Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy
367 U.S. 886, 1961 U.S. LEXIS 814, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1230 (1961)
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Rule of Law:
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not require a trial-type hearing for a private contractor's employee who is denied access to a federal military installation for security reasons, as the government's proprietary interest in managing its internal affairs outweighs the employee's interest in working at that specific location.
Facts:
- Rachel Brawner was employed as a short-order cook by M & M Restaurants, Inc., a private contractor operating a cafeteria on the premises of the U.S. Naval Gun Factory.
- The Naval Gun Factory was a secure military installation engaged in developing highly classified weapons systems.
- M & M's contract with the government stipulated that its employees must meet the security requirements of the installation, as determined by the Security Officer.
- Brawner had worked at the cafeteria for over six years and was issued an identification badge granting her access to the premises.
- On November 15, 1956, the installation's Security Officer determined that Brawner failed to meet the security requirements.
- Consequently, Brawner's identification badge was revoked, and she was permanently denied access to the Gun Factory, effectively ending her employment at that location.
- The installation's commanding officer, Admiral Tyree, approved the decision and denied a request for a hearing, stating it would 'serve no useful purpose.'
- M & M offered Brawner employment at another of its restaurants, but she declined the offer due to the inconvenient location.
Procedural Posture:
- Rachel Brawner and her union sued the Secretary of Defense, Admiral Tyree, and Lieutenant Commander Williams in the U.S. District Court.
- The defendants (government officials) filed a motion for summary judgment.
- The District Court, as the court of first instance, granted summary judgment for the defendants.
- The petitioners (Brawner and the union) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc as an intermediate appellate court, affirmed the District Court's judgment.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted the petitioners' writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment require the government to provide notice and a formal hearing to a private contractor's employee before summarily revoking her access to a secure military installation for failing to meet security requirements?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Stewart
No. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not require a formal hearing before revoking a private employee's access to a military installation for security reasons. First, the commanding officer's action was explicitly authorized by Navy Regulations, approved by the President, which grant commanders absolute authority to control access to their installations. Second, the constitutional requirements of due process are flexible and depend on a balancing of the governmental function and the private interest affected. Here, the government was acting not as a sovereign regulating a profession, but as a proprietor managing its own internal affairs on a secure military base, a function where it has traditionally exercised unfettered control. The private interest affected was not the right to pursue a profession, as Brawner remained free to work as a cook elsewhere, but merely the interest in working at one specific location. This interest is analogous to that of a government employee who, absent statutory protection, can be summarily discharged. As long as the exclusion is not for a patently arbitrary or discriminatory reason, and does not bestow a 'badge of infamy' foreclosing other employment, a hearing is not constitutionally required.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Brennan
Yes. Summarily depriving a person of her employment at a government facility by labeling her a 'security risk' without providing any notice of the charges or an opportunity to be heard violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. While the Court acknowledges that Brawner has a right not to be arbitrarily injured by the government, it nullifies this right by denying any procedural protection. Allowing the government to use the vague term 'security requirements' as a justification prevents inquiry into potentially discriminatory or arbitrary motives. A right with no procedural safeguard is not a right at all. Furthermore, the designation 'security risk' is a 'badge of infamy' in contemporary society, carrying a sinister meaning that can severely damage a person's reputation and future employment prospects. To affix such a stigma without providing a statement of charges and a chance to respond is fundamentally unfair.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the distinction between the government acting as a sovereign lawmaker versus a proprietor managing its own affairs. By characterizing the government's role as proprietary, the Court significantly lowered the procedural due process requirements for individuals working on, but not for, the government in sensitive locations. This creates a precedent that weakens the due process rights of government contractors and their employees, especially in the context of national security. The case's balancing test, weighing the nature of the government function against the private interest, became a foundational framework for future due process litigation involving government employment and benefits.
