Bush v. Commonwealth
78 Ky. 268, 1880 Ky. LEXIS 10 (1880)
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Rule of Law:
Courts must instruct juries on all offenses, including lesser included offenses like involuntary manslaughter, for which evidence exists; malice is a question of fact for the jury and cannot be implied by law from any facts; and an accused is not guilty of homicide if the victim's wound was not dangerous and death resulted from an independent, supervening cause not naturally flowing from or superinduced by the wound.
Facts:
- John Bush shot Annie Vanmeter with a pistol.
- John Bush may have accidentally shot Annie Vanmeter while attempting to shoot her father in necessary self-defense.
- Alternatively, John Bush may have had the pistol for defense from an anticipated assault, and the shot that wounded Annie Vanmeter was unintentional, both as to the firing of the pistol and as to the person wounded.
- The wound inflicted upon Annie Vanmeter was neither necessarily nor probably mortal.
- Annie Vanmeter subsequently contracted scarlet fever, possibly communicated negligently by her attending physician.
- Annie Vanmeter died, and her death may have ensued from the scarlet fever rather than from the wound.
Procedural Posture:
- John Bush was indicted for an unspecified offense, impliedly murder or manslaughter, in Fayette County.
- A jury found John Bush guilty of murder.
- The trial court sentenced John Bush to death by hanging.
- John Bush appealed the judgment to the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Did the trial court err by failing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter, improperly instructing that malice could be implied by law, and incorrectly instructing on the chain of causation when a supervening disease, not caused by the wound, contributed to the victim's death, thereby warranting a reversal of the murder conviction?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Hines
Yes, the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter, improperly instructing on implied malice, and providing an inadequate instruction on causation in relation to a supervening disease. The court first established that it is a court's duty to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter when evidence from which the jury might find facts constituting that offense exists, referencing prior cases like Buckner v. Commonwealth. Second, the court reiterated its stance from Farris v. Commonwealth and Buckner v. Commonwealth that malice must be left to the jury's determination as any other fact, and it is error to instruct the jury that the law implies malice from any fact or facts. The court found such an instruction misleading and detrimental. Third, regarding causation, the court affirmed the common law rule that if a wound is dangerous and death ensues, the inflictor is responsible even if improper treatment or victim's neglect contributed. However, if the wound is not dangerous in itself, and death results from improper treatment or a disease subsequently contracted that is not superinduced by or resulting from the wound, the accused is not guilty. In this case, the scarlet fever was not a natural consequence of the wound nor produced by any necessity created by it, representing a 'new and wholly independent instrumentality' that could break the chain of causation. The jury should have been clearly instructed that if death would not have resulted from the wound but for the intervention of the disease, they should not find the accused guilty of murder or manslaughter, but potentially lesser offenses of shooting and wounding included in the indictment under the Criminal Code.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the duties of trial courts in instructing juries in homicide cases, particularly concerning lesser included offenses, the determination of mens rea, and complex causation issues. By mandating instructions on all supported offenses, it protects defendants' rights to a fair trial reflecting all possible interpretations of evidence. The ruling on supervening causes establishes a critical limitation on criminal liability, emphasizing that a defendant is only responsible for the natural and proximate consequences of their actions, not for wholly independent interventions. This precedent helps refine the legal concept of proximate cause in criminal law, especially in medical malpractice or disease scenarios.
