C.E.L. v. State
34 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 663, 2009 Fla. LEXIS 2068, 24 So. 3d 1181 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
A person's unprovoked flight from police in a high-crime area provides the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop, making a subsequent police order to stop lawful. Defying that lawful order by continuing to flee constitutes the offense of resisting an officer without violence.
Facts:
- C.E.L., a fifteen-year-old African-American male, was standing with a companion in the public area of an apartment complex.
- The apartment complex was located in a neighborhood that law enforcement considered a 'high-crime area'.
- Two plainclothes officers, wearing vests marked with 'Sheriff', were patrolling the complex and approached C.E.L. and his companion.
- Upon seeing the officers, C.E.L. immediately turned and began to run away.
- While C.E.L. was running, the officers verbally commanded him to stop.
- C.E.L. disregarded the officers' command and continued to flee before being apprehended.
Procedural Posture:
- C.E.L. was charged with resisting a law enforcement officer without violence.
- At an adjudicatory hearing in the circuit court (trial court), C.E.L. moved for a judgment of dismissal for insufficient evidence.
- The circuit court denied the motion, found C.E.L. guilty, and adjudicated him delinquent.
- C.E.L., as the appellant, appealed the decision to the Second District Court of Appeal.
- The Second District Court of Appeal, sitting en banc, affirmed the circuit court's judgment.
- C.E.L. sought review in the Supreme Court of Florida, arguing the Second District's decision directly conflicted with a prior decision from the Third District Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
Does a juvenile's continued flight in a high-crime area, in defiance of a lawful police order to stop, constitute the offense of resisting an officer without violence when the reasonable suspicion for the stop arose from the initial act of flight itself?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes. A juvenile's continued flight in a high-crime area, in defiance of a lawful police order to stop, constitutes the offense of resisting an officer without violence. The court, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Illinois v. Wardlow, reasoned that C.E.L.'s unprovoked flight in a high-crime area created the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a lawful investigative stop. This meant the officers were engaged in the 'lawful execution of any legal duty' when they ordered C.E.L. to stop. The critical moment is when the obstructing conduct occurs; it is irrelevant that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion before C.E.L. began to flee. Therefore, C.E.L.'s continued flight in knowing defiance of that lawful command satisfied the elements of resisting an officer without violence under section 843.02.
Dissenting - Quince, C.J.
No. While a literal reading of the statute may support the majority's conclusion, the societal implications are unacceptable. The dissent argues that this holding criminalizes individuals, particularly young people, based on where they live, thus violating principles of equal protection and due process. A person in a 'high-crime area' becomes a criminal for running from police, while a person doing the same thing in another area does not. The dissent contends that Wardlow was intended to be an investigative tool to justify a temporary stop, not a basis for arrest and prosecution for the flight itself. This decision will result in many young people gaining criminal records for conduct stemming from a justifiable distrust of police in their communities.
Concurring - Pariente, J.
Yes. The majority's holding is a legally correct application of the statute's plain language and the precedent set by Wardlow. However, the concurrence expresses grave concern over the public policy implications of the decision, noting its potential to disproportionately criminalize minority youth in poor neighborhoods designated as 'high-crime areas.' The opinion points out that motives for flight can be innocent, such as a well-founded fear of police. It urges the legislature to amend the statute to prevent these unintended consequences but also clarifies that the decision does not foreclose future defendants from challenging key factual predicates, such as whether their flight was truly 'unprovoked' or whether an area was properly designated as 'high-crime.'
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the application of Illinois v. Wardlow in Florida, establishing that the act of flight itself can create the legal predicate for a lawful stop, which in turn can make continued flight a criminal offense of resistance. It resolves a direct conflict between Florida's appellate districts, setting a clear, statewide precedent. The ruling significantly impacts Fourth Amendment police encounters by allowing an individual's reaction to police presence in certain areas to form the basis for both a lawful detention and a subsequent criminal charge, raising substantial concerns about disparate enforcement and the criminalization of behavior that may be motivated by fear rather than guilt.
