Butler v. McKellar
494 U.S. 407, 108 L. Ed. 2d 347, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 1246 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
A new rule of constitutional law, established after a defendant's conviction is final, cannot be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review unless the rule falls into one of two narrow exceptions. A rule is considered 'new' if its result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the conviction became final and was susceptible to debate among reasonable minds.
Facts:
- On July 17, 1980, Pamela Lane was last seen alive leaving her job at a convenience store.
- The next day, her body was discovered near a bridge.
- Six weeks later, Horace Butler was arrested on an unrelated assault and battery charge and placed in jail.
- After invoking his Fifth Amendment right to counsel for the assault charge, Butler retained an attorney who appeared with him at a bond hearing.
- Butler's attorney allegedly told police officers not to question his client further, though the officers denied recalling this instruction.
- The following day, police took Butler from jail to the police station for questioning about the Lane murder.
- After being read his Miranda rights, Butler signed waiver forms and, without his attorney present, agreed to speak with the police.
- During the interrogation, Butler confessed to murdering Pamela Lane.
Procedural Posture:
- Horace Butler was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in a South Carolina state trial court.
- The trial court denied Butler's motion to suppress statements he made to the police.
- The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal.
- The U.S. Supreme Court denied Butler's petition for a writ of certiorari.
- Butler then unsuccessfully sought collateral relief in South Carolina state courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court again denied certiorari.
- Butler filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court, which dismissed the petition.
- Butler (appellant) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the dismissal.
- While Butler's petition for rehearing was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Arizona v. Roberson.
- The Fourth Circuit denied rehearing, holding that the rule in Roberson was not retroactive and thus Butler (petitioner) could not benefit from it.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Fourth Circuit's decision on retroactivity.
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Issue:
Does the rule established in Arizona v. Roberson—that the Fifth Amendment bars police-initiated interrogation following a suspect's request for counsel in the context of a separate investigation—constitute a 'new rule' that cannot be applied retroactively to a defendant's case on federal habeas corpus review?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Rehnquist
No, the rule established in Arizona v. Roberson is a 'new rule' and does not apply retroactively to Butler's case on collateral review. A case announces a 'new rule' if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final. The fact that the outcome in Roberson was susceptible to debate among reasonable minds, as evidenced by the disagreement among lower federal courts, demonstrates that it was not a foregone conclusion dictated by Edwards v. Arizona. The Roberson rule does not fall into either of the two exceptions for retroactive application: it does not place any primary conduct beyond the power of the criminal law, nor is it a watershed rule of criminal procedure essential to the fundamental fairness and accuracy of a trial. Therefore, Butler cannot benefit from the Roberson decision.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
Yes, the rule from Roberson should apply because it was not a 'new rule' but rather a direct application of existing precedent. The majority's holding defines a 'new rule' as any ruling that was 'susceptible to debate among reasonable minds,' which effectively strips state prisoners of any meaningful federal habeas review. This standard requires a petitioner to show that a state court's decision was so clearly invalid that no reasonable jurist could defend it, replacing de novo review with a 'clearly erroneous' standard. Roberson was a straightforward application of the principles established in Miranda and Edwards, not a novel creation. By adopting such a broad definition of 'new rule,' the Court is eviscerating Congress's habeas corpus regime and undermining the federal courts' role in protecting constitutional rights.
Analysis:
Butler v. McKellar significantly narrowed the scope of federal habeas corpus relief by refining the definition of a 'new rule' under Teague v. Lane. By establishing that a rule is 'new' if it was 'susceptible to debate among reasonable minds,' the Court made it substantially more difficult for petitioners to benefit from favorable Supreme Court decisions issued after their convictions became final. This decision elevates the principles of finality and comity over the correction of constitutional errors on collateral review. It effectively insulates most state court judgments from federal habeas review unless the state court's decision was contrary to a precedent that was squarely on point and dictated the outcome.
