law:
An employer is not vicariously liable for an employee's negligence during an ordinary commute under the "going-and-coming rule"; exceptions for a "special errand" or "travel allowance" do not apply where the employee's travel is merely at an earlier time, a ride given to a coworker is gratuitous and not employer-requested, or the travel allowance is a fixed reimbursement for expenses without compensation for travel time, as these circumstances do not establish sufficient employer benefit or control to overcome the rule.
Facts:
- On January 20, 1982, plaintiff was driving his van on Highway 58 in Kern County when it collided head-on with a vehicle driven by Bruce Wayne Brandon, resulting in Brandon's death and severe injuries to the plaintiff.
- Brandon was an apprentice pipefitter employed by A.R.B., Inc. to work at a Shell Oil dehydration plant project located north of McKittrick, approximately 35-40 miles from Bakersfield.
- Brandon's employment terms were governed by a union contract between United Association Local Union No. 460 and the Plumbing and Mechanical Contractors Association, to which A.R.B., Inc. was also subject.
- On January 20, 1982, the workday at the jobsite ended early, around 11 a.m., due to heavy rain making working conditions around the pipe unsafe and preventing welders from working; employees were sent home and not subject to recall.
- Brandon offered to give a coworker, Jeff Richardson, a ride home because Richardson's usual carpool partner had been sent home earlier after falling in a mud puddle.
- The accident occurred around noon, while Brandon and Richardson were traveling from the jobsite back to Bakersfield.
- A.R.B., Inc. employees, including Brandon, had to use their own vehicles to commute to the jobsite as there was no public transportation, and they were not permitted to bring personal vehicles onto the plant premises for work duties.
- Employees were not paid for their travel time, but all employees received a daily travel allowance (e.g., $10-$13 per day, depending on distance from union office) as part of their weekly check, regardless of whether they actually drove their own car.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff filed a complaint for damages against Bruce Wayne Brandon, charging him with negligent vehicle operation and alleging he was acting in the scope of his employment.
- A.R.B., Inc. was later named as a defendant in the suit.
- A.R.B., Inc. filed a motion for summary judgment in the trial court, arguing that Brandon was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.
- The trial court granted A.R.B., Inc.'s motion for summary judgment.
- Plaintiff appealed the trial court's ruling.
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Issue:
Does an employee's commute home, even if shortened due to hazardous weather conditions and coupled with the provision of a gratuitous ride to a coworker and receipt of a daily travel allowance, fall within the "special errand" or "travel allowance" exceptions to the "going-and-coming rule," thereby making the employer vicariously liable for the employee's negligence?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Best
No, the employee's commute home, under these circumstances, does not fall within the "special errand" or "travel allowance" exceptions to the "going-and-coming rule," and thus the employer, A.R.B., Inc., is not vicariously liable. The court affirmed the summary judgment, holding that Brandon was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. The general "going-and-coming rule" dictates that an employee is outside the scope of employment during their ordinary commute, as the employment relationship is suspended and no services are being rendered to the employer (citing Ducey v. Argo Sales Co. and Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co.). The court rejected the argument for a "special risk" exception, even assuming its applicability from workers' compensation cases, because driving home in hazardous weather did not pose a risk "distinctive in nature or quantitatively greater than risks common to the public." The "special errand" exception was also inapplicable because Brandon's act of giving a coworker a ride home was a gratuitous offer, not part of his regular duties, nor at a specific order or request (express or implied) of A.R.B., Inc. Furthermore, the early work shutdown due to rain was not a special errand; any benefit to the employer (avoiding workplace injuries) did not extend to the employee's commute, which simply occurred earlier than usual, a circumstance generally held insufficient to create a special mission (citing General Ins. Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.). Finally, regarding the "travel allowance" exception, the court explicitly followed Harris v. Oro-Dam Constructors, which distinguished respondeat superior principles from workers' compensation law. It held that the mere payment of a fixed travel allowance, without compensation for travel time, does not reflect a sufficient benefit to the employer or right to control the employee's commute to overcome the going-and-coming rule. The court emphasized that the travel allowance primarily benefits the employee for their expenses, and a general benefit to the employer (like widening the labor market) is insufficient to establish vicarious liability in tort, specifically answering the question left open in Hinman.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the strict application of California's "going-and-coming rule" for employer vicarious liability under respondeat superior, distinctly separating it from the broader compensability standards found in workers' compensation law. It clarifies that a fixed travel allowance, without accompanying payment for travel time, is generally insufficient to establish a nexus between the commute and employment for tort liability purposes. The decision also narrowly defines the "special errand" exception, requiring a clear employer directive or an extraordinary work-related purpose, thereby limiting employer responsibility for gratuitous employee actions or simple alterations to commute schedules. This ruling limits the circumstances under which employers can be held responsible for employee negligence during routine commutes, even in the presence of adverse conditions or acts of coworker assistance.
