C.T. v. State
2010 WL 3624420, 939 N.E.2d 626, 2010 Ind. App. LEXIS 2371 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
A public nudity statute that prohibits the exposure of female nipples but not male nipples does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because protecting public morality is an important governmental objective, and the gender-based classification is substantially related to achieving that objective.
Facts:
- On June 16, 2009, at approximately 4:30 a.m., Indianapolis police received a report of three females exposing themselves to passing vehicles.
- Police Officer Jerry Durham responded to the report.
- Upon arrival, Officer Durham observed sixteen-year-old C.T. and a companion pulling their shirts and bras down to cover their exposed breasts.
- Officer Durham later testified that he recalled seeing C.T.'s nipple during the incident.
Procedural Posture:
- The State filed a delinquency petition against C.T. in juvenile court, alleging an act that would be Class B misdemeanor public nudity if committed by an adult.
- C.T. filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that the Indiana public nudity statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
- The juvenile court denied C.T.'s motion to dismiss.
- Following a hearing, the juvenile court entered a true finding that C.T. had committed the act of public nudity and discharged her to her mother.
- C.T. appealed the juvenile court's true finding to the Indiana Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does Indiana's public nudity statute, which criminalizes the public exposure of female but not male nipples, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Bradford, Judge
No, Indiana's public nudity statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. A gender-based classification is subject to intermediate scrutiny, which requires the state to show the law serves important governmental objectives and is substantially related to achieving those objectives. The court found that protecting the 'social interest in order and morality' is an important governmental objective. The statute is substantially related to this objective because society generally considers the female breast to be an erogenous zone, unlike the male breast, and its public display is more likely to cause offense. The court reasoned that the law is rooted in societal perceptions and norms, not in an attempt to perpetuate the legal, social, or economic inferiority of women.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the principle that laws differentiating based on gender can survive intermediate scrutiny if justified by societal norms related to public morality. The court's reasoning indicates a willingness to defer to legislative judgments about community standards, even when those standards result in disparate treatment between sexes. This case serves as a precedent for upholding gender-specific public decency laws by distinguishing them from invidious discrimination that creates or perpetuates gender inequality, thereby narrowing the scope of successful equal protection challenges in this area.
