C.H. v. Oliva
226 F.3d 198 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a defendant cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation unless the plaintiff alleges the defendant personally participated in or approved the violation; there is no vicarious or respondeat superior liability.
Facts:
- In the Fall of 1994, Z.H. was a kindergarten student at Haines Elementary School in Medford, New Jersey.
- As part of a class assignment for the Thanksgiving holiday, Z.H.'s teacher asked students to make posters depicting what they were thankful for.
- Z.H. created a poster indicating he was thankful for Jesus.
- The poster was initially displayed in the school hallway along with those of his classmates.
- On a day when Z.H.'s teacher was absent, unidentified employees of the Medford Township Board of Education removed Z.H.'s poster from the hallway because of its religious theme.
- Upon her return, Z.H.'s teacher returned the poster to the hallway, but placed it in a less prominent location at the end of the hall.
Procedural Posture:
- C.H., as guardian ad litem for her son Z.H., filed a civil rights complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey against the Medford Township Board of Education, the school principal, the superintendent, and state education officials.
- The defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).
- The District Court granted the motion, entering judgment in favor of all defendants.
- C.H., the plaintiff, appealed the District Court's judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
- A three-judge panel of the Third Circuit initially heard the appeal and issued an opinion affirming the District Court.
- The Third Circuit subsequently granted a petition for rehearing en banc, vacating the panel's decision and bringing the case before the full court.
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Issue:
In a § 1983 action, does a complaint fail to state a claim for a constitutional violation when it attributes the allegedly unconstitutional acts to unidentified employees and fails to allege that the named defendants personally participated in, approved of, or established a policy that led to the violation?
Opinions:
Majority - Stapleton, J.
Yes. A complaint fails to state a claim under § 1983 when it does not allege the personal involvement of the named defendants. A defendant in a civil rights case cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation in which he or she neither participated nor approved. The complaint attributes the removal of the poster to unidentified "employees" and the restoration to the teacher, who is not a defendant. It contains no allegation that the named defendants—the principal, superintendent, school board, or state commissioner—participated in, approved, or were even aware of the decisions. Liability for a school board under § 1983 requires a policy or custom, which was not alleged, and supervisory liability requires a showing of deliberate indifference, which necessitates alleging the supervisor's knowledge of the incident or a prior pattern of similar incidents. Without allegations of personal involvement, the court is being asked to decide a significant constitutional question that is purely hypothetical as to the named parties.
Dissenting - Alito, J.
No. The complaint is adequate under liberal federal pleading standards and should not be dismissed on a procedural ground that the defendants never raised. The majority improperly avoids the central First Amendment issue by focusing on a supposed pleading defect. The complaint provides fair notice of the claim, and it is reasonable to infer that the school principal, Gail Pratt, knew about and acquiesced in the treatment of the poster within her own school. The defendants themselves did not challenge the sufficiency of the allegations regarding their involvement, instead arguing the case on its constitutional merits. The court should have addressed the substantive issue: that discriminating against student speech because of its religious character constitutes viewpoint discrimination, which must survive strict scrutiny.
Analysis:
This decision emphasizes the strict requirement of pleading personal involvement for each defendant in a § 1983 civil rights action, reinforcing that respondeat superior is not a viable theory of liability. By dismissing the case on these procedural grounds, the court avoided setting a precedent on the contentious First Amendment issue of student religious expression in a curricular context. The ruling serves as a procedural gatekeeper, preventing courts from reaching the constitutional merits of a case where the link between the defendants and the alleged harm is not specifically pleaded. This forces future plaintiffs to conduct more thorough pre-filing investigations to identify and allege the specific actions of each individual they intend to sue.
