Bushnell v. Bushnell
131 A. 432, 103 Conn. 583 (1925)
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Rule of Law:
A spouse may maintain a tort action for negligence against their spouse. The mere fact that a driver falls asleep while operating a vehicle is not negligence per se, but it creates a prima facie case and a permissible inference of negligence, which the driver may then rebut with evidence of justifying circumstances.
Facts:
- The plaintiff and defendant were husband and wife.
- They were returning home in their automobile after dropping their son off at college.
- The defendant husband was driving, and the plaintiff wife was a passenger in the front seat.
- During the return trip on a warm, drowsy afternoon, the plaintiff fell asleep.
- The defendant, who had been driving for several hours, also momentarily fell asleep.
- As a result of the defendant falling asleep, the car ran off the highway and struck a tree.
- The plaintiff sustained personal injuries in the resulting crash.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff, a wife, brought a negligence action against her husband, the defendant, in a trial court.
- The case was tried before a jury.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
- The defendant appealed the judgment entered on the jury's verdict to the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does a driver's act of momentarily falling asleep while operating a vehicle, resulting in an accident, constitute negligence as a matter of law?
Opinions:
Majority - Maltbie, J.
No. The act of falling asleep is not itself negligent, but it gives rise to a permissible inference of negligence that can create a prima facie case. Negligence is not established by the physical act of driving while asleep, as an unconscious person cannot be negligent. Instead, the critical question is whether the driver was negligent in permitting himself to fall asleep. Citing precedent from Brown v. Brown, the court first affirmed that a wife may sue her husband for a tort like negligence. The court also dismissed the 'joint enterprise' doctrine as inapplicable because the plaintiff was suing the driver directly, not a third party. On the central issue, the court reasoned that sleep does not ordinarily overcome a driver without some prior warning. A driver has a duty to stay awake or cease driving. Therefore, the fact that a driver fell asleep is sufficient evidence for a jury to infer negligence unless the driver presents evidence of circumstances that excuse or justify their conduct. The question is one of fact for the jury, and the trial court was correct to submit it to them.
Analysis:
This decision is a foundational case in tort law regarding the negligence of drivers who fall asleep at the wheel. It establishes the widely adopted rule that falling asleep is not negligence per se but creates a rebuttable presumption or inference of negligence. This shifts the burden to the driver to prove that the onset of sleep was sudden and unforeseeable, a difficult standard to meet. The ruling clarifies that the negligent act is not the conduct during unconsciousness but the failure to heed the warnings of drowsiness and stop driving. The case also solidifies the abrogation of interspousal tort immunity for negligence in its jurisdiction.
