C.C. v. A.B.
406 Mass. 679 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
A man alleging himself to be the father of a child born to a married woman may bring a paternity action under the Probate Court’s general equity jurisdiction if he first demonstrates a substantial parent-child relationship with the child and then proves paternity by clear and convincing evidence.
Facts:
- At the time of the child’s conception and birth on May 19, 1986, A.B. was married to another man but lived with and had sexual relations with C.C.
- C.C. was listed as the father on the child’s birth certificate and baptismal record, and the child was given C.C.'s last name, with a middle name derived from C.C.’s first name.
- After the child’s birth, A.B., C.C., and the child lived together, and C.C. cared for the child.
- A.B. later took the child and ended her relationship with C.C.; she subsequently acknowledged that C.C. may be the father.
- A.B. and her husband have since reconciled and now live together.
- A.B. instituted an action against C.C. seeking custody and support payments for the child.
Procedural Posture:
- C.C. filed a complaint in Probate Court alleging paternity and seeking visitation rights with a child born to A.B.
- A.B. moved to dismiss C.C.'s complaint, arguing that G. L. c. 209C, § 5(a) precluded the action because she was married to another man at the time of the child's conception and birth, and that the statute was unconstitutional if it denied C.C. standing.
- The Attorney General intervened in the case due to the constitutional challenge to the statute.
- The Probate Court judge reported the case to the Appeals Court.
- The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted an application for direct appellate review.
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Issue:
Does a man who alleges he is the father of a child have standing to bring an action to establish paternity when the child's mother was married to another man at the time of conception and birth?
Opinions:
Majority - Nolan, J.
Yes, a man in C.C.'s position may bring an action to establish paternity, not under G. L. c. 209C, but under the Probate Court’s general equity jurisdiction, provided he demonstrates a substantial parent-child relationship and proves paternity by clear and convincing evidence. General Laws c. 209C, § 5(a), which restricts who can file paternity actions when a mother is married, only limits actions brought 'under this chapter' and does not abrogate the Probate Court's pre-existing general equity jurisdiction under G. L. c. 215, § 6. While common law historically created a strong, difficult-to-rebut presumption of legitimacy for children born in wedlock to avoid the social stigma of illegitimacy, modern legal and societal trends, including G. L. c. 209C's goal to afford children born out of wedlock the same rights, have weakened the purpose behind this strict presumption. Concurrently, unwed fathers have gained constitutional due process rights to maintain relationships with their children where a 'substantial relationship' has been established. The Court concludes that the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard previously required to rebut the presumption of legitimacy is no longer warranted. Instead, a putative father must prove paternity by 'clear and convincing evidence,' which better balances the interests in avoiding bastardy and recognizing unwed fathers' rights. The common law rule known as Lord Mansfield's Rule, which prevented spouses from testifying about nonaccess, is also abandoned as it is no longer effective or justified. The Court finds that C.C. has a viable common law action given the substantial parent-child relationship evidenced by his living with and caring for the child, the child bearing his name, and his name being on birth and baptismal records. A preliminary hearing must be held in Probate Court to determine the extent of this substantial parent-child relationship, considering factors like emotional bonds, economic support, custody, personal association, commitment, consistency of interest, and names on official documents. This requirement protects traditional family units from undue intrusion while allowing fathers with established relationships to pursue their claims. The Court does not address the constitutionality of G. L. c. 209C, § 5(a) or the specific rights C.C. might have if paternity is established, emphasizing that the child's best interest must be paramount. The case is remanded to the Probate Court to deny the motion to dismiss and allow C.C. to proceed with proving paternity.
Dissenting - O’Connor, J.
No, the plaintiff should not have standing to bring an action to establish paternity when the mother was married to another man at the time of conception and birth, and now lives with her husband who accepts the child as his own. The majority's discussion of evidentiary standards is irrelevant because the core issue is whether the husband is conclusively presumed to be the father, which would deny standing to anyone else. The 'substantial parent-child relationship' test, while applicable to children born out of wedlock to protect evolving rights, is not appropriate for children born in wedlock. Justice Scalia in Michael H. v. Gerald D. clearly distinguished between the 'unitary family' of unmarried parents and their child (which might receive protection) and the relationship between a married woman, her lover, and their child (which does not). Society's traditions protect the marital family against such claims. The majority errs by creating policy where the Legislature has already definitively spoken. General Laws c. 209C, § 5(a) clearly bars paternity complaints 'under this chapter' by putative fathers if the mother was married at the time of birth or conception, unless he is the husband. This legislative provision reflects a clear public policy, previously articulated in P.B.C. v. D.H., of strengthening family life, protecting children, and affording legitimacy, by withholding a judicial forum for attacks on the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock. Allowing such actions undermines family harmony, disrupts the traditional family unit, and effectively rewards adulterous relationships, which Massachusetts law still considers criminal. Furthermore, the majority fails to address what specific rights the plaintiff would gain if paternity were established, a critical question for policy determination. Massachusetts should not be the first to award substantive parental rights to a man who claims fatherhood of a child born into an existing marital union that wishes to embrace the child.
Analysis:
This case represents a significant evolution of common law in Massachusetts concerning paternity claims for children born within a marriage. It moves away from a near-conclusive presumption of legitimacy to a more nuanced standard that recognizes the potential rights of unwed biological fathers, especially where a substantial parent-child relationship has already been established. The ruling highlights the judiciary's role in adapting common law to changing social norms and constitutional interpretations of family relationships, particularly regarding unwed fathers' due process rights. The establishment of a preliminary hearing to assess the substantiality of the relationship serves as a gatekeeping mechanism, balancing the interest in protecting marital families from unwarranted intrusion with the interests of unwed fathers and the child's right to know their parentage.
