Calder v. Bull

Supreme Court of United States
3 U.S. 386 (3 Dall. 386) (1798)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

The U.S. Constitution's prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal and criminal laws that retroactively impose punishments, not to retrospective civil laws that may affect private property rights.

Facts:

Normand Morrison, the grandson, created a will that left certain property to Caleb Bull and his wife.
On March 21, 1793, a Connecticut Court of Probate disapproved of the will, meaning the property would pass to Calder's wife as an heiress of the estate.
The statutory period for Bull and his wife to appeal the probate court's decision expired after 18 months, vesting the property right in Calder's wife.
In May 1795, the Connecticut Legislature passed a resolution that set aside the probate court's decree.
The resolution granted a new hearing before the same Court of Probate to reconsider the will's validity.
Following the new hearing granted by the legislature, the Court of Probate approved the will, and this decision was affirmed by higher state courts.
This subsequent approval of the will divested the property right from Calder's wife and granted it to Bull and his wife.

Procedural Posture:

The Court of Probate for Hartford, Connecticut, issued a decree disapproving the will of Normand Morrison.
After the 18-month appeal period expired, the Connecticut Legislature passed a resolution setting aside the decree and granting a new hearing.
The Court of Probate held a new hearing and approved the will, a decision which was then appealed.
The Superior Court of Connecticut affirmed the probate court's decision to approve the will.
Calder and his wife, the appellants, appealed to the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, the state's highest court, which affirmed the lower court's judgment.
Calder and wife then brought the case to the U.S. Supreme Court on a writ of error, naming Bull and wife as appellees.

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Issue:

Does a state legislative act that sets aside a court decree and grants a new hearing in a civil case, thereby divesting a previously established property right, violate Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution's prohibition on ex post facto laws?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Chase

No. The Connecticut resolution is not an ex post facto law because the constitutional prohibition on such laws applies only to criminal statutes, not civil ones. Justice Chase established a clear distinction between prohibited ex post facto laws and permissible retrospective laws. He reasoned that the Ex Post Facto Clause was intended to protect individuals from arbitrary punishment by legislatures, not to secure private property rights, which are protected by other constitutional provisions like the Contracts Clause. He defined ex post facto laws as those which: 1) make a previously innocent act criminal; 2) aggravate a crime after it was committed; 3) inflict a greater punishment than was prescribed at the time of the crime; or 4) alter the rules of evidence to make conviction easier. Since the Connecticut law concerned a civil matter of inheritance and did not impose any criminal penalty, it did not fall within this definition.

Concurring - Justice Paterson

No. The Connecticut resolution is not an ex post facto law. Justice Paterson agreed that the term 'ex post facto' has a technical legal meaning that refers exclusively to criminal laws imposing pains and penalties. He noted that the specific inclusion of a prohibition against laws 'impairing the obligation of contracts' later in the same constitutional section demonstrates that the Framers did not intend for the Ex Post Facto Clause to cover civil matters. He also argued that the Connecticut legislature had historically exercised judicial powers, so granting a new trial could be seen as a valid judicial act by that body, consistent with the state's constitution.

Concurring - Justice Iredell

No. The act is not an ex post facto law because the prohibition applies only to criminal, not civil, cases. Justice Iredell argued forcefully that courts should not declare a law void merely because it seems contrary to 'natural justice.' He contended that a court's power is limited to invalidating laws that violate a specific constitutional provision. Since the Connecticut law was civil in nature, it did not violate the express prohibition on ex post facto laws. He further suggested that the act was judicial in nature, consistent with Connecticut's long-standing practice, and therefore not a legislative act subject to the prohibition.

Concurring - Justice Cushing

No. The Connecticut resolution is valid. In a brief opinion, Justice Cushing concluded that the act was constitutional regardless of its classification. If it is considered a judicial act, it is not subject to the federal Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause. If it is a legislative act, it is justified by the 'ancient and uniform practice of the state of Connecticut.'

Analysis:

This case is foundational in American constitutional law for establishing the definitive interpretation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. By limiting its scope strictly to criminal laws, the Court created a clear distinction between prohibited retroactive punishments and permissible retroactive civil legislation. This decision has had a lasting impact, allowing legislatures to pass retroactive laws in areas such as taxation, inheritance, and regulation without facing constitutional challenges under this clause. The case also features a significant early debate between Justice Chase and Justice Iredell on the role of natural law versus positive law in judicial review, with Iredell's view—that courts should only strike down laws violating specific constitutional text—largely prevailing in subsequent jurisprudence.

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