Caldor, Inc. v. Bowden
625 A.2d 959, 330 Md. 632, 1993 Md. LEXIS 85 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
When a single, unallocated punitive damages award is based upon multiple tort counts, and a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is subsequently granted for some but not all of those counts, the entire punitive damages award must be vacated and a new trial ordered to recalculate punitive damages based only on the remaining valid counts.
Facts:
- Samuel Bowden, a sixteen-year-old employee at a Caldor retail store, was summoned by his manager to a 10' x 10' windowless office.
- Inside, two loss prevention employees, Mr. Hedrick and Mr. Hodum, interrogated Bowden for over four hours about missing money and merchandise.
- During the interrogation, Hedrick and Hodum physically blocked Bowden from leaving, verbally threatened him, prevented him from calling his parents, and falsely claimed to have videotapes of him stealing.
- Under duress, Bowden signed a dictated confession admitting to theft that he denied committing.
- The following day, when Bowden and his mother returned to the store, another manager, Mr. Forrester, directed a racial slur at Bowden.
- A store security manager, Mr. Mehan, then seized Bowden's arm, handcuffed him, and paraded him through the store in full view of customers and employees before police arrived.
- Caldor subsequently terminated Bowden's employment based on the suspicion that he had committed theft.
- Bowden was prosecuted in a juvenile proceeding but was acquitted due to insufficient evidence.
Procedural Posture:
- Samuel Bowden sued Caldor, Inc., and three of its employees in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, a state trial court, alleging five torts.
- A jury rendered a verdict in favor of Bowden on all five counts, awarding $110,000 in itemized compensatory damages.
- Following a separate hearing, the jury awarded a single, unallocated sum of $357,500 in punitive damages against the defendants.
- The defendants filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (J.N.W.V.).
- The circuit court granted the J.N.W.V. on the counts of wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress but denied the motion as to the other three counts.
- The circuit court left the entire $357,500 punitive damages award intact, despite vacating two of the five underlying compensatory awards.
- Both parties appealed to Maryland's intermediate appellate court. The Court of Appeals of Maryland, the state's highest court, granted certiorari to hear the case before the intermediate court ruled.
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Issue:
Does a trial court err by leaving a single, unallocated punitive damages award intact after granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on some of the underlying tort counts that the jury may have relied upon in granting the award?
Opinions:
Majority - Chasanow, J.
Yes. When a jury's single punitive damages award is based on multiple causes of action, and some of those underlying causes of action are subsequently invalidated, a new trial must be held to redetermine punitive damages. An award of punitive damages must rest upon a foundation of compensatory damages for each count that provides a basis for the award. Because the court set aside the compensatory awards for intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful discharge, and it is impossible to know what portion of the unallocated punitive award was based on those now-invalidated counts, the entire punitive award must be vacated and recalculated based solely on the three remaining torts of false imprisonment, defamation, and malicious prosecution. The J.N.W.V. for intentional infliction of emotional distress was proper because Bowden's distress, while genuine, was not so 'severe' as to hinder his ability to carry out daily activities, as required by law. The J.N.W.V. for wrongful discharge was also proper because the motivation for the discharge was suspicion of theft, which is a permissible reason to terminate an at-will employee, even if the methods used to confirm the suspicion were tortious. Finally, statements made to police reporting a crime are subject to a qualified, not absolute, privilege, which the jury's finding of malice properly defeated.
Dissenting - Eldridge, J.
No. The court should not have affirmed the trial court's decision to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful discharge claims. The majority improperly substituted its own factual inferences for those of the jury, which should be viewed in the light most favorable to Bowden. Given the extreme and outrageous nature of the defendants' conduct—including imprisoning a minor, coercing a confession, and using racial slurs—a reasonable jury could find that Bowden suffered severe emotional distress; the law does not require that a plaintiff be totally disabled from daily activities to recover. Furthermore, the jury was entitled to infer that the defendants' stated reason for the discharge—suspicion of theft—was merely a pretext for a racially motivated termination, which violates a clear mandate of public policy. The jury's verdicts on these counts should have been upheld, rendering the issue of recalculating punitive damages moot.
Analysis:
This case establishes a critical procedural rule in Maryland for multi-count tort litigation involving punitive damages. It clarifies that a general punitive damages award is not a monolithic sum but is dependent on the validity of each underlying compensatory claim. By requiring a new trial on punitive damages when any part of the foundation is removed, the court prevents defendants from being punished for conduct that was ultimately found not to be legally actionable. The decision also reinforces the high evidentiary bar for proving 'severe' emotional distress in IIED claims and narrowly defines the 'public policy' exception for wrongful discharge, focusing on the employer's motive rather than their methods. Finally, it sets an important state-level precedent by limiting the scope of absolute privilege for defamation, holding that malicious, false reports of crime to police are not shielded from liability.
